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Abstract 
         Internet of Things communication is mainly based on a machine-to-machine pattern, 
where devices are globally addressed and identified. However, as the number of connected 
devices increase, the burdens on the network infrastructure increase as well. The major 
challenges are the size of the routing tables and the efficiency of the current routing protocols 
in the Internet backbone. To address these problems, an Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) working group, along with the research group at Cisco, are still working on the 
Locator/ID Separation Protocol as a routing architecture that can provide new semantics for 
the IP addressing, to simplify routing operations and improve scalability in the future of the 
Internet such as the Internet of Things. Nonetheless, The Locator/ID Separation Protocol is 
still at an early stage of implementation and the security Protocol e.g. Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec), in particular, is still in its infancy.  
Based on this, three scenarios were considered: Firstly, in the initial stage, each Locator/ID 
Separation Protocol-capable router needs to register with a Map-Server. This is known as the 
Registration Stage. Nevertheless, this stage is vulnerable to masquerading and content 
poisoning attacks. Secondly, the addresses resolving stage, in the Locator/ID Separation 
Protocol the Map Server (MS) accepts Map-Request from Ingress Tunnel Routers and Egress 
Tunnel Routers. These routers in trun look up the database and return the requested mapping 
to the endpoint user. However, this stage lacks data confidentiality and mutual authentication. 
Furthermore, the Locator/ID Separation Protocol limits the efficiency of the security protocol 
which works against redirecting the data or acting as fake routers. Thirdly, As a result of the 
vast increase in the different Internet of Things devices, the interconnected links between 
these devices increase vastly as well. Thus, the communication between the devices can be 
easily exposed to disclosures by attackers such as Man in the Middle Attacks (MitM) and 
Denial of Service Attack (DoS). 
This research provided a comprehensive study for Communication and Mobility in the 
Internet of Things as well as the taxonomy of different security protocols. It went on to 
investigate the security threats and vulnerabilities of Locator/ID Separation Protocol using 
X.805 framework standard. Then three Security protocols were provided to secure the 
exchanged transitions of communication in Locator/ID Separation Protocol. The first security 
protocol had been implemented to secure the Registration stage of Locator/ID separation 
using ID/Based cryptography method. The second security protocol was implemented to 
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address the Resolving stage in the Locator/ID Separation Protocol between the Ingress 
Tunnel Router and Egress Tunnel Router using Challenge-Response authentication and Key 
Agreement technique. Where, the third security protocol had been proposed, analysed and 
evaluated for the Internet of Things communication devices. This protocol was based on the 
authentication and the group key agreement via using the El-Gamal concept. The developed 
protocols set an interface between each level of the phase to achieve security refinement 
architecture to Internet of Things based on Locator/ID Separation Protocol. These protocols 
were verified using Automated Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications 
(AVISPA) which is a push button tool for the automated validation of security protocols and 
achieved results demonstrating that they do not have any security flaws. Finally, a 
performance analysis of security refinement protocol analysis and an evaluation were 
conducted using Contiki and Cooja simulation tool. The results of the performance analysis 
showed that the security refinement was highly scalable and the memory was quite efficient 
as it needed only 72 bytes of memory to store the keys in the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
device.  
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
         Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of globally identifiable physical objects (or Things) 
in their integration with Internet and their representation in the virtual or digital world. In 
order to build the IoTs, a wide range of technologies are involved such as, the Radio-
Frequency Identification (RFID) for location and device identification, improved personal 
and web area networking protocols, web technologies [Atzori et al., 2010]. These 
technologies help to build a virtual world of things on top of physical world where things 
through Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication talk to each other, through humans-to-
machine interactions providing information to humans or taking actions on human inputs, or 
acting as passive entities to provide data to intelligent entities.  
IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) standard is IEEE 
802.15.4; it allows the efficient use of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) over a low power 
and low rate wireless network on simple embedded devices through an adaptation layer and 
the optimization of released protocols [kim, 2008]. Adding to this, Wireless Sensor Network 
(WSN) is a technology that connects the virtual world and physical world where nodes can 
autonomously communicate among each other and with intelligent systems [Fei et al., 2016]. 
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is a routing architecture that provides new 
semantics for IP addressing, in order to simplify routing operations and improve scalability in 
the future of the Internet such as the IoT [Cisco-A, 2014].  Based on this, the thesis focuses 
on the IoT formed through the interconnection of IP-connected WSN based on the LISP 
network architecture.  
A conventional WSN is a network of sensor devices that senses and collects environmental 
data and cooperatively forward it to the router for further processing. However, these first 
generations WSN lack any standardization support and are mostly used for environmental 
monitoring and battlefields [Li et al., 2016]. Current WSNs are deployed in environments 
more close to humans and are aimed for applications such as building automation, bridge and 
tunnel monitoring, industrial automation and control and human sensing. The sink in current 
WSN such as LISP routers, i.e., ITR and ETR, can query data from sensor nodes and/or send 
control message to them [Kafle et al., 2010]. In other words, the sensor nodes are resource-
 
 
2 
 
constrained devices with limited storage and processing capabilities because its battery power 
is connected through weak links.  
1.1 Security Cryptography for the Internet of Things  
      More and more Internet of Things (IoT) devices will be connected to the network [Atzori 
et al. 2010]. The sensors distributed in the smart city will be able to communicate to another 
one with smartphones. Therefore, this channel needs security protocol which connect all 
these devices to the Internet [Cheng et al. 2017]. In order to establish this secure 
communication in the IoT, cryptography is used as a security measure.  
   The encryption methods for 6LoWPAN/IoT need to be developed more  in order to be  
adapted to the prevailing constraints in 6LoWPAN/IoT such power and low computing 
ability. This means that the un-optimised cryptography mechanisms will consume more 
resources and, therefore, shorten network life time [Ferguson et al. 2010]. Added to this ,the 
key used in encryption methods should  not be too short, otherwise, it will be easy to be 
broken by any attacks. As 6LoWPAN/IoT is the combination of WSN and the Internet, it is 
natural to apply these two network cryptography mechanisms for securing this network. To 
secure the link layer with several operations, WSN uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[Biryukoy et al 2010] modes. Most of these modes do not ensure integrity function. In order 
to protect network layer end-to end security, IPsec (Internet protocol Security) is utilised with 
transport and tunnel models. Formerly, the public key cryptography mechanism was thought 
to be too heavy for applying in WSN. Fortunately, recent developments [Ayuso et al. 2010]    
show a way to combine Rivest- Shamair–Adelman asymmetric encryption (RSA) and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) techniques with several modes that can be adjusted to network 
scenarios. Another problem that should be considered is the exchanging key. The Internet 
Key Exchange from Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is suggested for exchanging the key in 
the network [kundu et al. 2010]. However, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is not considered 
as a feasible solution because of its heavy signalling messages, which are unsuitable for the 
small packet size of 802.15.4 nature and the energy efficiency requirement. Besides, they 
lack scalable ability. Therefore, it is very necessary to analyse the threat towards the key at 
the bootstrap time when an adversary sits among other nodes without being required to be 
authenticated. 
Therefore, this research study used El-Gamal encryption which is lierally an asymmetric key 
algorithm for public key cryptography which is based on Diffie-Hellman key (DH) exchange. 
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Here, the public key of   𝐵  is 𝑔𝑏 and the computed DH key 𝑔𝑎𝑏 are used as one-time pad to 
encrypt a message 𝑚 ∈ ℤ𝑝
∗  which are  a group element of the respective group used, typically 
the encryption operation is defined as multiplying the message with the DH key or xoring the 
message with a hash of the DH key [Mikhail et al.2014]. The cipher text is then a tuple 
(𝑐1, 𝑐2)  consisting of the message encrypted with DH key 𝑚. 𝑔
𝑎𝑏  and the part 𝑔𝑎 of the DH 
key computed by the encrypting party. But it should be noted that the entire process is 
conducted by one party, i.e. the party encrypting the message. This party then sends the tuple 
(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = (𝑔
𝑎 , 𝑚. 𝑔𝑎𝑏) to the receiver 𝐵. Consequently, the advantages of useing El-Gamal 
in this research are the following [Mikhail et al 2014]:   
 It is homomorphic encryption scheme that allows multiplying plaintext hidden inside 
the cipher texts. When using the homomorphic property with an encryption of the 
identity element 1 of the group, it allows publicly re-randomising El-Gamal cipher 
text, i.e. obtaining new cipher texts for the same message which are unlikable to the 
original cipher text. Furthermore, using exponential El-Gamal obtained from EL-
Gamal by encoding the message 𝑚  as 𝑔𝑚, i.e. as exponent of the generator 𝑔, El-
Gamal can also be made additively homomorphic for polynomial sized message 
spaces (since decrypting  involves computing discrete logarithms)  
 There are efficient honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to prove 
properties of El-Gamal cipher texts without revealing the plaintext, e.g., equality of 
plaintexts. 
 EL-Gamal schemes provide a good security system that can exchange and compute 
the shared secret keys between the devices  
 El-Gamal schemes provide End-to-End Security encryption where only the 
communicating users can read the messages.  
 
1.2 Research Motivations  
         The IoT has become a ubiquitous term to describe the tens of billions of devices that 
have sensing or actuation capabilities and are connected to each other via the Internet. This 
massive increase has a direct effect on the network infrastructure and on the size of the 
routing table’s efficiency of the current routing protocols in the IoT. To address this problem, 
an IETF working group, along with the research group at Cisco, are working on LISP as a 
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routing architecture that provides new semantics for IP addressing in order to simplify 
routing operations and improve scalability in the future of the Internet such as the IoT [Chen 
et al 2016]. However, LISP is still at an early stage of implementation and the security 
protocol, in particular, is still in its beginning. Therefore, the main motivation of this research 
is divided into four main parts:  
 Part I: Investigating and analysing the level of security performance for the IoT 
based on LISP architecture and exposing its security vulnerabilities using X.805 
security framework architecture.  
 Part II: Modelling the security threats for the IoT based on LISP using Automated 
Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) tool in order to 
design efficient protocols against these threats. 
 Part III: Designing and simulating three security protocols namely the registration 
stage, the resolving stage and the communication procedure for the IoT based on LISP 
network architecture. 
 Part IV: Implementing the analysis and the verification of the designed protocols via 
AVISPA. 
1.3 Research Challenges  
         There has been a tremendous increase in the use of the IoTs, from the 365 million of 
users in 2000 to 50 billion devices in 2020 [Gartner, 2013]. Nevertheless, this rising growth 
faces serious challenges related to scalability, manageability, addressing/identity and 
robustness [Sundmaeker et al., 2010]. Furthermore, the distinct features of the openness and 
ubiquity of the current Internet are considered in fact a real problem as they do not offer 
suitable support for privacy and secure communication/mobility. Henceforth, different 
challenges arise that actually need to be faced in this research especially because this 
technology has unique characteristics such as low energy combustion, short size memory and 
small packet size. These challenges were tackled in the IoT as the following: 
 Communication/Mobility support in IP-WSN increases the fault tolerance capacity 
and connectivity, allowing extending and adapting network to change its location and 
infrastructure. These features are necessary to satisfy the dependability and scalability 
of the networks of the future world. Several solutions have been developed to support 
mobility, but actually they still present limitations mainly caused by the role of IP 
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address, as both node ID for session determination in the application/transport layer, 
and Locator in the network layer [Cisco-A, 2014]. For that reason, this research study 
is based on one of the first LISP that supports IP-WSN, which has defined 
compressed and size optimised mobility signalling. The mentioned approach presents 
the first challenge, since LISP messages are potentially dangerous. For example, a 
malicious host might be able to establish false updates of the location, thereby 
preventing some packets from reaching their intended destination, diverting some 
traffic to the intruder, or flooding third parties with unwanted traffic. Therefore, 
robust authentication protocols are very much needed to support the security in IP-
WSN in both scenario communication between the devices and mobility, i.e., when 
the devices are roaming to different domain. 
 
 Another challenge is the security privacy and trust in the IoT which can be the 
platform of choice for launching a variety of attacks targeting the IoT. At the most 
basic level, the IP-WSN devices will likely to have evolving naming and addressing 
schemes which can ensure that the names and addresses used are verifiable and 
authenticated. The research study is based on the LISP network architecture, as each 
LISP-capable router needs to register with a Map Server (MS), and this is known as 
the initial or the Registration stage. However, this stage is vulnerable to masquerading 
and content poisoning attacks which disclose the privacy and the trust in the 
WSN/IoT devices on the network. Consequently, an enhanced security protocol is 
needed to authenticate the MS with the source of the data (device) in a secure way. 
The MS and a globally distributed database that contains all known Endpoint 
Identifiers (EIDs) prefixes to Routing Locators (RLOC) mappings. Similar to the 
current Domain Name System (DNS), the Mapping systems are queried by LISP-
capable devices for EID-to-RLOC mapping [Cisco-B, 2013]. 
 One more challenge is the data confidentiality and encryption. The WSN/IoT devices 
transfer the data over the network, which in turn disclose the secret information from 
unauthorised device.  As the research study is based on LISP network architecture, 
the address resolving stage is therefore one of the important stages that allow the Map 
Server (MS) to accept Map-Requests from routers MS that has to look up the 
databased before returning the requested mapping to routers. However, this stage 
lacks data confidentiality and mutual authentication. Therefore, the implementation of 
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security protocol is needed to maintain the data confidentiality over the network. 
Besides, security protocol must be devised and applied to ensure the secure transfer of 
the transmitted data and guard it against unauthorized interference or misuse of the 
data being transmitted across the network.  
1.4 Research Questions  
         Targeting the unaddressed challenges in the IoT Security communications using LISP, 
this research intended to find out answers to a set of important questions as shown below: 
How to introduce an efficient architecture in term of routing size for the 
future of Internet and what are the main operational entities that are required 
in this architecture? 
This research question requires the presence of a new architecture for the future of Internet in 
order to contain huge numbers of the IoT devices. 
   
‘What are the Security vulnerabilities/threats in terms of Internet of Things 
that the devices can expose in Locator/ID Separation Protocol?’   
This research question requires using a specific mechanism in order to expose the security 
vulnerabilities for the IoT using Locator/ID Separation Protocol networks. 
 
‘How to provide End-to-End Secure communication between the Internet of 
Things devices?’ 
The answer to this question is designing a new security protocol which can provides, a high 
security communication to the IoT.  
 
‘Considering the proposed security protocols; how could the security 
protocols interface to a single refinement protocol which is integrated in order 
to approach a robust security for the Internet of Things using Locator/ID 
Separation Protocol?’ 
Therefore, the proposed approach aims at protecting the data and network from malicious 
attacks; this protection can be achieved by building a security interface between the proposed 
security protocols.  
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1.5 Research Aims and Objectives:  
      The aim of this research is to improve the security of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
networks using the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) and to provide comprehensive 
solution to mitigate outlined challenges. The above mentioned objectives encompass the 
following challenges, which must be specifically addressed:   
 The LISP architecture and security protocol are still at an early stage of development 
and implementation as mentioned earlier. Based on this fact, this research investigated 
the security issues arising from deploying the LISP architecture in the IoT. The 
investigation comes to discover a number of vulnerabilities that must be considered 
before moving to the implementation stage. 
 
 To secure the IoT and provide robust security against any security vulnerabilities, the 
research designed three security protocols for IoT using LISP network architecture. 
Firstly, security enhancement protocol is the registration protocol. It allowed the 
authentication of new IoT device that can join the network. This protocol was 
achieved by ID/Based Cryptography (IBC) [Tan et al., 2016]. Secondly, enhancement 
protocol attempted to secure the resolving addresses, when the devices send a data 
through the network, and this data must be encrypted and routers must trust and 
authenticate each other. This protocol was accomplished by Authentication and Key 
Agreement (AKA) [Li et al., 2017]. Thirdly, security protocol was developed to 
secure the communication between IoT devices by providing secure link and 
authentication. The protocol was achieved by El-Gamal cryptography [Mikhail et al 
2014].   
 
 The research proposed a set of interfaces between each level of the protocols in order 
to achieve a new security refinement protocol that can provide End-to-End secure 
communication for IoT using the LISP network architecture.    
 
 The study then evaluated the performance of those security protocols for the IoTs. In 
order to resolve the problem outlined in this study, the developed protocols and their 
accompanying security refinement protocol were validated in terms of both (formal 
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security analysis and AVISPA simulation tool). No security flaws were found, the 
performance analysis has been accompanied by Contiki and Cooja simulation tool.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
         The methodology of this study was proposed after a detailed analysis of the identified 
challenges with enough consideration given to multiple parameters in each studied area. The 
literature review has discussed many previous related works to the present study in order to 
evaluate the existing limitations and eventually present suitable solutions to minimise these 
limitations with the intention of improving the system security.  
Thus, the methodology of this research is divided into four phases. The understanding and 
conclusion of each phase have given motivation to address the next phase in a better manner.  
 The first phase illustrates the related literature provides a solid background of the IoT 
in order to understand the features of this technology. Furthermore, it discussed the 
existing IoT network architecture and the performance limitations of this technology. 
Added to this, it discusses different communication security protocols for the IoT 
devices. A comparative analysis of these protocols and techniques has been presented 
in order to avoid any security vulnerabilities in the design phase. 
 The second phase provides the IoT threats model which is based on LISP architecture 
using X.805 framework.  
 The third phase of this research introduces the designed security protocols that are 
based on LISP architecture. These designed protocols include three security protocols; 
two of them are enhanced security protocols. The first protocol is to secure the 
Registration stage and the second is to secure the Resolving stage in LISP 
architecture. While the third protocol is a new security protocol that is designed to 
secure the communication process between the IoT devices.  
 In the fourth phase, these protocols have been implemented through a simulation tool 
in order to achieve powerful IoT security refinement based on LISP architecture. 
The comparative simulation in this thesis is performed by using the Automated Validation of 
Internet Security Protocols (AVISPA) tool [AVISPA, 2013], which is a formal method based 
tool. The AVISPA has been chosen from a range of options such as Casper/FDR, SN2 
[Hossain, 2009], BAN logic [Burrows et al. 1990], and OPNET [Aboelela,2007]  tools, 
 
 
9 
 
because AVISPA provides a modular and expresses a formal language for specifying 
protocols and their security properties, and also integrates different back-ends that implement 
a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. Experimental results, carried out 
on a large library of Internet security protocols, indicate that the AVISPA tool is the state of 
the art for automatic security protocols. No other tool combines the same scope and 
robustness with such performance and scalability. 
1.7 Research Contributions  
         In order to reach the planned objective, the following contributions are realised:  
 Provided an overview of existing network architectures for the IoT and identifying the 
security issues and network operation in these architectures in chapter 2.  
 
 Provided a comprehensive security analysis via using X.805 security framework to 
analyse the security performance of the IoT based on the LISP network architecture. 
Furthermore, modelled the security threats for the IoT based on LISP network 
architecture using AVISPA tool in order to design efficient protocols against these 
threats in chapter 3 
 
 Designed security protocols for the IoT based on the LISP architecture. These 
protocols are divided as the following: 
1. The Initial stage; each LISP-capable router needs to be registered with a Map 
Server, known as the Registration stage. This stage is vulnerable to 
masquerading and content poisoning attacks. Consequently, the research has 
introduced an enhanced security protocol which addresses the security issue in 
the Registration stage in chapter 4. 
 
2. The Resolving addresses between the Routing Locators (RLoC) routers need to 
be addressed, e.g. when the RloC router (A) wants to send data to the RLoC 
router (B), both of these routers need to be authenticated so that the information 
can be reached from its original destination. Adding to this, LISP limits the 
efficiency of the security protocol which works against the redirection of the 
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data or acting as fake routers. Therefore, the research provides an enhanced 
security protocol to address this issue in chapter 5. 
 
3. Designeing an end to end secure communication protocol for the IoT nodes. In 
this research study, a new security protocol provides a message authentication 
scheme that relies on locally shared keys and symmetric cryptographic 
operations only it provides also also a level of security approximating and that 
of end-to-end security mechanisms in chapter 6. 
 
 The proposed protocols set an interface between each level of the protocol in order to 
achieve security refinement protocol to the IoT based on LISP architecture; these 
proposed protocols methods meet practicability, simplicity and the strong notions of 
security. Besides, a performance security refinement protocol analysis is provided, in 
order evaluated the developed protocol impact on the IP-Based Sensor Network (IP-
WSN) in chapter 7.   
 
 Provided a comparison of the recent security protocol for IoT against the present 
research study protocols in chapter 8. 
 
 The proposed protocols were verified using methods based on AVISPA tool 
[AVISPA, 2013]. The performance and evaluation have used Contiki and Cooja 
simulation tool [Contiki, 2014]. Contiki and Cooja have been chosen because they are 
an open source operating system for the IoT. They connect tiny low-cost and low-
power microcontrollers to the Internet. Indeed, they are a powerful toolbox used for 
building complex wireless systems.     
 
1.8 Thesis Outline  
         This thesis has eight chapters, beginning with an introductory chapter one that outlines 
the work in the IoT technologies. It spotlights the thesis contributions, aims, objectives and 
motivations. Each chapter opens with an introduction and issues discussion related to the 
studied research area; it goes on to review the achieved security protocols in IoT after 
proposing suitable solutions to the raised issues. A summary is provided at the end of the 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two provides a background of the IoT that is considered the base of this research. It 
foucs on the previous work in this area that dealt with the existing IoT networks architecture 
and the performance limitations of this technology. Besides, it discusses different 
communication security protocols for the IoT devices. A comparative analysis of these 
protocols and techniques has been presented in order to avoid any security vulnerabilities in 
the design phase. 
Chapter Three deals with the security Threats/Attacks analysis using X.805 framework for 
the IoT based on the LISP network architecture.   
Chapter Four introduces the enhanced security protocol for Registration stage in LISP 
Architecture. In this chapter, more than one protocol version is provided to reveal any 
possible attacks on the protocol. This protocol has been designed and verified via AVISPA 
tool.   
Chapter Five presents the enhanced security protocol for Resolving Addresses in LISP 
Architecture. Also, the chapter discloses different types of attacks by designing more than 
one protocol versions in order to test the protocol flexibility and robustness. The protocol has 
been verified by AVISPA tool.     
Chapter Six proposes a mutual authentication protocol for IoT communication based on the 
LISP network architecture. In addition, the chapter presents two versions of protocol and 
attack revealed by AVISPA tool. The second version therefore is designed to stop any 
security vulnerabilities that can affect the performance of the protocol.    
Chapter Seven proposes a new security refinement for the IoT based on LISP network 
architecture. This chapter provides a set interface of each protocol to create refinement, in 
order to provide a robust security to IoT devices which can resist any possible attacks by 
providing End-to-End Security. Also, it provides a performance analysis for the developed 
security refinement protocol to IP-WSN devices.   
Chapter Eight provides a comparison of the recent security protocol for IoT against the 
present research study protocols. 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis with a summary of the main contributions of this research 
study along with a discussion of future works and recommendations.  
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Chapter 2  
Internet of Things: Security Research in 
Heterogeneous Network   
 
2.1 Introduction 
        The Internet of Things (IoT) defines a highly interconnected network of 
heterogeneous devices where all communications seem to be possible, even unauthorized 
ones. As a result, the security requirement for such network is critical whilst common 
standard Internet security protocols are recognised as unusable in this type of networks, 
particularly due to some classes of the IoT devices with constrained resources. On the other 
hand, for the large numbers of applications of smart object, i.e., IoT, the networking 
technology must be scalable, interoperable, stable, manageable and flexible. Consequently, 
new mechanisms are needed to protect users/devices, servers and networks infrastructure. 
This means that the future of the IoT networks has to integrate communication, mobility and 
security. Therefore, the structure of this chapter is divided as the following: 2.2 is a brief 
background for the IoT. In section 2.3, the IPv6 on Sensor Nodes has been tackled together 
with 6LoWPAN. Section 2.4, however, discusses the main security issues in the IoT. Section 
2.5 provides a comprehensive study of the most common communication and mobility 
networks which have been used for the IoT devices and the key issues in communication and 
mobility. Section 2.6 discusses the type of mobility network in the IoT. Section 2.7 discusses 
the mobile IPv6 in the IoT and other related issues. Section 2.8 discusses the proxy MIPv6. 
Section 2.9 discusses the network mobility (NEMO). In section 2.10, LISP architecture is 
explained. Section 2.11 discusses the security in the IoT. Section 2.12 discusses the main 
security classification in the IoT. As for section 2.13, it verifies Security Protocol Tools. 
Finally, a summary concludes the chapter in section 2.14. 
 
2.2 Brief Background  
           Both Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication and IoT are results of the 
technological progress over the last decades, including not just the decreasing costs of 
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semiconductor components, but also the spectacular uptake of the Internet protocol (IP) and 
the broad adoption of the Internet.  
The application opportunities for such solutions are limited only by human imaginations. 
This is because; the role that M2M and IoT will have in industry and border society is just 
starting to emerge for a series of interacting and interlined reasons [Yang et al., 2016]. 
The Internet has undoubtedly had a profound impact on society and industries over the past 
two decades. Starting off as ARPANET [DARPA, 2017] connecting remote computers 
together, the introduction of the TCP/IP protocol suite, and later the introduction of services 
link email and the World wide Web (WWW), created a tremendous growth of usage and 
traffic. In conjunction with innovations that dramatically reduced the cost of semiconductor 
technologies and the subsequent extension of the Internet at a reasonable cost via mobile 
networks, billions of people and businesses are now connected to the Internet. Quite simply, 
no industry and no part of society have remained untouched by this technical revolution.  
At the same time the Internet has been evolving, another technology revolution has been 
unfolding the use sensors, electronic tags and actuators to identify digitally observe and 
control objects in the physical world.  
Decreasing rapidly costs of sensors and actuators means that where such components cost 
previously several Euros each, they are now a few cents only. In addition, these devices, 
though increasing in the computational capacity of the associated chipsets, are quite able now 
to communicate via fixed and mobile networks. As a result, they are able to communicate 
information about the physical world in near-time across networks with high bandwidth low 
relative cost.  
So undoubtedly, M2M solution will be seen for quite some time; we are now entering a 
period of time where the uptake of both M2M and IoT solutions will increase dramatically. 
The reasons for this are diagnosed as the following [Singh, 2012]: 
 An increased need for understanding the physical environment in its various forms, 
from industrial installations through to public spaces and consumer demands. These 
requirements are often driven by efficiency improvements and sustainability 
objectives, or improved health and safety. 
 The improvement of technology and improved networking capabilities. 
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 Reduced costs of components and the ability to collect and analyse the data they 
produce more cheaply. 
 
2.2.1 Machine-to-Machine 
        M2M refers to those solutions that allow communication between devices of the same 
type and specific application, all via wired or wireless commutation network. M2M solutions 
allow end to capture data about events from assets such as temperature or inventory levels. 
Typically, M2M is deployed to achieve productivity gains, reduce costs and increase safety 
or security. In fact, M2M has been applied in many different scenarios, including the remote 
monitoring and control of enterprise assets, or to provide connectivity of remote machine-
type devices [Atanasoy et al., 2017]. Remote monitoring and control have generally provided 
the incentive for industrial applications, whereas connectivity has been the focus in other 
enterprise scenarios such as connected vending machines or point-of-sale terminals for online 
credit card transactions. M2M solutions, however, do not generally allow for the broad 
sharing of data or connection of the devices in question directly to the Internet [Yang et al., 
2016]. 
2.2.2 Internet of Things 
        The IoT is a widely used term for a set of technologies, systems and design principles 
associated with the emerging wave of Internet-connected things that are based on the physical 
environment. In many respects, it can initially look the same as M2M communication 
connecting sensors and other devices to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
systems via wired or wireless networks [Zigler et al., 2015]. 
In contrast to M2M, however, IoT also refers to the connection of such systems and sensors 
to the broader Internet, as well as the use of general Internet technologies. In the longer term, 
it is envisaged that IoT ecosystem will emerge not different to today’s Internet, allowing 
things and real world objects to connect, communicate and interact with one another in the 
same way humans do via the web today [Clark et al., 2003]. Increased understanding of the 
complexity of the system in question, economies of scale and methods for ensuring 
interoperability in conjunction with key business drivers and governance structures across 
value chains will create wide-scale adoption and deployment of IoT solutions [Mahalle et al, 
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2014]. The Internet will no longer be only about people, media and content, but it will also 
include all real-world assets as intelligent creatures exchanging information, interacting with 
people, supporting business processes of enterprises and creating knowledge as shown in 
figure 2.1. The IoT is an extension to the existing Internet [Makinen, 2014]. 
IoT is actually about the technology; the remote monitoring and control is also about where 
these technologies are applied. IoT can have a focus on the open innovative promises of the 
technologies at play and also on advanced and complex processing inside very confined and 
close environments such as industrial automation. Visions put forward have included notions 
like a global open fabric of sensor and actuator services. These notions integrate many 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) deployments and provide different levels of aggregated 
sensor and actuator series in an open manner. The purpose is to achieve application 
innovation and use it not only in pure monitor and control type of applications, but also to 
enrich other types of services with contextual information [Kortuem et al., 2010]. However, 
IoT applications will not only rely on data and services from sensor and actuators alone. 
Equally important is the blend in of other information sources that have relevance from the 
viewpoint of the physical world. These can be data from Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) like road databases and weather forecasting systems and can be of both a static nature 
and a real-time nature. Even information extracted from social media like Twitter feeds or 
Facebook status updates that relate to real world observations can be fed into the same IoT 
system [Butun, 2017].  
 
Fig 2.1 Internet of Things [Kogatam, 2014]  
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2.3 The IPv6 on Sensor Nodes: 6LoWPAN  
        Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the most recent version of the Internet Protocol (IP). 
In other words, it is the communications protocol that provides an identification and location 
system for computers on networks and routes traffic across the Internet [Nicills et al., 2017]. 
With the introduction of 6LoWPAN compressed IPv6 in WSNs, resource constrained devices 
can be connected to the Internet [Khan et al., 2017]. This hybrid network of the Internet and 
the IPv6 connected constrained devices from the IoT [Sanchez, 2015]. Unlike the Internet 
where devices are mostly powerful and unlike typical WSN where devices are mostly 
resource constrained, the things in the IoT are extremely heterogeneous [Dawood et al., 2014]. 
The IoT device can be a typical sensor node, a light bulb, a microwave oven, an electricity 
meter, an automobile part, a smartphone, a PC or a laptop, a powerful server machine or even 
a cloud [Rantos et al., 2014]. Hence the numbers of potential devices that can be connected to 
the IoT are in hundreds of billions. Definitely, this requires the use of IPv6 [Xiaorong et al., 
2013], a new version of the Internet Protocol that increases the address size from 32 bits to 
128 bits (2 
128
 unique addresses). Also, a number of protocols are being standardized to fulfil 
the specific needs of the IoT [Dooley et al., 2013]. 
6LoWPAN allows the transmission of IPv6 packets over an IEEE 802.15.4 network. The 
main idea of 6LoWPAN is to introduce an adaptation layer to enable IPv6 communication in 
WSNs.  
2.4 Security Issues in Internet of Things  
        The security in the IoT is essentially linked to the ability of users to trust their 
environment. If users do not believe their connected devices and their information are 
reasonably secure from misuse or harm, the resulting erosion of trust causes a reluctance to 
use the Internet [Pishya 2017]. This has global consequences to electronic commerce, 
technical innovation, free speech and practically every other aspect of online activities. 
Indeed, ensuring security in the IoT products and services should be considered a top priority 
for the sector [Cheah, 2017].  
However, as we increasingly connect devices to the Internet, new opportunities to exploit 
potential security vulnerabilities grow. Poorly secured IoT devices could serve as entry points 
for cyberattack by allowing malicious individuals to re-program a device or cause it to 
malfunction. It is noteworthy that the poorly designed devices can expose user data to theft 
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by leaving data streams inadequately protected. Added to this, Failing or malfunctioning 
devices can also create security vulnerabilities. These problems are just as large or even 
larger for the small, cheap and ubiquitous smart devices in the IoT as they are meant for the 
computers that have been traditionally the endpoints of Internet connectivity. Along with 
potential security design deficiencies, the sheer increase in the number and nature of the IoT 
devices could increase the opportunities of attack. When coupled with the highly 
interconnected nature of the IoT devices, every poory secured device that is connected online 
will affect potentially the security and resilience of the Internet globally, and not just locally. 
Therefore, two main security issues can be summarised as the following: 
 Security Issue 1: Many IoT devices such as sensors and consumer items are designed 
to be deployed at a massive scale which is beyond that of traditional Internet-
connected devices. As a result, the potential quantity of interconnected links between 
these devices is unprecedented. Furthermore, many of these devices will be able to 
establish links and communicate with other devices on their own in an unpredictable 
and dynamic fashion. Consequently, security communication protocol is mostly 
required in the IoT. It is important that a receiver which is able to verify the IoT data 
is generated by trusted nodes. It is also necessary to encrypt the IoT data in transit. As 
this research study focuses on the network layer of the Open Systems Interconnection 
Model (OSI Model), the IPsec works well on non-Low-power devices which are not 
subject to severe constraints on host software size, processing and transmission 
capacities. IPsec supports Authentication Header (AH) for authenticating the IP 
header and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) for authenticating and encrypting 
the payload [Djeddai et al., 2016]. The main issues of IPsec are twofold processing 
power and key management. Since these tiny IoT devices do not process huge number 
of data or communicate with many different nodes, it is not well understood if 
complete implementation of Security Association Database (SADB), policy-debase 
and dynamic key-management protocol are suitable for these small battery powered 
devices. In addition, given existing constraints in IoT environments, IPsec might not 
be suitable to be use in such environments, especially that IoT node devices might be 
able to operate all IPsec algorithms on its own capability either Full-Function Device 
(FFD) or Reduced-Function Devices (RFD). Bandwidth is a very rare resource in IoT 
environments. The fact that IPsec requires another header (AH or ESP) in every 
packet makes its use problematic in IoT environments [Aouini et al., 2016]. Besides, 
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IPsec requires two communicating peers to share the secret key that is established 
dynamically with the Internet key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol. Thus, it has an 
additional packet overhead incurred by IKEv2 packets exchange [Rao et al 2016].   
      
 Security Issue 2: In the IoT, there are privacy, integrity and disclosed data 
(confidentiality) issues. This is because of the features of the IoT as they are randomly 
deployed by users in the network. Thus, the decentralisation of these nodes in most 
cases can create many privacy and security issues. Therefore, the majority of the IoT 
applications need to take into considerations the support of mechanisms to carry out 
the authentication, authorization and key management. In addition, due to the reduced 
capabilities from the constrained devices enabled with Internet connectivity, a higher 
protection of the edge networks needs to be considered with respect to the global 
network.  In other words, during the development of IPv4, information Technology 
security is not one of the focus points [Siddika et al., 2017]. This had caused a lot of 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited in IPv6 implementation. Even though a lot of 
methods such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Secure Shell (SSH) are introduce to 
overcome this weakness, still it they are not sufficent. In a network, five phases are 
involved in exiting IPv4 environment [Shaharuddin et al., 2017], which are 
reconnaissance, scanning, Gaining access Maintaining access, and Clearing track. The 
first two phases involve a process of scanning for vulnerabilities in the host networks. 
One of these vulnerabilities are exposing the process of gaining access is executed.  
Freely available on the internet, port scanning tools like Nmap [Jicha et al., 2016] and 
Wireshark [Beeharry et al., 2016] can bused to execute the reconnaissance and 
scanning phase. As the number of IPv4’s addresses is small, scanning a class C 
network takes only a few minutes. This show how vulnerable is IPv4 network, with a 
few minute all open access can be expose. Furthermore, Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) and internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) are two protocols in layer 4 
used for finding a host’s hardware address and protocol for responding to errors in 
datagram respectively [Nikolenko et al., 2016]. In an attack these two protocols can 
be exploited by associating the packet with a fake address resulting in other packet to 
be mistakenly sent to a rogue address. Besides, IP fragmentation referred to IP 
datagram that is broken up to smaller size. This is to enable the IP datagram to pass 
through the data link medium which has a limit on the size of transiting frame called 
 
 
19 
 
Maximum Transmission unit (MTU). An attacker can use this features to evade from 
being detected by firewall and Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS).  Also, 
broadcast features in IPv4 can also be exploited. A huge number of frames are 
broadcasted through a network and are now flooding the network system. However 
this large number of frames looks like a legitimate packet will hinder the hosts from 
receiving a valid packet. Likewise, the packet in IPv4 can be intercepted during its 
transmission by eavesdropping on the network. This attack is called Man in the 
Middle Attack (MitM) and it occurs as a result of the lack of authentication 
mechanism provided in IPv4 protocol [Shuai et al., 2016]. And it can be done 
applying ARP attack as explained above. 
In order to prevent all vulnerabilities, extra tools are used to harden the network 
security in IPv4 environment. Application like Network Address Translation (NAT) is 
used to overcome the shortage of IPv4’s addresses. Firewall and IDS are deploying to 
protect and detect any anomalies in the networks. Access Control List (ACL) can be 
applied in network to drop any packets that can cause security problems in the 
networks.         
      
2.5 Communications and Mobility in the Internet of Things  
        A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a multi-hope network and is made up of a number 
of wireless sensor devices. With the constant increase in demands for various global services, 
it has become urgent to connect these wireless sensor devices to Internet [Khan et al., 2014]. 
Since IP is the facto standard for the Internet, it is quite reasonable to believe that IP could be 
the future for WSN [Bag et al., 2009]. However, and due to limited resources, implementing 
the heavy IP protocol in WSNs has become a big challenge [Pradeska et al., 2017]. The IPv6 
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) enables the wireless 
connection to be one of the key technologies for WSNs [Twayej et al., 2017]. Therefore, this 
section, reviews the recent mobility and communication architecture that supports the IoT 
devices and defines the suitable network architecture to the IoT network.  
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2.6 Types of Mobility in Internet of Things  
     The two types of mobility that are possible in 6LoWPAN networks itself are micro and 
macro mobility [Shelby et al., 2009]. Micro mobility in 6LoWPAN refers to the mobility of a 
node within 6LoWPAN where IPv6 prefix remains the same. Likewise, macro mobility refers 
to the mobility between two 6LoWPAN networks with different IPv6 prefix. In this case, the 
handover is presented, while in the second, joint roaming and handover mobility are 
presented in place as figure 2.2 shows. The same definition regarding macro and micro 
mobility of nodes can be applied for the edge routers. From the network perspective, there is 
both node and network mobility. Network mobility occurs when the edge router changes its 
point of attachment [Mulligan et al., 2010], while all nodes from 6LoWPAN network remain 
essentially the same.  
 
Fig 2.2 Mobility Types Inside 6LoWPAN [Shelby et al., 2009] 
The above Figure 2.2 shows the two types of mobility, i.e., the macro and the micro. In case 
of macro, when the edge router changes its point of attachment, the IPv6 address also 
changes and this result in a change of node’s IP addressing. In other words, once the node 
changes its point of attachment, there are several things to be done in order to resume data 
flows: re-establishing a link by assigning IPv6 address by bootstrapping node, updating of 
DNS (Domain Name System) settings with new IPv6 and notification to application layers 
etc. When micro mobility takes place, link layer is sufficient to cope with mobility without 
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any notification to the network layer. In 6LoWPAN networks, some techniques can be used 
in future to deal with micro mobility inside LoWPAN itself. 
IEEE 802.15.4, a standard which specifies the physical layer and media access 
control for low-rate wireless personal area network) intends to leave mobility issues to the 
network layer, and all topology changes are node controlled. Neighbour Discovery (ND) 
[Mulligan et al., 2010] for 6LoWPAN is used to cope with a micro mobility in extended 
LoWPAN networks. Here, ND proxy technique and synchronization are used between routers 
allowing a node to save the same IPv6 address, no matter where the point of attachment is. In 
contrast to this, macro mobility always includes changes of IPv6 address of a node. This is 
especially hard to deal with from the perspective of an application. If a node is acting as a 
client, the best way that also fits 6LoWPAN is that whenever node detects change in IPv6 
address, the application restarts itself. However, this is not so practical for the case where the 
node is acting as a server due to needs that servers must be reliable 100% of time. In this 
scenario and within 6LoWPAN network, application is dealt on application level using 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) which is a communications protocol for signalling designed, 
for the purpose of controlling multimedia communication sessions. SIP can support any type 
of single-media or multi-media session, including 6LoWPAN [Zhang et al., 2015], Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI). The latter is a string of characters used to identify a resource. Such 
identification enables interaction with representation of the resource over a network, typically 
the World Wide Web, using specific protocols. Therefore, URI is important to 6LoWPAN to 
as it access the resource of the devices online [Liu et al., 2016]. Furthermore, when the user 
enters the URL in the Web browser, the Domain Name System (DNS) server uses its 
resources to resolve the name into the IP address for the appropriate Web server. The user 
can get just connected through a domain name server, also called a DNS server or name 
server, which manages a massive database that maps domain names to IP addresses [Fireze et 
al., 2011]. 
2.7 Mobile IPv6  
         Mobile IPv6 basic operations consist of the following steps. First, the mobile node 
should detect the arrival in a new IPv6 network. This step is known as movement detection 
and it is based on the reception of a new router advertisement. Then, the mobile node can 
create a new care-of address and perform a duplicated address detection procedure to ensure 
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that this address is unique on the link. Finally, the mobile node registers this new care-of 
address to the home agent by the means of binding update and binding acknowledgment 
messages. Mobile IPv6 also defines an alternative to bidirectional tunnel known as route 
optimization [Imran et al 2016]. Corresponded node is a node that is intended to 
communicate with mobile node it may be mobile or a stationary node.  In this mode, the 
mobile node and its correspondent communicate directly without the help of the home agent. 
For this, the mobile node registers its current binding at the correspondent by exchanging 
binding update and acknowledgment. Once the registration with a correspondent is complete, 
the mobile node sends its data to this correspondent by using its care-of address as source 
address and adding its home address in a destination option extension header. Similarly, the 
correspondent sets the care-of address of the mobile node as the destination address and adds 
the home address in a routing type 2 header. The route optimization mode allows the shortest 
communications path to be used between the mobile node and its correspondent and reduces 
the congestion potentially experienced by the home agent. The above discussed processes are 
all presented in the following Figure 2.3. 
 
Fig 2.3 MIPv6 in 6LoWPAN [Shelby et al., 2009] 
However, each correspondent is required to implement additional mechanisms to support the 
route optimization of Mobile IPv6. At each handover, the mobile node is also required to 
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update its bindings at all of its correspondent which may generate large control traffic 
overhead. Due to those limitations, any network protocol should protect itself against misuses 
of its features and mechanisms. In Mobile IPv6, binding updates with the home agent should 
use an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) security association to protect the 
integrity and authenticity of the binding updates and acknowledgments [Raza et al., 2011]. 
Similarly, the binding updates with correspondent are secured by the return rout ability 
procedure which ensures that the sender of a new binding update is reachable through both its 
home address and claimed care-of address. Security consideration in 6LoWPAN is currently 
investigated by the research community [Imran et al., 2016]. However, when IPsec ESP is 
used, the following headers, e.g. mobility header, inner IPv6 header, transport header, etc. are 
encrypted and as such cannot be compressed by 6LoWPAN [Isah et al., 2015]. Resulting 
packets would only leave few bytes for data and the overall system is likely to generate 
fragmentation. Security consideration in Mobile IPv6 for the IoT and 6LoWPAN is therefore 
really challenging and it requires new architecture network that is integrated with the IoT.       
2.8 Proxy MIPv6 
        In M2M world, it is quite often to change a point of attachment in the same domain, (for 
example the operator), as IETF has devolved standardized Proxy MIPv6 that consists of a 
local hierarchical structure of routers which handles mobility on behalf of nodes. It is very 
suitable, therefore, to be used for LoWPAN networks as it allows LoWPAN edge routers to 
proxy MIPv6 for attached LoWPAN nodes. The PMIPv6 allows LoWPAN to communicate 
with different networks request some services, such as downloading file, making connection, 
web page, or other resources from different servers [Huang et al., 2017].  
Figure 2.4 shows the mobility aspect of the LoWPAN devices in PMIPv6. The transaction 
messages have been summarised in 4 steps as the following: Step (1) assumes that the 
LoWPAN node wants to change its position to a new segment on a different subnet.  Step (2) 
PMIPv6 uses Router Solicitation/Router Advertisement (RS/RA) communication between 
mobile nodes and Mobile Access GWs (MAGs) to detect when one of the mobile nodes has 
changed its point of attachment. In order to apply MIPv6, each LoWPAN router must act as 
MAG providing separate 64 bit prefix address for each mobile node. Step (3) Mobile Access 
GWs send proxy binding updated towards Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) on behalf of the 
mobile nodes attached to them. Step (4) the mapping is then done in the LMA between this 
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address and the temporary address of the visited MAG. In each moment, there is a 
bidirectional channel between MAGs and LMA enabling LMA to send traffic towards mobile 
nodes static addresses (mobile node Home Address). Moreover, the basic idea is that the edge 
routers in 6LoWPAN, which are full of IPv6 (MIPv6 as well) sufficient to cope with network 
mobility in general, i.e., routers and nodes attached to them.  
 
 
Fig 2.4 PMIP in 6LoWPAN [Shelby et al., 2009] 
However, in MIPv6 the signalling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding 
Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access gateway and the local mobility 
anchor must be protected using end-to-end security association offering integrity and data 
origin authentication. Therefore, as in Mobile IPv6, the use of the IPsec is to protect a mobile 
node's data traffic in PMIPv6 [Raza et al., 2017]. 
 
2.9 Network Mobility (NEMO) 
        To begin with, NEMO has introduced the term mobile router and mobile nodes within 
mobile network and are called Mobile Networks Nodes (MNN). If NEMO is applied in the 
6LoWPAN network, even though each 6LoWPAN node is not a running mobility protocol, it 
 
 
25 
 
can keep up session continuity for all the mobile network nodes and even when the mobile 
router changes dynamically its point of attachment to the Internet through the 6LoWPAN 
mobile router [Ye et al., 2017]. NEMO protocol [Hasan et al., 2017] enables the extension of 
the home agent so that the agent becomes able to work with prefixes as with Home Addresses 
of mobile nodes. Figure 2.5 shows the communication flows between nodes when using 
NEMO. The NEMO is applied when mobile router, in its communication with home agent, 
negotiates the prefixes which are forwarded back to it. Home agent then forwards all packets 
that match with bound prefix of MNNs towards mobile router. This can be a good solution 
for network mobility in 6LoWPAN when mobile nodes and edge router all together are 
changing their point of attachment. In 6LoWPAN, edge router becomes a mobile router that 
binds new address in the visited network with home LoWPAN prefix as shows in figure 2.5. 
In practice, this means that there is no change visible inside LoWPAN network when network 
mobility occurs, because LoWPAN still uses the same prefix as in its home network. Home 
agent then transfers all the data destined to the same prefix using a tunnel between HA and 
edge router. The disadvantage of NEMO is that it cannot deal with individual node mobility 
on behalf of LoWPAN nodes unless MIPv6 is installed itself on nodes or if home agent or 
PMIP is used. Prefix delegation can be done by The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
version 6 (DHCPv6). 
 
Fig 2.5 NEMO in 6LoWPAN [Shelby et al., 2009] 
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However, in terms of security, these binding updates are vulnerable to different attacks as 
many malicious users send fabricated binding to fool the Mobile Router (MR), the Home 
Agent (HA) and the Corresponding Node (CN). Although the path between the MR and the 
HA is protected by IPsec tunnel, the paths between the MR and CN, between the HA and CN 
and between a mobile network node and the MR remain unprotected. Nonetheless, IPsec will 
be very heavy and expensive to use on the IoT or 6LoWPAN network.  
2.10 Locator/ID Separation Protocol 
       Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is another approach to split the current Internet 
namespace into separate identifier and addressing entities that have been proposed [Kafle et 
al., 2010]. In order to understand the Architecture LISP, it is necessary to note that LISP uses 
dynamic tunnelling encapsulation approach rather than requiring the pre-configuration of 
tunnel end-points. It is, in fact, designed to work in a multi-homing environment and support 
communications between LISP and non-LISP sites inter working [Cisco-A, 2014].  
To improve routing scalability while facilitating flexible address assignments in multi-homing 
and mobility scenarios, the LISP describes changes to the Internet architecture in which IP 
addresses are replaced by Routing Locators (RLOCs) for routing through the global Internet and 
by Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) for identifying network sessions between devices [Cisco-A, 
2014]. As shown in Figure 2.6, three important components exist in the LISP environment: the 
LISP sites (EID space), the non-LISP sites (RLOC space) and the LISP Mapping System which 
includes Map Servers and databases [Raheem et al., 2014]. The three components are explained 
as the following: 
 The LISP sites (EID space): These represent customer end-sites in exactly the same way 
that end-sites are defined today. However, the IP addresses in the EID space are not 
advertised to the non-LISP sites, but are published in the LISP Mapping Systems which 
perform the EID-to-RLOC mapping. The LISP functionality is deployed on the site's 
gateway or edge routers. Therefore, based on their roles, two types of routers are defined 
and as follows: Firstly, the Ingress Tunnel Routers (ITRs) which receive packets from 
hosts and send LISP packets towards the Map Server. Secondly, the Egress Tunnel 
Routers (ETRs), which receive LISP packets from the Map Server and pass them to hosts 
[Cisco-A, 2014] 
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 Non-LISP sites (RLOC space): They represent current sites where the IP addresses are 
advertised and used for routing purposes. 
 LISP Mapping Systems: These are represented by Map Servers (MS) and a globally 
distributed database that contains all known EID prefixes to RLOC mappings. Similar to 
current DNS, the Mapping systems are queried by LISP-capable devices for EID-to 
RLOC mapping.  
 
 
Fig 2.6 the LISP Network Architecture Design [Cisco-A, 2014] 
 
2.10.1 Address Registration Procedure: 
The functionality of the LISP goes through two stages:  
1. The EID prefix Configuration and ETR Registration Stage : 
As explained in [Cisco-A,2014], the EID Prefix Configuration and ETR Registration Stage is an 
ETR publishes its EID-prefixes on a Map Server (MS) by sending LISP Map-Register messages 
which include the ETR's RLOC and a list of its EID-prefixes. Initially, it has been presumed that 
prior to sending a Map-Register message, the ETR and the Map Server must be configured with 
shared secret or other relevant authentication information. Upon the receipt of a Map-Register 
from an ETR, the Map Server checks the validity of the Map-Register message and 
acknowledges it by sending a Map-Notify message. When registering with a Map-Server, an 
ETR might request a no-proxy reply service which implies that the Map Server will forward all 
the EID-to-RLOC mapping requests to the relevant ETR rather than dealing with them.  
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Therefore, Figure 2.7 shows the registration operation which can be summarised as the 
following; Step (1) the Egress Tunnel Router (ETR) detects the new host Endpoint Identifiers 
(EID) 178.17.4.2/24 on the network. Step (2) Routing Table (RT) updates and registers the new 
EID with the current Router Locator (RLOC). Step (3) The ETR sends Map-Register (MR) 
messages including the ETR RLOC and a list of its EID to the Map-Server (MS).  Step (4) MS 
checks the validly of a Map-Register message and acknowledges it by sending a Map-Notify 
(MN) message to the ETR.   
However, the security-related research is still at an early stage. The research in [Raheem et al, 
2013] has highlighted the potential threats to be addressed at a later stage of this research. 
Therefore, the main security registration issues is whern an LISP-capable router publishes all its  
hosts EID to the Map Server via a Map–Resister  as is shows figure 2.7 in step (3). For a secure 
Registration, two information elements are critical: the hosts EID and the routers address RLOC. 
Certainly, a malicious router might spoof different RLOC and supply wrong EID-Prefixes to the 
MS. This is very similar to poising attacks against Domain Name Server (DNS) or router table 
[Maino et al., 2012]. To stop such attacks, this research has provided a security enhancement 
protocol to the registration stage. It allowed the authentication of new IoT device that joins the 
network. This protocol was achieved by ID/Based Cryptography (IBC) [Tan et al., 2016].  The 
IBC helps to certify the messages sender as the real owner of the RLOC that will update the Map 
Server. The main advantage of using the IBC over traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is 
that since the public key will be derived from the nodes identifiers, IBC eliminates the need for a 
public key distribution infrastructure; more details are in section 2.12.1.1     
 
Fig 2.7 ETR Address Registration Procedure 
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2. The Address Resolving Stage: 
Once a Map Server has EID-prefixes registered by its client ETRs, the following   resolving 
operational steps take place, as figure 2.8 shows. Step (1) the Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) 
send Map-Request to the Map-Server (MS), then the MS first checks to see if the required EID 
matches a configured EID-prefix. If there is no match, the Map Server returns a negative Map-
Reply message to the ITR. Step (2) In case of a match, the MS re-encapsulates and forwards 
the resulting Encapsulated Map-Request to one of the registered ETRs. Step (3) ETR return 
Map-Replay directly to the requested ITR. Step (4) Data exchange between ITR and ETR 
[Cisco-A, 2014].   
 
 
Fig 2.8 the No Proxy Map Server Processing 
 
The main security resolving stage issues occurs as, there is no mechanism such as encryption/ 
or encoding between the ITR and ETR routers. And this causes a lack of data confidentiality 
and mutual authentication. Therefore, the attacker is able to capture and modify all the packets 
exchanged between an Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) and Egress Router (ETR) and between the 
X Router Tunnel Router (XTR) and the mapping system (MS). Thus, an enhancement protocol 
attempts to secure the resolving addresses, when the devices send a data through the network; 
this data must be encrypted and routers must trust and authenticate each other. This protocol 
was accomplisheqd by Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) [Li et al 2017]. 
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2.10.2 Address Query and Communication: 
        Figure 2.9 shows the communication between Mobile Sensor devices in the case of LISP 
enabled sites. To explain this, it is better to assume that Mobile Sensor Node (MSN) EID 1 
wants to communicate with WSN EID 2. In order to establish the communication, the following 
steps show the procedures of establishing this communication [Fuller et al., 2013]:  
 
Figure 2.9 The Communication between Mobile Sensor devices (LISP Sites) 
Step (1): the MSN device which is in the remote LISP enabled site sends queries through DNS 
to get the IP address of the destination server that is deployed at the LISP enabled EID 2.  Step 
(2): the traffic that originated from the devices (MSN) is steered towards the Local LISP 
enabled device (usually devices default gateway). However, the LISP device performs first a 
lookup for the destination 178.17.4.2 in its routing table. Step (3): the ITR receives valid 
mapping information from the mapping database and populates local map-cache. If the mapping 
exists, the packet is encapsulated using that map-cache policy and then forwards it. If no 
mapping exists, the ITR sends a map request for the destination EID in query to its configured 
Map-Resolver. Furthermore, each entry has associated priority and weight values that are 
controlled by the destination site to influence the way inbound traffic is received from the 
transport infrastructure. The priority is used to determine if both ETR devices can be used to 
receive LISP encapsulated traffic destined to Local EID subnet. The weight allows tuning the 
amount of traffic received by each ETR in load-balancing which is shown in Figure 2.9. Step 
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(4): the ITR performs LISP encapsulation of the original IP traffic and sends it to transport 
infrastructure, destined to one RLoCs of the EID 2 ETR. Step (5): The ETR receives the packet, 
de-capsulate it and sends it to the site towards the destination EID2. 
2.10.3 Mobility Transaction: 
        Figure 2.10 shows the mobility aspect of the IoT devices in LISP network architecture. The 
mobility procedure has been summarised in 6 steps as the following: Step (1) assumes that the 
Mobile Sensor Node (MSN) EID 2 wants to change its position to a new segment on a different 
subnet. Step (2) the 10.10.2.2 is a LISP router which is configured with a dynamic-EID range of 
addresses that are acceptable to move, and then the XTR detects the new host movement. Step 
(3) Once XTR 10.10.2.2 notices that it has a new server, it updates the new EID and it installs a 
specific /32 address in its routing table. Step (4) the XTR 10.1.0.2.2 sends queries to register the 
/32 address with the map-register message with the map server, then the map database checks the 
data and updates old location with the new location. Step (5) the map server now sends a map-
notify message back to the 10.10.1.1 XTR and lets it know that it is no longer responsible for 
178.17.4.2. Step (6) the XTR 10.10.1.1 updates the routing table and removes old EID by 
installing ‘null0’. 
 
Fig 2.10 Mobility Signalling 
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Consequently, LISP network architecture supports IoTs/6LoWPAN devices in both 
communication and mobility and it adopts a huge number of devices at the same time. 
However, the LISP is still at an early stage of implementation and the protocols security, in 
particular, is still in its first beginning [Raheem et al., 2014].  
2.11 Security in Internet of Things  
       As demonstrated earlier in the study, the IoT offers connectivity for both human-to-
machine and machine-to-machine communications. Moreover, everything in the near future 
is likely to be equipped with small embedded devices which are able to connect to the 
Internet. Such ability is useful for various domains in our daily life; from building automation, 
smart city and surveillance system to all wearable smart devices [Roman et al., 2011]. 
However, the more the IoT devices are deployed, the greater our information system is at risk. 
Indeed, a significant number of devices in IoT are vulnerable to security attacks, such as DoS 
and replay attacks, security attacks that are the result of their constrained resources and the 
lack of protection methods. As such, they will definitely lead to sensor battery depletion and 
intern to poor performances of sensing application. However, the IoT security has been one 
of the most discussed and yet pending issues, even after the existence of protocols for IPv6 
network security such as IPSec, and also for datagrams, i.e., UDP or CoAP [Betzler et al., 
2016] such as DTLS [Ngoepe et al., 2017]. Security for the IoT is not excessively extended 
and deployed because of the difficulties in configuring (IPSec) for end users and the lack of 
scalable certificate management for DTLS [Kothmay et al., 2013]. Consequently, the 
majority of the Internet traffic continues being transmitted in plain text, i.e., unprotected. 
Thus, to provide the security in IoT such as End-to-End (E2E) communications, it is 
necessary to clarify and explain the currently proposed security protocols in this technology. 
Section 3.10 discusses the main security protocols classification in the IoT.  
2.12 The Security Protocols Classification in Internet of Things  
       The existing security proposers in the IoT are categorized into two main types: security 
that relies on asymmetric key schemes and security that pre-distribute symmetric keys as 
shown in Figure 2.11. This section describes the two first levels of the security taxonomy in 
the IoT.  
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Figure 2.11 Security Classification of IoT Network 
 
 Asymmetric Key Schemes (AKS): The key schemes based on asymmetric 
cryptography, also known as Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) are considered as a 
very common approach to establish a secure communication between two (or 
more) parties. They employ asymmetric algorithms and are widely deployed in 
the conventional Internet. The applicability AKS in IoT has one major 
inconvenience, which is the computation cost and energy consumption. In spite of 
expensive operations, a lot of researches still seek to apply AKS in the context of 
the IoT. The proposed approaches can be classified into two categories: the first 
category is key transport based on public key encryption, which is quite similar to 
the traditional key transport mechanism, the category requires from the public 
key to security transport information. Various key establishment techniques have 
been proposed for the IoT, ranging from raw public key usage to complex 
implementations in X.509 standard [Uahhabi et al., 2016]. The second category 
however, is a Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques, in which a shared 
secret is derived among two or more parties. In this category, we notice obviously 
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the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [Qin et al., 2017], and its 
variants are obviously noticed and will be mentioned later in this chapter.  
 
 Symmetric Key Pre-distribution Schemes: For asymmetric approaches, 
researchers propose also multiple techniques using symmetric key establishment 
mechanisms in the IoT security. Symmetric approaches often assume that nodes 
involved in the key establishment share common credentials. The pre-shared 
credentials might be a symmetric key or some random bytes flashed into the 
sensor before its deployment. This category can be divided into two main sub-
categories: The first category is probabilistic key distribution. In other words, it is 
the mechanisms that distribute security credentials (keys or random bytes) chosen 
randomly from a key pool to constrained nodes [Saikia et al., 2016]. During their 
initial communication, each two nodes may discover a common key, with certain 
probability, to establish a secure communication. The second category is the 
deterministic key distribution. In this sub-category, a deterministic design is 
applied to create the key pool and to distribute uniformly the keys as such each 
two nodes share a common key [Sharma et al., 2016]. 
 
2.12.1 Asymmetric Key Schemes  
        The position of asymmetric cryptography or PKC is clear in the conventional Internet. 
However, it is not the case in the context of the IoT because of its expensive encryption and 
verification operations [Christianah et al., 2014]. Nevertheless, the development and 
implementation of PKC in the IoT have never been stopped. In fact, new improvements of 
several primitives, i.e., Elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) and NTRU continue to reduce 
the cost of cryptographic operations, so the PKC approach is of a growing interest for 
constrained environments [Jayapandia et al., 2016]. A brief study in the following sections 
demonstrates various possible forms of asymmetric key schemes in the IoT. 
2.12.1.1 Key Transport Based on Key Encryption  
        This sub-category looks into the key establishment schemes where the public key is used 
to transport secret data or to negotiate a session key. Several methods are used to generate the 
pair of public and private keys [Walsh, 2016]. These mechanisms are classified based on the 
public/private keys generation methods.  
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Figure 2.12 gives an example of a communication scenario between two entities A and B. In 
this scenario, A and B can directly use the public keys to create an encrypted channel. The 
Certificate Authority (CA) may not be needed to verify the identity of the message 
transmitter even when the certificates are supported. It should be noted that this method can 
be expensive for resource-constrained-sensor nodes, in particular when using a traditional 
algorithm like RSA [Giridhar et al., 2016]. Without a verifiable relationship between the 
public key and the identity, (i.e., ID-based cryptography, cryptographic-based ID or with CA 
mediation), this approach becomes vulnerable to the Man in the Middle Attack (MitMA). 
Indeed, both A and B cannot authenticate each other’s identity. An attacker may generate any 
public/private keys and pretend to be A when communicating with B. Many security 
protocols have been proposed to secure the IoT networks, [Cao et al. 2015] has proposed an 
authentication and mutual key establishment scheme for IP based wireless sensor network 
(6LoWPAN). The authentication has been achieved in 6LoWPAN via Eliptic Cure 
Cryptosystem (ECC), although, public key cryptography is costly in terms of WSN 
(6LoWPAN) as shown in [Mstafa et al., 2017], [Baker et al., 2016] and [Haripriya et al., 
2016].  
 
Fig 2.12 Public Key Transport Mechanism [Stallings, 2011] 
 
A-  Raw Public key encryption  
        Some mechanisms assume that the public key has been distributed beforehand or 
has been used out-of-band communications [Huany et al., 2017]. These mechanisms 
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offer a small number of message exchanges but they are not scalable, because the 
public keys of all devices should be known by each device. Some ‘‘raw public key 
encryption’’ mechanisms, i.e., NtruEncrypt [Yin et al., 2014] have been 
recommended for WSNs. The author in [Nimala et al., 2016] has presented very 
similar approach to the RSA algorithm (widely used cryptosystem), which is also 
based upon the hardness of the factorization problem. Furthermore, the scheme 
requires the same energy consumption for decryption operations as RSA with the 
same security level [Yajam et al., 2016]. However, it offers much faster mechanism 
for encryption operations because only one squaring is required to encrypt a message. 
NtruEncrypt is a cryptosystem which is known to be a lattice-based alternative to 
RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) primitives [Mstafa  et al., 2017]. The 
mechanism is highly efficient and suitable for the most limited-resource devices such 
as smartcards and RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) tags. In [Bafandehkar et al., 
2013], the author gives a comparison of the three PKC mechanisms proposed for 
constrained devices: The author NtruEncrypt and ECC. The results show that 
NtruEncrypt leads to the smallest average power consumption. However, this 
cryptosystem often requires large-size messages, and might result in packet 
fragmentation at lower layers and many re-transmissions in the presence of 
communication errors [Liu et al., 2016].   
 
B-  Certificate-based Encryption  
 
       Certificate-based protocols are a popular choice to establish a secure 
communication between two entities over Internet. The trust relationship between the 
two entities is guaranteed by a well-known third party (CA) using the standard X.509 
certificate that validates the identity of the entity as Figure 2.12 shows. Indeed, each 
sensor node possesses a certificate signed by the trusted CA. The latter can be loaded 
into the node before the deployed node directly requested from a trusted party. 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [Yu et al., 2015] has been recommended by many 
standards specified by IETF for security services. However, it is mentioned in 
[Bafandehkar et al., 2013], that TLS is not a wise choice with respect to the security 
best practices in the IoT. In fact, TLS runs normally in a reliable transport protocol 
like TCP which is unsuitable for constrained resource devices, due to its congestion 
control algorithm. As a replacement for TLS in the tightly constrained environments, 
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the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol has been proposed recently 
[Kothmay et al., 2013]. It operates over the unreliable transport protocol, i.e., UDP 
and provides the same high security levels as TLS. The utilization of a certificate is 
basically expensive.  
 
C-  ID-based Cryptography (IBC)  
 
      The IBC is cryptographic scheme that was first proposed by [Tan et al., 2016]. 
The scheme enables users to communicate securely and verify each other’s signature 
without exchanging public or private keys as shows in figure 2.13. However, the 
scheme requires the presence of Trusted Key Generation (TKG) centres demonstrated 
as the following: 
 
The IBC’s Operation is unlike the normal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) where a 
TKG randomly generates pairs of public/private keys, each node in IBC chooses its 
identifier (address or name) as a public key. Practically, any public known 
information that uniquely identifies the node could be used as a public key. The TKG 
generates the corresponding private key and security distributes it to the node.  
As figure 2.13 shows, when node (A) wants to communicate with another node (B), 
node  A will sign the message using its private key and encrypt the result with the 
node B’s public key. Upon receiving the message, node B will decrypt the message 
using its private key and verify the signature using node A’s public key. 
 
The IBC represents an efficient and an easy system to be implemented which removes 
some of the overheads encountered in PKI for key management and digital certificate 
issuance/ revocation. However, the security of the IBC is based on the security of the 
private key [Wang et al., 2016]. To deal with this issue, the node needs to combine 
additional information such as timestamps to their identifiers when generating the 
public key. This procedure will definitely guarantee a periodic update of the public 
key. However, it introduces a key-management problem where all users must have the 
most recent public key for the node. 
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Fig 2.13 Identity-based cryptography infrastructure [Stallings, 2011] 
 
 In a constrained environment, ID-Based Encryption (IBE) model is mostly 
implemented using the ECC primitive [Fanian et al., 2010]. Implementations on other 
primitive exist, for example, RSA or El-Gamal-type IBE [Mikhail et al 2014].  [Yang 
et al., 2013] has proposed Identity-based-Authentication and Key Agreement 
(IBAKA) – an IBE scheme inspired by [Tan et al.2016]. However, they combined the 
IBE method with the Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [Qin et al., 2017] key 
exchange in order to establish a session key.  
 
2.12.1.2 Key Agreement based on Asymmetric Techniques 
         This sub-category is about key agreement protocols based on asymmetric primitives 
in the IoT. As mentioned in various research works, a key agreement protocol is the 
mechanism where two (or more) parties derive a shared secret and no other party can 
predetermine the secret value. Figure 2.14 illustrates the process of a typical asymmetric 
key agreement. Km is the secret generated after the agreement procedure. Consequently, 
this symmetric key is then used to secure the communication. 
The Diffie–Hellman (DH) protocol and its variants are classical examples for symmetric 
key agreement [Mortazavi et al., 2011]. However, the DH protocol is vulnerable to 
different attacks such as DoS and MitMA; thus, using this protocol can affect the security 
performance of the IoT devices. On the other hand, some variants of the DH protocol are 
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considered in constrained environments using ECC, i.e., ECDH. The ECDH 
cryptographic primitive offers smaller key size than RSA. Indeed, the US National 
Institute for Standard and Technology (NIST) in [Soliman  et al., 2016] has showed that 
to achieve the security level of 128-bit AES key size, one can prefer 256 bit key size 
using elliptic curve instead of 3072 bit parameters in RSA and DH protocol. The scheme 
relies on the ECDH protocol, and additionally provides the privacy of message exchanges 
using identity-based scheme [Yao et al., 2015].  
 
 
Fig 2.14 Key Agreement on Asymmetric Mechanisms [Stallings, 2011] 
 
Host Identity Protocol Diet Exchange (HIP-DEX) [Sahraui et al., 2014] applies also the DH 
protocol to generate a session key between two entities after only a 4 message exchange. This 
protocol is a variant of HIP Base Exchange [Takahashi et al., 2012] designed, specially, to 
reduce the complexity of cryptographic computations. It uses the smallest possible set of 
cryptographic primitives (e.g. AES-CBC instead of cryptographic hash functions), removes 
digital signatures and implements static ECDH to encrypt the session key, etc. This protocol 
has been largely taken into consideration in the context of the IoT by many recent works 
[Yang et al., 2013]. For example, [Meca et al., 2013] proposed an efficient network access 
mechanism based on HIP-DEX for mobile nodes joining the local sensor network. Besides, 
[Hummen et al., 2013] tailored HIP-DEX to the IoT, in particular, by adapting the session 
resumption mechanism as in TLS [Paris et al., 2017]. As such, the constrained node performs 
expensive operations once and maintains session-state for re-authentication and re-
establishment of a secure channel. The key agreement protocols based on DH require fewer 
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messages to establish a session key but the computational tasks on sensor nodes are usually 
complex. 
2.12.2 Symmetric Key Pre-Distribution 
        In this sub-category, the key pre-distribution mechanism is divided into two main 
sections as the following:  
2.12.2.1 Probabilistic Key Distribution  
        The mechanism of Random Key Pre-distribution (RKP) was first proposed by [Miyaji et 
al., 2013]. A typical RKP consists of three phases: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery 
and path-key establishment. In the scheme, a large key pool is generated. Keys are then 
randomly selected from the key pool and distributed to sensor nodes. Any two nodes may 
share a common key with a certain probability. The third phase is triggered when two nodes 
do not share any common key. In this process, one node first generates a random key K. It 
then sends the key to its neighbours using the pre-established secure channel. The process 
continues until the key K arrives at the other node. K is considered afterward as the pairwise 
key between both nodes. Several solutions are inspired by this scheme [Papadimitratos et al., 
2012].  
These proposals improve specially the pre-distribution phase to enhance the key connectivity 
between nodes and reduce the memory space needed for key storage. In fact, [Liu et al., 
2006] proposed a key pre-distribution scheme that relies on the deployment knowledge and 
avoids unnecessary key assignments. On the other hand, [Mehmood et al., 2017] developed a 
scheme based on [Reegan et al., 2016] works but the keys are mapped on two-dimensional 
positions. Both of them proposed a probability density function which provides a better key 
connectivity. [Levi et al., 2017] developed also a mechanism to reinforce the path-key 
establishment phase. The basic idea is that node A finds all possible links to node B. It 
generates for each link a random value and routes these values to B. The common keys 
between A and B are protected by these random values. However, the generated key will be 
shared by both nodes, unless the adversary manages to eavesdrop on all paths between them. 
The probabilistic key distribution generally does not guarantee session key establishment 
between all nodes even with the path-key establishment phase. Two nodes may not share any 
common keys with a certain probability. 
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2.12.2.2 Deterministic Key distribution  
      In this sub-category, the described key schemes rely on a deterministic process to 
generate the key pool and to distribute keys to nodes in order to guarantee secure full 
connectivity in the network. In deterministic solutions, the key schemes are distinguished by 
either the presence of a trusted third party in the IoT security or not. 
 
A-  Offline key Distribution  
      The offline key distribution method is used widely in WSNs because of its 
simplicity. Depending on the used protocol, every node in the same network may 
share a network key or each two nodes may have a common pairwise key [Tong et al., 
2013]. The session key is then generated after very few data exchanges without the 
presence of any third party. The offline key distribution provides efficiency in terms 
of energy consumption because it does not require expensive cryptographic 
computations like asymmetric approaches. However, when a sensor node is physically 
attacked, the secret data stored inside the node can be exposed. Consequently, the 
attacker can gain access to several nodes which share the secret key with the attacked 
node, or in the worst case, it may access the whole network [Alejandro et al., 2016]. 
In several existing works, mathematical properties have been applied to create the 
model for securing key exchanges between sensor nodes. These mechanisms are still 
applicable in the context of the IoT. The most well-known schemes are based on 
bivariate polynomials [Klodowski et al., 2016]. In these schemes, node A shares with 
other nodes a bivariate n-degree polynomial f(x,y). Node A can obtain the pairwise 
key with another node B by calculating the value of f(IdA, IdB), where IdA and IdB 
are the respective identities of A and B. In the same way, B can obtain the same 
pairwise key, since f(IdA, IdB) is equal to f(IdB, IdA). In another scheme, called the 
Bloom’s scheme [Rescorla, 1999], a secret symmetric matrix D is generated from the 
shared secret key between two nodes A and B. Each of them generates a public matrix 
IA and IB respectively for A and B. The private keys are respectively privA = D x IA 
and privB = D x IB for A and B. Finally, the pairwise key is calculated by solving 
(privA x IB) or (privB x IA). Howerver, the problem with these latter two schemes is 
that the session key will remain unchanged for every two nodes [Klodowski et al., 
2016]. 
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SNAKE and BROSK [Yeh et al., 2016] are two key establishment schemes where the 
session key is generated without the need for a key server to perform key 
management. These two protocols assume that all nodes in the same network share a 
master secret key. In SNAKE, the session key is obtained by hashing two random 
nonces generated from each communicating party using the pre-shared key. BROSK 
broadcasts the key negotiation message containing a nonce. Once a node receives the 
message from its neighbours, it can construct the session key by computing the 
message authentication code (MAC) of two nonces. [Driessen et al., 2012] has 
investigated the ability to secure the communication for smart IoT objects. The 
objective of this work is to design a lightweight protocol procedure to set up secure 
end to end channels between unconstrained and remote peers and IoT devices. The 
author addressed security in terms of resilience against node capture via using 
lightweight IPsec security association [Driessen et al., 2012]. Furthermore, AH and 
ESP mechanisms provide origin authenticity, message integrity and confidentiality 
protection of IP packets but they do not handle the key exchange. The security 
associations are established manually using pre-shared key and, the offline key 
distribution does not provide rekeying operations. When the system changes to other 
secret keys; all the entities in the network need to be updated to establish secure 
communications using the new keys.     
 
B-  Server Assisted key Distribution  
        Due to the resource limitation of constrained devices, the cryptographic 
computation and other expensive tasks e.g. identity management and key generation, 
can be handled at rich–resource servers. Server-assisted approaches for key 
establishment protocols have been proposed in this respect in IoT. In such protocols, 
message exchanges engage two entities and one (or more) trusted servers. The server 
shares long-term key a priori with each communicating entity. It often plays the role 
of a Key Distribution Center (KDC) and then supplies the session key to each party 
by re-encrypting it using the shared keys as shown in Figure 2. 15. 
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Fig 2.15 Server-Assisted Mechanism [Stallings, 2011] 
 
MIKEY [Boudguiga et al., 2013] is a protocol, in which a KDC is involved in the 
process of establishing a security association between the two parties. MIKEY-Ticket 
originated from the ticket concept of Kerberos [Zhang et al., 2016], [Prakasha et al., 
2016], [Tbatou et al., 2015]. The KDC securely communicates with the node initiating 
the protocol (Initiator) and the responding node (Responder) by encrypting important 
data using the pre-shared master key shared with each node. Nevertheless, the 
protocol is vulnerable to DoS attacks, particularly replaying messages to the 
Responder. To prevent these attacks, [Bouduguia et al., 2013] has proposed a new key 
establishment, called Sever Assisted Key Establishment (SAKE) based on the 
MIKEY-Ticket mode but removing the threat of DoS attacks. SAKE [Hussen et al., 
2013] allows establishing security associations between the two parties after only five 
exchanged messages, compared to six messages in the original MIKEY-Ticket. 
Indeed, upon reception of the first message from the Initiator, the KDC generates the 
session key and contacts directly the Responder. This change reduces one message 
exchange comparing to MIKEY-ticket.  
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) runs over UDP 
and uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [Pawlowski et al., 2015] for 
authentication that supports multiple authentication methods including pre-shared key 
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distribution. [Hernndez-Ramos et al. 2015], [Bernal-Hidalgo et al., 2014] propose an 
improvement of PANA to adapt the resource-constraints. The main modifications 
consist of reducing the number of message exchanges (e.g. choosing EAP-PSK as the 
only authentication method), removing unused PANA header fields, minimizing the 
collection of cryptographic primitives at the constrained device [Forsberg et al 2015]. 
These proposals may reduce effectively the PANA implementation code size at the 
device; however, the authors do not show that reduces the number of messages could 
affect the strength of security protocol which can make it easy to capture the IoT 
device from the adversary. 
2.13 Verifying Security Protocols  
        Protocols verification and validation can be achieved using different approaches. 
Discrete event simulators such as NS2 [Hossain, 2009] and OPNET [Aboelela, 2007] provide 
good capabilities to analyse the protocol performance. Other approaches based on the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) or the Specification and Description Language (SDL) provide 
validation methods to check the protocol against its specification in order to prevent 
undesired states and behaviour. This includes preventing deadlocks and live locks. However, 
the verification of security protocols against their claimed properties requires special toolsets 
as mathematical logic or model checks.  In general, verifying security protocols is based on 
theorem proofs and verification logic such as the BAN logic [Burrows et al., 1990] which 
determines the trust relationship among the protocols’ parties. However, the BAN logic 
considered the authentication properties only, therefore, it could not be used in confidentiality 
analysis. Also, the BAN logic assumed all parties to be honest and trustworthy, thus this 
assumption has to be considered when reading the BAN results. In this research, AVISPA 
tool is used to verify security protocols implementation. AVISPA is a push tool for the 
automated validation of security protocol [AVISPA, 2013]. In other words, significantly, a 
modular and expressive formal language called High level protocols specification language 
(HLPSL) is used by AVISPA to specify the security protocol and their properties [AVISPA, 
2013]. HLPSL is a role-based language, meaning that the sequence of actions of each kind of 
protocol participant in a module should be specified first; this is called a basic role. This 
specification can be later presented by one or more agents that play the given role. Later on, 
this document will specify how the resulting participants interact with one another by 
combining multiple basic roles together into a composed role.  
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HLPSL specification is translated into the Intermediate Format (IF), using hlpsl2if. The IF 
specification is then processed by the model-checkers to analyse if the security goals are 
violated or not. As figure 2.16 shows, there are four different verification back end tools that 
are used to analyse the IF specification namely: On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC), 
Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) 
and Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyser (TA4SP). Possible flaws in a protocol can be 
identified using these back end tools. As exponential and XOR operations are supported by 
CL-AtSe and OFMC back ends, OFMC back end tool will be used with AVISPA and SPAN 
(Animation tool for AVISPA) to analyse the proposed protocols [AVISPA, 2013].  
 
Fig 2.16 Architecture of the AVISPA tool [AVISPA, 2013]. 
In order to test and evaluate the security performance protocol, a Contiki and Cooja 
simulation tool is used [Contiki, 2014]. It is to be mentioned here that the Contiki and Cooja 
is an open source operating system for the Internet of Things. It connects tiny low-cost and 
low-power microcontrollers to the Internet. Indeed, it is a powerful toolbox used for building 
complex wireless systems [Contiki, 2014].    
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2.14 Summary  
         In this chapter, different types of IoTs/6LoWPAN Communication and mobility 
protocols are discussed. As shown below, the existing protocols in the IoT such as MIPv6, 
PMIPv6, and NEMO are reviewed. With the knowledge of the 6LoWPAN network, it has 
been demonstrated that the Edge Router uses the NEMO extensions of Mobile IP. Some 
comparisons of the mobility protocols have been done in terms of different mobility and 
communication scenarios. The exchange messages used for neighbour discovery in 
IoTs/6LoWPAN networks have also been investigated. As shown in table 2.1; Networks 
architecture comparison, each mobility protocol has its own advantages depending on the 
scenarios it involves.  
  Table 2.1 Network Architecture Comparison  
Network Architecture Router Size Concretively Security protocol 
MIPv6 [Imran et al 2016] Small Limited Yes 
PMIPv6 [Huang et al., 2017]. Small Medium Yes 
NEMO [Ye et al., 2017] Small Medium Yes 
LISP [Cisco-A, 2014] Big Good No 
However,   most of these mobility protocols, such as MIPv6, PMIPv6 and NEMO, might be 
too much for low-bandwidth wireless links in domains with large LoWPAN. Adding to this, 
as the number of connected devices increases, i.e., IoT devices, the burden on the network 
infrastructure increases as well. One of the key challenges will be the size of the routing 
tables and efficiency of the current routing protocols in the Internet backbone. For that reason, 
LISP supports different types of networks, i.e., IoT, which defines compressed and size 
optimised mobility/communication signalling. Though, as mentioned earlier the LISP 
protocol and the security protocol, in particular, are still at an early stage of implementation.  
As shown above this chapter has provided therefore a comparative classification of existing 
protocols for IoTs. These protocols and techniques are analysed according to different criteria 
in order to identify the advantages and drawbacks of each protocol as table 2.2 shows.   
Using this methodology, it was noted that symmetric approaches are not anymore the default 
choice for IoT of robust communications security between the entities. Public key 
cryptography is increasingly recommended in the IoT context, provided that the associated 
asymmetric techniques are properly optimized. A trusted third party will certainly take a 
more active role to secure the IoT and adapt to its heterogeneous nature.  
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Table 2.2 Security Protocols Comparison 
 
Added to this, security protocols should take into account the resource-constrained feature of 
things. Heavyweight cryptographic operations based on RSA and public key cryptography 
should be replaced by lightweight operations, i.e., using symmetric cryptography or applying 
more lightweight asymmetric primitives [Lara-Nino et al., 2017]. Besides, lightweight security 
protocols are also needed to reduce the communication complexity. Aside from performance 
concerns, the future proposed security solutions will offer perspectives on new applications 
that increasingly expand the coverage of capabilities and features offered by the IoT devices 
making them more and more intelligent. However, reducing the exchange messages in security 
protocols could break the security and capture the IoT devices by adversary. As the number of 
communication used in IoT device is increasing, designing a security protocol to be 
Security Protocol in Internet of Things 
Asymmetric key Symmetric Key  
Key Transport based on Public Key 
Encryption 
Key Agreement 
on Asymmetric 
Techniques 
Probabilistic 
Key 
Distribution  
Deterministic Key Distribution  
Raw Public 
Key 
Encryption 
Certificate 
based 
Encryption 
Identity-based 
Schema 
 
 
Diffie-Hellman 
IBAKA HIP-
DEX 
 
[Qin et 
al.,2017] 
 
 
 
Random key 
Schemes 
[Rahman et 
al., 2017] 
 
 
Offline key 
Server-Assisted 
Key Distribution 
Protocols 
based 
NTRU 
Encrypt 
 
[Yin et al., 
2014] 
 
DTLS 
 
[Kothmay 
et al., 2013 
Tiny IBE 
IBAKA 
[Masdri et al., 
2017] 
 
 
Bivariate 
Ploynomail 
Blom’s scheme 
Based SNAKE, 
BRoSK 
[Yeh et al., 2016] 
Kerberos Mikey-
ticket 
 
[Boudguiga et al., 
2013] 
Security  Benefits 
-In asymmetric or public key, cryptography doest not need 
exchanging keys, thus eliminating the key distribution 
problem. 
-A symmetric cryptosystem is faster 
-The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is 
increased security: the private keys do not ever need to be 
transmitted or revealed to anyone. 
-In Symmetric Cryptosystems, encrypted data can be 
transferred on the link even if there is a possibility that 
the data will be intercepted. Since there is no key 
transmitted with the data, the chances of data being 
decrypted are null. 
-Can provide digital signatures that can be repudiated  -symmetric cryptosystem uses password authentication 
to prove the receiver’s identity 
- Only symmetric cryptosystem possesses the secret 
key and it can decrypt a message. 
Security limitations 
-Security limitation of using public-key cryptography for 
encryption is speed: there are popular secret-key encryption 
methods which are significantly faster than any currently 
available public-key encryption method. 
-Symmetric cryptosystems have a problem of key 
transportation. The secret key is to be transmitted to the 
receiving system before the actual message is to be 
transmitted. Every means of electronic communication 
is insecure as it is impossible to guarantee that no one 
will be able to tap communication channels. So the 
only secure way of exchanging keys would be 
exchanging them personally. 
- Symmetric cannot provide digital signatures that 
cannot be repudiated 
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implemented will be the biggest challenge, especially with the deployment of a huge number 
of devices on the network. Therefore, a new security protocol is needed to secure the IoT 
devices, which can provide End-to-End secure communication process between IoT nodes. 
This security protocol should be adopted in accordance with the nature of IoT devices and 
infrastructure of the networks. Therefore, the next chapter will provide a comprehensive 
security threats/attacks analysis using X.805 framework for IoT based on LISP network 
architecture. 
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Chapter 3:  
Security Issues and Analysis in Internet of Things 
based on LISP Network Architecture 
 
3.1 Introduction 
        To begin with, the importance of thethe Interenet of Things (IoT) les in the fact that 
integrates various sensors devices that enable communication with each other without human 
interference. In this regard, the IoT   concept trefers to the usage of standard Internet 
protocols that allows communication among those devices. In other words, a  Locator ID 
Separation Protocol (LISP) is a routing architecture that provides new IP addressing in order 
to simplify routing operations and improve scalability in the Future of the Internet such as the 
IoT. Because, LISP and the security protocol are still under development, this chapter 
investigates the security issues that could occur from deploying the Locator ID Separation 
Protocol in the IoT. The investigation discovers a number of vulnerabilities that should be 
considered before moving to the implementation stage. Accordingly, the structure of this 
chapter is divided as the following: In section 3.2, the current security threats and attacks in 
the IoT are tackled. In section 3.3, a brief overview of X.805 framework is given. In section 
3.4, a comparative security analysis via using X.805 security framework is provided. The aim 
of the whole chapter, however, is to analyse the security performance of the IoT based on 
LISP network architecture. The results of the analysis are summarized in section 3.5.   
3.2 Security Threats in Internet of Things    
        Most of the attacks and threats against devices and data security in IoT have a 
destructible effect, because of their wireless radio access and connectivity to the Internet. The 
security analysis of IoT starts with the appreciation of various threats posed at respective 
Open System Interconnection (OSI) layers. In this section, the threats in IoT network are 
classified and discussed [Husamuddin et al., 2017].  
The IoT is highly vulnerable to physical attacks, i.e., threats due to physical node destruction, 
and relocation. For example, an intruder or attacker can redirect all packets between two 
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nodes to himself. By sending, on the one hand, spoofed location update to the gateway from 
Sensor-A to the new location of Sensor-B indicating its own locator (intruder) for the new 
location and them, sending other spoofed location update to gateway from the Sensor-B about 
the new location of Sensor-A indicating also the new location to its own locator. Thus, the 
intruder or adversary is able to capture the data between Sensor-A and Sensor-B, establish 
new spoof connections as Sensor-A and/or Sensor-B, and finally insert itself in the middle of 
all connections between them (man in the middle attack). Therefore, the intruder receivers 
and can modify all the packets exchanged between Sensor-A and Sensor-B [Khan et al., 
2016]. Moreover, and many of these attacks allow the malicious node to take control over 
them. These compromises can result into code modification inside the node and change in the 
role of networks and sensors. In addition, several types of DoS attacks can be triggered in 
different IoT and 6LoWPAN environment and in different layers. At the physical layer, the 
DoS attacks can be launched by tampering and jamming electromagnetic (EM) signals and by 
swarming the limited resources of 6LoWPAN devices with the high resource devices quite 
easily.  
An attack on MAC layer involves collision, exhaustion and unfairness. Being always power 
hungry, 6LoWPAN devices try to sleep as often as possible in order to keep it. Such 
constraints allow the attacker to let the device execute a large number of tasks in order to 
deplete its battery. This is called sleep deprivation torture [Nawir et al., 2016]. To achieve 
such a goal, an attacker can, for example, target different destination devices with 
unnecessary  packets, possibly in other 6LoWPAN, regardless of whether the destination 
6LoWPAN and/or device actually exists or not. Such attack can also lead to deplete the 
6LoWPAN coordinator battery power. In other words, the downlink packets have to be 
clearly requested from the LoWPAN coordinator; this will in turn keep it busy. 
An attack against network availability can consist of flooding the network by simply 
transmitting a large number of large packets. In such a case, the attacker may degrade the 
network performance and reduce the throughput in general. In WPAN specification, the 
replayed message is prevented by the replay protection mechanism, i.e., sequential freshness. 
In a replay-protection attack, the malicious node sends many frames containing large 
counters to a particular receiver, which in turn raises the replay counter up [Aris et al., 2015]. 
Then, when a normal device sends a frame with a lower frame counter, it will be rejected by 
the receiver and thus, leads to DoS attack. 
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As the ACK frame integrity is not protected, it can possibly open the door for a malicious 
node to prevent a legitimate device from receiving a particular frame. This is possible by 
forging an ACK using the unencrypted sequence number from the data frame and sending it 
to the source while creating enough interference in order to prevent the legitimate receiver 
from receiving the frame [Nurse et al., 2015]. In such scenario, the source device leads the 
belief that the frame has been received. Moreover, a corrupted device can also attack the key 
distribution process since the WSN coordinator announces the IDs of devices that can change 
the link key in plain-text in the beacon frame. Therefore, the attacker can send request packet 
with the ID of the legitimate node. Obviously, the goal from such request is to push the 
coordinator to trigger a key exchange process while the legitimate recipient may not be ready 
[Yang et al., 2016]  
3.2.1 Attacks Against Network Layer  
       As stated earlier, this thesis focuses on designing a security protocol to the IoT at 
network layer; it is therefore very important to disclose attacks on this layer. The following 
types explain the attacks of IoT in a network layer [Dragomir et al., 2016]:  
 Spoofing: in this attack, the malicious node uses spoofing to target routing 
information exchanged between nodes in an attempt to create routing loops attack or 
repel network traffic extending/shortening source routes, generating false error 
messages, etc.  
 Selective forwarding: in this attack, the malicious device may refuse to forward 
certain messages by dropping them, for instance. In this case, neighboring devices 
may conclude that the malicious device has failed and thus tries to seek another router. 
A more subtle form of this attack is when the malicious device selectively forwards 
packets. However, neighboring nodes here will not be able to reach the conclusion 
that another route is needed. This would in turn encourage them to resend the data 
packets. 
 Sinkhole attack: in a sinkhole attack, the malicious device tries to get all traffic from 
one particular area which can potentially result in DoS attack. In order to launch a 
sinkhole attack (black hole attack), the attacker can listen to requests for routes then 
replies to the requesting nodes that contain high quality or the shortest path to the base 
station. Once the malicious device is able to insert itself between the communicating 
nodes, he/she is able to do anything with the packets passing through it. In fact, this 
 
 
52 
 
attack can affect even the nodes that are located farther from the malicious node 
[Dragomir et al., 2016].  
 Sybil attack:  in a Sybil attack, a single node presents multiple identities to other 
nodes in the IoT/ or WPAN. Sybil attacks pose a significant threat to geographic 
routing protocols and may be performed against the distributed storage, routing 
mechanism, data aggregation, and voting, fair resource-allocation and misbehaviour 
detection.  
 
 Wormhole attack: in a wormhole attack, the attacker records packets at one location in 
the network and tunnels them to another one. Such attacks can damage the working of 
the 6LoWPAN since it does not require compromising a node in the WPAN. Instead, 
it could be performed at the initial phase when 6LoWPAN nodes start to discover the 
neighbouring information. Wormhole attacks can target, for example, routing function 
or application. 
3.2.2 Analysis  
       Essentially, IPsec works well on non-Low-power devices which are not subject to severe 
constraints on host software size, processing and transmission capacities. Furthermore, IPsec 
supports AH for authenticating the IP header and ESP for authenticating and encrypting the 
payload. The main issues of IPsec are twofold: firstly, processing power and, secondly, key 
management. Since these tiny IoT devices do not process huge number of data or 
communicate with many different nodes, it is not well understood if complete 
implementation of Security Association Database (SADB), policy-debase and dynamic key-
management protocol are suitable for these small battery powered devices. Besides, given 
existing constraints in IoT environments, IPsec may not be suitable to use in such 
environments, especially that IoT node devices may be able to operate all IPsec algorithms on 
its own capability either Full-Function Device (FFD) or Reduced-Function Devices (RFD).   
Bandwidth is very rare resource in IoT environments. The fact that IPsec requires another 
header (AH or ESP) in every packet makes its use problematic in IoT environments. 
Moreover, IPsec requires two communicating peers to share secret key that is established 
dynamically with the Internet key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol. Thus, it has an additional 
packet overhead incurred by IKEv2 packets exchange.  Therefore, a new security protocol is 
needed to address this issue.   
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3.3 Overview of X.805 Security Framework 
      The X.805 standard proposes three security layers: The first security layer is the 
applications security layer; which are in fact network-based applications accessed by end-
users e.g. web browsing, directory assistance, email, and E-commerce. The second security 
layer is services security layer; which is services provided to end-users e.g. Frame Relay, IP, 
cellular, Wi-Fi, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The third security layer is 
Infrastructure Security layer; which is Fundamental building blocks of networks services and 
applications e.g. Individual routers, switches, servers, Point-to-point WAN links and Ethernet 
links. Furthermore, it has three security planes: End user Plane which is Access and use of the 
network by the customers for various purposes, e.g. Basic connectivity/transport and value-
added services Virtual Private Network (VPN) and VoIP. Control/Signaling Security Plane; 
which refers to any Activities that enable efficient functioning of the network, e.g. Machine-
to-machine communications. Management Security plane; which is the management and 
provisioning of network elements, services and applications and also Support of the FCAPS 
functions: acronym for fault, configuration, accounting, performance and security. Finally 
these security layers and planes are based on the performed activities over the network and 
eight security dimensions to address general system vulnerabilities (access control, 
authentication, non-reputation, data confidentiality communication security, data integrity, 
availability and finally privacy) [Raheem et al., 2013].  Figure 3.1 illustrates the complete 
architecture of the X.805 standard with its security layers 
 
Fig 3.1 The X.805 Standard Architecture [Raheem et al., 2013] 
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In this section, the X.805 security framework standard has been applied to analyse the 
security performance of IoT based on the LISP architecture. In addition, the functionality of 
these devices (IoT) is only related to the Infrastructure Layer and services Layer of the X.805 
standard. In LISP architecture, there are two planes only; Control Plane and User Plane 
[Raheem et al., 2013]. These planes are concerned with the security of the network links and 
elements as shown in figure 3.2.  
 
Fig 3.2 X.805 Standard for Internet of Things using LISP Network Architecture 
 
3.4 Security Analysis to Internet of Things using LISP Network 
Architecture 
      In this section, a security analysis to the IoT based on LISP network architecture using 
X.805 security framework is provided.   
 3.4.1 Access Control  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: ACLs (Access Control) 
can be applied in LISP between the Ingress direction and the Egress direction on the 
LISP site-facing interface. It plays as a packet filtering between two networks. 
 
 
55 
 
Therefore, ACLs are needed when one specific network might choose not to receive 
packets from the other networks or make connections to other networks. 
 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane, ACLs can be applied between an 
XTR router and the map services, which should be reflected in the registration 
procedure stage. Therefore, unregistered routers cannot send updates with the mapping 
system. 
 Threats and Attacks: Figure 3.3 shows that unauthorized devices/or illegitimate 
devices can access the network. Added to this, Dos attacks can intercept packets 
between the (ITR & ETR) and between the XTR router and mapping system. Therefore, 
in this attack the intruder is able to redirect all the traffic sent by two nodes to a random 
or non-existent Locator, in order to stop or disrupt communication between the nodes.     
 
 
Fig 3.3 Threats in Access Control 
 
3.4.2 Authentication 
- Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: Users/or machines that 
register themselves with the XTR router require authentication to ensure that whoever the 
user or the machine claims to be, it should be the correct one. For example, 
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Authentication needs to be applied when machine (A) wants to communicate with 
machine (B). 
 
- Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: When the Router XTR is registered 
with the mapping system, it needs to be authenticated with another router 
- Threats and Attacks: As Figure 3.4 shows, the attackers (unauthenticated devices) can 
access the network by claiming fake identities to the router or the mapping system. 
Furthermore, the presented attack can be also on ETR Router as figure 3.4 illustrations, 
where the attacker is able to create a spoofed binding update, this attack appears because 
ETR router is not authenticated. Besides, the non-authentication of the ETR router 
presents other kind of attack which can steal the device ID based on spoofed host name 
registered update message which are originally sent between ETR router and EID 2 
device, likewise for ITR router and EID 1 device.  
 
Fig 3.4 Threats in Authentication 
3.4.3 Non-Repudiation  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: The links 
(transactions) need to be secured between the XTR router and the Mapping system. 
For example, routers will not claim something they do not provide. 
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 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: Between the mapping system 
and the XTR, there is an insecure link. For example, by referring to the registration 
procedure after the router has registered, the device sends the queries to the mapping 
system in order to register and update this device. Through the insecure link, the 
mapping system can deny the acknowledgement to the router. 
 
 Threats and Attacks: The attacker can act as either a fake router or a mapping system 
which cause disruption or interception of the data as shown in Figure 3.5. Here, the 
intruder can launch sinkhole attacks that make EID 1 or EID 2 devices believe that 
they are neighbour nodes and forward the packets between them. This cause confusion 
to the routers ITR and ETR and locator which the node receives make false data. 
Similarly the intruder can spoof on routers table of EID as well as on to the Map-
Server table of Locator and EIDs.   
 
Fig 3.5 Threats in Non-Repudiation 
3.4.4 Data Confidentiality  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: There is no mechanism 
such as encryption/or encoding between the machine and the XTR router, and from 
machine to machine when they communicate with each other on different networks. 
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 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: There is no encryption mechanism 
between the (ITR and ETR) routers and between an XTR and a mapping system  
 
 Threats and Attacks: As shown in Figure 3.6, two threats can occur here: EID Spoofing 
and RLOC spoofing. In EID spoofing, the originator of the packet puts in a spoofed EID 
and the packet will normally be encapsulated by the ITR of the site/or a PITR if the 
source site is not LISP enabled. As for the RLOC Spoofing, the originator of the packet 
directly generates an LISP-encapsulated packet with a spoofed source RLoC. 
 
Fig 3.6 Threats in Data Confidentiality 
 
4.4.5 Communication Security  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: There is no security 
Tunnel/or End to End security between the machine and the XTR router, nor between the 
machine and other machines when they are communicating with each other on a different 
network. 
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 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: End to End is not exiting between 
the (ITR and ETR) routers and between the XTR and mapping system. 
 
 Threats and Attacks: Eavesdropping/or spoofing can occur between the machine and the 
XTR router as shown in Figure 3.7. Furthermore, the attacker is able to capture and 
modify all the packets exchanged between an Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) and Egress 
Router (ETR) and between the XTR and the mapping system. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Threats in Communication 
 
3.4.6 Data Integrity 
  Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: there are no mechanisms 
such as MD5/or digital signatures between the machine and the XTR router, and between 
the machine and other machines e.g. when machine (A) wants to communicate with 
machine (B) on a different network. 
 
 
 
60 
 
 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: there are No mechanisms such as 
MD5/or digital signature between Ingress and Egress and between the XTR and mapping 
system. 
 
 Threats and Attacks: The intruder can capture the data between machine A and machine 
B, and establish a new spoofed connection. Adding to this, the intruder inserts itself in the 
middle of all connections, (i.e., Man in Middle Attack) as shown in Figure 3.8. 
Furthermore, the attacker can spoof on the transaction queries between (ITR and ETR) 
and the mapping system. 
 
Fig 3.8 Threats in Data Integrity 
 
3.4.7 Availability  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: In the router, there is only 
one scenario with invalid information, i.e., Locator location and EID address 
 
 Service Layer: Modules Control Plane & User Plane: Two kinds of Availability are 
needed: firstly, the Mapping system should not be overloaded and secondly, it should not 
have invalid information which affects the system scalability. 
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 Threats and Attacks: EID redirection/RLOC poisoning: The EID/or machine-Prefix in 
the mapping is not bound to (located by) the set of RLOCs present in the mapping. This 
could result in packets being redirected elsewhere, eavesdropped, or blackhole attack. 
Note: it is not necessary that RLOCs the highest priority ones are compromised. 
Moreover, DoS attacks can occur and intercept the packet between the machine and the 
XTR, between the machine and another machine on different networks and also between 
(ITR & ETR) and the XTR router and mapping system, as shown in Figure 3.9. 
 
Fig 3.9 Threats in Availability 
 
3.4.8 Privacy  
 Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2 & 3: There is no privacy when data/or 
information is registering on the router leading to a security issue called information 
leaking. 
 Service Layer: Modules 2 & 3: No privacy information is in the mapping system. 
 Threats and Attacks: Unauthorized entity can disclose the privacy of the system. 
In order to modell the security threats for the IoT based on LISP network architecture using 
AVISPA tool is used in order to design efficient protocols against these threats. Table 3.1 
shows the headers of Automated Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications 
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(AVISPA) the #basic roles; it is essentially needed to define the composed roles which 
describe the sessions of the protocol [AVISPA, 2013]. The #composed roles have no 
transition section, but rather a composition section in which the basic roles are instantiated. In 
the session role, it usually declares all the channels used by the basic roles. These variables 
are not instantiated with concrete constants. The channel type takes an additional attribute, in 
parentheses, which specifies the intruder model that assumed for that channel. The #intruder 
may play some roles as a legitimate user. There is also a statement which describes what 
knowledge the intruder initially has. Typically, this includes the names of all agents, all the 
symmetric keys and any shares with others. #Specifying Security Goals are specified in High 
level protocols specification language (HLPSL) by augmenting the transitions of the basic 
roles with the so-called goal facts and by then assigning them a meaning by describing, in the 
HLPSL goal section, what conditions – i.e. what combination of such facts indicate an attack 
and a violation of secrecy [AVISPA, 2013].  
Table 3.1 The Headers of AVISPA Input File:  
The Header Description  
# Basic roles Define agents, variables and functions in the protocol. 
# Transition Represents the receipt of messages and the sending of reply messages, 
 i.e., showing all the messages  exchanges between the agents  
# Composed role It is one or more basic roles, ‘gluing’ them together so they 
execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving semantics. 
# Session environment Defines how agent parameters interact in the protocol.   
# Intruder Information Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities  
# Specifying Security Goal Specifies the security properties to be checked. 
 
3.5 Summary  
       This chapter has presented a comprehensive security analysis for the IoT network. In 
other words, it demonstrates the most common security issues and vulnerabilities in the IoT 
network. The analysis is based on the X.805 security standard and has, therefore, considered 
the security threats of IoT based on LISP network architecture. The analysis shows that there 
is a genuine need to provide new mechanisms to enforce Access control, Authentication, Non 
repudiation, Data confidentiality, Communication Security, Data Integrity, Availability and 
Privacy. The chapter, then, has to consider two layer threats namely, the infrastructure and 
Service layers to expose the security threats during the unsecure signal transactions between 
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the IoT, the LISP-capable routers and the mapping system. As a result, a number of security 
vulnerabilities have been discovered and described. Therefore, table 3.2 shows the 
comparison summarising the analysis of security issues  
Table 3.2 Comparison security Issues in IoT 
Access Control:  
Infrastructure  Layer:  Modules 2 & 3, no Packet filtering between  ITR and ETR 
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3,no Packet filtering between  ITR and ETR 
Threats and Attacks:  Unauthorized devices/ or illegitimate devices access to the network and the 
Dos attacks.  
Authentication: 
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3, users/machines that register themselves with XTR router 
require authentication to ensure that whoever the user or machine claims to 
be. 
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, The XTR is registered with the mapping system, it needs to 
be authenticated with another router.  
Threats and Attacks:  The attackers ( Unauthenticated devices) can access the network by claiming 
fake identities to the router or the mapping system   
Non-Repudiation: 
Infrastructure  Layer:  Modules 2 & 3, the links (transactions) need to be secured between  XTR 
router and Mapping System 
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, between the mapping system and the XTR there is an 
insecure link  
Threats and Attacks:  The attacker can act as either a fake router or a mapping system which 
causes disruption or intercepts the data. 
Data Confidentiality:   
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3,no mechanism such as encryption/ or encoding between the 
machine and the XTR, and from machine to machine when they 
communication with each other on different networks   
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, There is no encryption mechanism between the XTR and a 
mapping system. 
Threats and Attacks:  Two threats : EID Spoofing and RLoC Spoofing  
Communication Security:   
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3, there is no security Tunnel/ or End to End security  between 
the machine and the XTR 
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, end to End is not exiting between the (ITR & ETR) router 
and between the XTR and mapping system. 
Threats and Attacks:  Eavesdropping/ or spoofing can occur between the machine and the XTR 
router.  
Data Integrity:  
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3, no mechanisms such as MD5/s or digital signatures between 
the machine and the XTR router.  
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, no mechanisms such as MD5/ or digital signature between 
Ingress and Egress and between the XTR and mapping system.  
Threats and Attacks:  The intruder can capture the data between machines A and machine B, and 
establish a new spoofed connection. Also, the intruder inserts a new spoofed 
connection. 
 
Availability:  
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3, In the router, there is only one scenario with invalid 
information i.e. Locator location and EID address.  
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Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, Two kinds of Availability are needed: Mapping system 
should not be overloaded and do not have invalid information which affects 
the system scalability. 
Threats and Attacks:  EID redirection/ RLoC poisoning The EID/or machine-Prefix in the 
mapping is not bound to located by the set of RLoCs present in the mapping. 
This could result in packets being redirected elsewhere, eavesdropped or 
black holed 
Privacy:  
Infrastructure  Layer: Modules 2 & 3, There is no privacy when data/ or information is registering 
on the router 
Service Layer:   Modules 2 & 3, Unauthorized entity can disclose the privacy of the system. 
Threats and Attacks:  Unauthorized entity can disclose the privacy of the system. 
 
Based on all these analyse, a strong End-to-End security authentication protocol is basically 
needed to the IoT devices. Accordingly, chapter 4 will discuss the registration security 
protocol, its design and verification in IoT based on LISP network architecture.        
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Chapter 4 
An Enhanced Security Protocol for Registration 
Stage in LISP Network Architecture  
 
4.1 Introduction 
       The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is a routing architecture that provides new 
semantics for IP addressing. To simplify routing operations and improve scalability in 
Internet of Things (IoT), The LISP separates the device identity from its location using two 
different naming spaces. As mentioned earlier in chapter 2, LISP introduced a mapping 
system match to two spaces. In the initial stage, each LISP-capable router needs to register 
with a Map Server known as the Registration Stage. Nevertheless, this stage is vulnerable to 
impersonating and content poisoning attacks. Consequently, this chapter introduces an 
enhanced security protocol in Registration stage using ID/Based Cryptography (IBC) method. 
The security protocols have been verified using formal methods approach via Automated 
Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) tool. Hence, the structure 
of this chapter is divided into two important sections as the following: section 4.2 discusses 
the first version of designed enhanced security protocol and various discovered attacks found 
by (AVISPA) tool. Whereas, section 4.3 discusses the final version of the enhanced security 
protocol using IBC method and is verified by AVISPA tool.  Finally, a summary concludes 
the chapter in section 4.4.    
4.2 First Version Enhanced Security Protocol for Registration 
Stage in LISP Architecture 
       As mentioned in chapter 4, LISP suffers from different security vulnerabilities; therefore, 
a new security method for protecting the LISP stage is presented. The proposed protocol 
provides a Two-party mutual authentication, by using a trust authentication server (TAS) as a 
third party trusted between ETR and MS. 
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4.2.1 Protocol Exchange Messages:  
Step 1A: ETR → TAS: (ETR, N1, Map- Request Register), {h (N1, Map-Register} {MS} 
Here, in step1A, ETR sends a Map request Register to TAS including a 4-byte random nonce 
(N1), in order to request a Map-Register from MS server. The ETR expects to receive the 
same nonce in Map-Reply message from the TAS.  
 
Fig 4.1 Security Protocol for Address Registration   
Step 1B: TAS → ETR:  (TAS, N1, Map-Register) {PUK (MS) {PSK1 (TAS)}    
Step 1B, the TAS replies to the ETR and provides the public key of MS encrypted with PSK1 
of TAS.  
Step 1C: ETR → MS:  (ETR, Map-Register) {PUK (MS)} 
Step 1C, ETR sends LISP Map-Register Packet to MS. This message is encrypted by MS 
public key and the MS decrypts the message using its private key.  
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Step 2A:  MS → TAS: (MS, N2, Map-Register), {h (N2, Map-Register} {ETR}  
Step 2A, the MS forwards the message to the TAS that is received in Step 1C; this message 
includes random nonce (N2) to register the new device of ETR request. The MS expects to 
receive the same nonce in Map-Reply message from the TAS. 
Step 2B: TAS →MS: (TAS, N2, Map-Register) {PUK (ETR) {PSK2 (TAS)}  
Step 2B, the TAS replies to MS and provides the public key of ETR encrypted with PSK2 of 
TAS.  
Step 2C: MS → ETR:  {MS, Map-Notify} {PUK (ETR)} 
Step 2C, the MS registers the device and sends a Map-Notify message to ETR encrypted with 
the Public key of ETR router. 
Step 3: ETR → MS: {ETR, ACK, Map-Notify} {PUK (MS)} 
Upon Step 2C, the ETR decrypts the message using its private key. The ETR then sends in 
Step 3 acknowledgment to the MS to confirm that Map-Notify has been received and updated 
its router table. This message is encrypted using the Public key of MS.   
Table 4.1 Notation of Register Stage in LISP Network Architecture 
 
4.2.2 Formal Analysis and Attacks Discovered Using AVISPA 
       The first version of security registration protocol for LISP network architecture is 
simulated using AVISPA tool. The AVISPA file describes the system Headers via table 3.1 
which has been introduced earlier in chapter 3. In brief, only the #Specifying security Goals 
and the #Intruder Information heading are described here while the rest is less significant in 
terms of understanding the verification process. The security requirements of the system are 
defined under the # specifying Security Goals. The PUK_ETR and PUK_MS are the public 
keys which are provided by Trust Authentication Server TAS, these keys are encrypted by 
PSK1 and PSK2 Pre-Sheared key that secures the connection between TAS and ETR, and 
The Notation Definition 
TAS Trust Authentication Server 
PUK (ETR) , PUK(MS) The Public Keys of the ETR and the MS, respectively. These keys are derived 
by the TAS 
PSK1,PSK2 Pre-shared keys to secure the connections between the TAS and ETR, MS  
ETR The Egress Tunnel Router in the destination EID Space  
MS The Map Server  
N1,N2 A fresh random number  
h(m) Hash value of the message (m) 
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between TAS and MS. The n1 and n2 random numbers (nonce) are used as challenge 
response between the ETR and the TAS on one hand, and between the MS and the TAS as 
secure request response on the other. Table 4.2 shows It has been set in this protocol as 
Weak_authentication on etr_tas, and Weak_authentication on ms_tas. The Weak 
authentication (X, Y) specifying goal means that if Y thinks he has successfully completed a 
run of the protocol with X, then X has previously been running the protocol with Y.  The 
authentication_on router_map_server_n1 and authentication_on map_server_router_n2 is set 
as strong authentication between TAS and ETR and TAS and MS.    
Table 4.2 HLPSL Code: Specifying Security Goal   
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be cheeked  
secrecy_of sn1, sn2,etr, ms, tas % Check the secrecy of  random nonce N1 and N2 between the 
MS and TAS 
Weak_ authentication on etr_tas % Check the authentication between ETR and TAS, and then 
ETR should provide confirmation witness information to TAS. 
Weak_authentication on ms_tas % Check the authentication between MS and TAS, and the MS 
should provide a confirmation witness information to TAS 
authentication_on router_map_server_n1 % strong authentication between router and map server on value 
of random nonce N1.     
authentication_on map_server_router_n2 % strong authentication between map server and router on value 
of random nonce N2.     
End goal %End of session goal  
 
Table 4.3 shows, the #Intruder Information heading specifies the intruder identity, knowledge 
and capability. The first line identifies the intruder knowledge and defines the Intruder’s 
initial Knowledge, i.e., it has been assumed that intruder knows the identity of the 
participants and can fabricate the map-register and map-notify by intercepting the connection 
and capturing information.   
Table 4.3 HLPSL Code: Intruder Information Heading    
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
intruder_knowledge = {etr,ms,psk1_tas, 
psk2_tas, puk_etr, puk_ms, puki,pski, 
inv(ki)} 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities. Check the 
intruder between the ETR and TAS and between MS and TAS 
on pre-shared keys PSK1 and PSK2. And also check if intruder 
captures the  public keys PUK between the ETR and MS.  
composition % It is one or more basic roles, gluing them together so they 
execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving semantics.  
map_server(ms,etr,psk1_tas, psk2_tas 
KeyMap, Snd, Rcv)  
%set the pre-shared keys PSK1 & PSK2 between the MS and 
TAS and between the ETR and MS.  
)/\ nspk(Snd, Rcv, %channels  
Psk1, psk2                                      % pre-shared keys to secure  the connections between the TAS 
and ETR , MS.  
{etr.ms.puk_etr.puk_ms,etr.i.puk_etr.ki,i.m % check the intruder between the ETR and MS on public keys 
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s.ki.puk_ms}, 
{etr.{etr.puk_etr,ms.puk_ms}, KeyRings 
ms.{ms.puk_ms},i.{i.ki}}) 
PUK_ETR and PUK_MS  
end role %End of session role  
 
4.2.3 Security Analysis for the Registration Protocol:  
After generating the HLPSL description of the system using the AVISPA tool to check the 
security assertion, the following attacks have been discovered by AVISPA tool:  
 
 
Fig 4.2 Attack 1: on I_ETR and I_TAS Playback Attacks 
Figure 4.2 shows Attack1, the intruder intercepts the messages (A1) to (B1) and replays as 
the ETR and TAS by acting both of the I_ETR and I_TAS. This is called playback attack, 
where the Intruder (I) intercepts the data and retransmits or redirects it to its own direction. 
Since, there is no encryption, the intruder acquires the N and uses it to impersonate the ETR. 
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Consequently, the TAS runs this process believing that it is communicating with ETR while 
in reality it is communicating with the Intruder.  
 
 
Fig 4.3 Attack 2: on I_MS and I_TAS Eavesdropping Attacks 
Figure 4.3 shows Attack2, the MS sends message (B2) to prove its identity and request PUK 
of ETR from TAS in order to communicate with ETR. This message is transformed like a 
hash function (h), meanwhile, the Intruder (I) eavesdrops on the conversation and keeps hash. 
When the interchange is over, the intruder is as either MS or TAS, when TAS asks for a proof 
of identity, the intruder sends ETR hash read from the first session, which TAS accepts and 
thus grants access to the intruder. This attack is called eavesdropping attack.  
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Fig 4.4 Attack 3: on I_ETR and I_MS Man in the Middle Attacks 
#Attack3, Here, the intruder intercepts the communication and acts as I_ETR, I_MS between 
the ETR and MS. It impersonates (imitates or mimics) both parties and gains access to 
information when the two parties are trying to send messages to each other. This attack is 
called MitM, which allows a malicious actor to intercept, send and receive data meant for 
someone else, or not meant to be sent at all, without either outside party knowing until it is 
too late, as messages (C1) to (C4) show in figure 4.4.   
4.3 Final Version Security Protocol Enhancement for Registration 
Stage in LISP Network Architecture 
      As it has been mentioned previously in above, the first version of the designed protocol 
has security vulnerabilities such as playback attack, eavesdropping attack and MitM; 
therefore, an enhanced security protocol for the registration stage is presented in this section. 
This security protocol method uses the ID-Based cryptography (IBC) which allows the 
mapping system to authenticate the data.  
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4.3.1 Protocol Exchange Message  
The registration procedure using the IBC goes as follows:  
 
Fig 4.5 Security Protocol for Address Registration 
Step 1:𝐓𝐊𝐆 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑 ∶ { 𝐏𝐕𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑){𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟏} 
Step 2:𝐓𝐊𝐆 → 𝐌𝐒 ∶ { 𝐏𝐕𝐊(𝐌𝐒){𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟐} 
The TKG provides the two communicating parties (ETR, MS) with their private keys PVK 
(ETR) and PVK (MS) in steps 1 and 2. These two steps are encrypted using the pre-shared 
secret keys PSK1 and PSK2 respectively.  
Step 3: 𝐄𝐓𝐑 → 𝐌𝐒: {𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫}{𝐏𝐔𝐊(𝐌𝐒)}, {𝐡(𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫)}{𝐏𝐕𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑)} 
The ETR sends a LISP Map-Register packet in step 3. The content of this message is 
encrypted using the MS’s public key which is known publicly and signed digitally using the 
private key of the ETR. As described in [Cisco-A, 2014], the Map-Register packet includes 
the ETR’s address (RLOC), a random number (n1) and a list of EID-Prefix managed by ETR.  
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Step 4:𝐌𝐬 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: {𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲}{𝐏𝐔𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑)}, {𝐡(𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲)}{𝐏𝐕𝐊(𝐌𝐒)} 
Upon receiving Step 3, the MS will use its private key PVK (MS) to decrypt the message and 
then verify the signature using the ETR’s public key PUK (ETR). Finally, the MS will hash 
the included Map-Register and compare the result with the received signed value. Only if the 
two values are equal, the MS can compose a Map-Notify packet as Step 4 which includes the 
received random number (n1). This message is encrypted using the ETR’s public key and 
signed digitally using the MS’s private key. The ETR will check the included random number 
and only when the check succeeds, the ETR authenticates the MS.  
   Table 4.4 Notation of Registration Stage in LISP Network Architecture 
 
4.3.2 Formal Analysis Using AVISPA 
        To formally analyse the basic mapping procedure, the system will be simulated via 
AVISPA tool. The full HLPSL input file describing the system is included in Appendix-D. 
For conciseness, only #Transitions, the #specifying security Goals and the #Intruder 
Information heading are described here while the rest is less significant in terms of 
understanding the verification process.   
In table 4.5 shows the #Transitions heading defines the system and the transitions between 
the entities. It is worth pointing out that for security simulation, it is essentially needed to 
define explicitly the security parameters. Therefore, the security related contents of the Map-
Register and Map-Notify have been shown in step 3. 
 
 
The Notation Definition 
TKG The Trusted Ticket Granting  
PVK (ETR) , PVK(MS) The Private Keys of the ETR and MS respectively. These keys are derived by 
the TKG 
PUK Public key 
PSK1,PSK2 Pre-shared keys to secure the connections between the TKG ,ETR and MS  
ETR The Egress Tunnel Router in the destination EID Space  
MS The Map Server  
n1 A fresh random number  
h(m) Hash value of the message (m) 
{m}{K} The message (m) being encrypted with the key (K) 
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Table 4.5 HLPSL Code: Transitions  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Transition % Represents the receipt of messages and the sending of reply 
messages, i.e. showing all the messages exchanges between the 
agents  
1. State   = 0  /\ Rcv(start) =|> State' := 1  
/\Snd(TKG.ETR.{PVK_ETR}_PSK1  
 
% The ETR received the private key of PVK_ETR from the 
TKG and encrypted by Pre-Shared Key PSK1.   
 2. State   = 1  /\ Rcv(Start) =|>State' := 2 
/\ Snd(TKG.MS.{PVK_MS}_PSK2 
 
% The MS received the private key of PVK_MS from the TKG 
and encrypted by Pre-Shared Key PSK2. 
3.State    = 2  /\ Rcv(PVK_ETR)PSK1) =|> 
State'  := 3     
/\Snd(ETR.MS.{M,ETR,N1,EIDPre}{PUK_
MS}, {H(M,ETR,N1,EIDPre)}{PVK_ETR}  
/\witness(ETR,MS,N1)  
% The ETR sends a Map-Register pack in State 3. The content 
of this message is encrypted using MS public key PUK which is 
known publicly and signed digitally using the private key of the 
ETR. The Map-Register packet includes the ETR address, 
random number (N1) and a list EID-Prefix managed by ETR. 
4.State    = 3  /\ Rcv(PVK_MS)PSK2) 
=|>State'  := 4 
/\Snd(MS.ETR.{m2,N1}{PUK_ETR},{H(m
2,n1)}{PVK_MS)} /\ witness(MS,ETR,N1) 
/\ secret (PUK_ETR,PVK_MS,{MS,ETR}) 
% In the State 4, the MS will use its private key PVK_MS to 
decrypt the message and then verify the signature using the ETR 
public key PUK_ETR. Then MS will hash the included Map 
Register and compare the result with the received signed value.   
End role %End of session transition 
 
The security requirements of the system are defined under the table 4.6 shows the 
#Specification Security Goals heading. The lines starting with the keyword Secret define the 
secrecy properties of the protocol. secret_of Map_server and Router_ETR on n1 specifies the 
n1 nonce as a secret between the ETR and the MS. The line starting the ROUTER_ETR 
authenticates Server_MS on n1. Authentication on_n1 defines the protocol’s authenticity 
properties, where the MS is authenticated correctly to ETR using the random number n1. The 
weak_authentication ETR and MS assertion could be explained as follows: if ETR has 
completed a run of protocol with MS, then MS has previously been running the protocol, 
apparently with ETR.  
 
Table 4.6 HLPSL Code: Specification Security Goals 
 
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be cheeked  
security_of secEtrMS, secMsEtr  
 
% Check the secrecy of between ETR and MS and between MS 
and ETR in order to avoid any intruder between these two 
entities.    
weak_authentication_on _ETR 
 
% Check the authentication of ETR, and then ETR should 
provide confirmation witness information to MS. 
weak_authentication_on_MS % Check the authentication of MS, and the MS should provide 
confirmation witness information to ETR. 
authentication on_n1 
 
% strong authentication between router ETR and map server 
MS on value of random nonce N1.     
End goal %End of session goal  
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Table 4.7 shows the # Intruder Information heading specifies the intruder’s identity, 
knowledge and capability. The first line identifies the intruder; the intruder knowledge 
defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge. In other words, it has been assumed that the intruder 
knows the identity of the participants, their own private key, and can fabricate Map-Register 
and Map-Notify messages.  
Table 4.7 HLPSL Code: Intruder Information Heading.  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
intruder_knowledge = 
{ETR,MS,ETR,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_
ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H,M,M2} 
 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities. Check the 
intruder between the ETR and MS on pre-shared keys PSK1 and 
PSK2. And also check if intruder captures the public keys PUK  
between the ETR and MS.  
composition % It is one or more basic roles, gluing them together so they 
execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving semantics.  
session(etr,ms,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_
ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,h) /\  
 
%set keys  PSK1, PSK2, PUK and PVK of ETR and MS  
session(etr,i,PVK_ETR,h)/\  
 
%Check the intruder between the ETR and the received PVK 
ETR from the TKG.   
session(Ms,i,PVK_MS,h) 
 
%Check the intruder between the MS and the received PVK MS 
from the TKG.   
end role %End of session role  
 
4.3.3 Analysis of Results  
Four tools in Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications 
(AVISPAP) have been used in order to check and verify any security vulnerabilities in the 
registration protocol. Figure 4.6 shows; the current version of the tool integrates four back-
ends: the On-the-fly Model-Checker OFMC, the Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher CL-
AtSe, the SAT-based Model-Checker SATMC and the TA4SP protocol analyser, they 
verifies protocols by implementing tree automata based on automatic approximations. All the 
back-ends of the tool analyse protocols under the assumptions of perfect cryptography and 
that the protocol messages are exchanged over a network that is under the control of a Dolev-
Yao intruder [AVISPA, 2013]. That is, the back-ends analyse protocols by considering the 
standard protocol independent, asynchronous model of an active intruder who controls the 
network but cannot break cryptography; in particular, the intruder can intercept messages and 
analyze them if he possesses the corresponding keys for decryption, Furthermore he can 
generate messages from his knowledge and send them under any party name. 
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Fig 4.6 AVISPA Results 
Table 4.8 shows the results of the proposed security protocol for the registration stage in 
LISP architecture, while the input code and results are described in the appendix section -D.  
Furthermore, AVISPA is used to verify the security properties like secrecy, integrity and 
authentication. It gives details about whether the protocol is safe or not. If not then it also 
gives the trace of the attacks found, to indicate secrecy attack or authentication attack. So 
even though many properties of the protocol are to be checked, but only few can be verified 
using AVISPA. For this reason, the modelling is done in HLPSL language used by AVISPA 
tool. For our verification, OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP have been used to search for 
the attacks on the protocol. The feature of finding and tracing the attack makes AVISPA 
different from other tools. Hence the tool is tested and the protocol verification results are 
analysed; the results show that they do not have any security flaws and the security protocol 
of registration stage is safe to be used.   
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Table 4.8 AVISPA Tools (OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP) Results 
 
 
4.3.4 Security Protocol Analysis for Registration in LISP Network 
Architecture  
       In spite of the fact that no attack has been discovered against the proposed solution in 
section 4.3.1, this result needs to be considered carefully. The formal verification result is 
based on the system defined in chapter 2 section 2.13. In this system, it has been assumed that 
the ETR knows the authoritative MS in its network or domain which is a very similar way to 
the current Domain Naming System (DNS), where clients are preconfigured with the 
authoritative DNS server. However, it simulates the case when the ETR is not sure of the 
identity of its authoritative MS. The following attack against the Secret_of Server_MS, 
Router_ETR on n1, ROUTER_ETR authenticates Server_MS on n1 and weak_ 
authentication Router_ETR, Server_MS assertions where discovered. Here the notations 
I_MS, I_ETR and I_TKG represent the case where the Intruder impersonates the MS, ETR 
and TKG, respectively. This is an active MitM; the Intruder intercepts and replays message 
A1 and A2 as shown in figure 4.7 this because the packets are sent in clear text. Since the 
ETR is not sure of the identity of the MS, the intruder manages to impersonate the MS and 
fools the ETR to use its public key rather than the MS’s public key to encrypt message A3. 
Version Tool Description Result 
 
Basic session 
 
OFMC 
Visited Nodes: 376 nodes 
Depth: 11 plies 
Search Time: 0.9s 
 
SAFE 
 
Basic session 
 
ATSE 
Analysed   : 23states 
Reachable  : 6 states 
Translation:  0.00 seconds 
Computation: 0.05 seconds 
 
SAFE 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic session 
 
 
 
 
 
SATMC 
Attack Found    false     Boolean upper Bound 
Reached       true    boolean 
graphLeveledOff    4       steps 
satSolver          zchaff      solver 
maxStepsNumber  11      steps 
stepsNumber          5       steps 
atomsNumber      542      atoms 
clausesNumber   1716      clause e 
ncodingTime      0.36       seconds 
solvingTime       0.006     seconds 
if2sateCompilationTime  0.09  seconds 
ATTACK TRACE 
%% no attacks have been found... 
 
 
 
 
SAFE & 
goal as specified 
 
 
Basic session 
 
TA4SP 
STATISTICS 
SECURITY-As specified 
ATTACK TRACE 
No attack found 
 
SAFE 
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Consequently, the random number (n1) will be compromised and ETR will run the protocol 
mistakenly believing it to be with the MS, while in reality it is with the Intruder in B1, B2 
and B3 
 
Fig 4.7 Attacks Discovery on Registration 
In order to stop such attacks, the ETRs should be configured to use the authoritative Map 
Server in its domain or network. This could be achieved simply during the network 
configuration in a similar way to configure the default DNS server or the default Gateway in 
a network. Since the TKG enables users to communicate security and verify each other’s 
signature without exchanging public or private keys, the protocol prevents Dos attacks on the 
network. 
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4.4 Summary  
       In this chapter, an enhanced security protocol had been introduced to secure the 
registration stage in the LISP architecture. The first designed version enhanced protocol used 
a Trust Authentication Server (TAS) as a third party trusted between ETR and MS, in order 
to provide two-party mutual authentication to entities i.e. ETR and MS. Noticeably, attacks 
had been discovered by AVISPA; these attacks were divided into three categories in the 
registration protocol. (I) attacks on I_ETR and I_TAS; here the intruder intercepts the 
messages between ETR and TAS: These attacks are called playback attacks. (II) attacks on 
the I_MS and I_TAS, here the intruder listens to the conversation between MS and TAS 
which causes disclose of the confidentiality information of these devices, i.e., MS and TAS. 
These attacks are called eavesdropping attack. (III) The third category is attack on I_ETR and 
I_MS where the intruder intercepts the communication and acts as I_ETR or I_MS 
conversation between the ETR and MS. These are known as Man in Middle Attacks (MitM). 
Therefore, the final version of enhanced security protocol for registration stage in LISP 
architecture provided a new security method based on the IBC, allowing a Map-Server to 
check the received information (i.e. the EID-Prefix) and providing secure authentication as 
well. The protocol is verified by AVISPA tool and the results show that there are no security 
flaws.        
As chapter 4 has introduced an enhanced security protocol for the Registration Stage, Chapter 
5 introduces an enhanced security protocol for Resolving stage in LISP architecture.  
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Chapter 5 
An Enhanced Security Protocol for Resolving 
Addresses in LISP Network Architecture  
 
5.1 Introduction    
      As stated previously, Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is a routing architecture that 
provides new semantics for IP addressing. To simplify routing operations and improve 
scalability in Internet of Things (IoT), the LISP uses two different numbering spaces spaces 
to separate the device identifier from its location.  The Addresses Resolving in LISP 
architecture is a very important stage that allows the Map Server (MS) accept Map-Requests 
from routers, looks up database and returns the requested mapping. However,  the addresses 
between the RLoC routers need to be addressed, e.g. when the RloC router (A) wants to send data 
to the RLoC router (B), both of these routers need to be authenticated so that the information can 
be reached from its original destination. Furthermore, LISP limits the efficiency of the security 
protocol which works against the redirection of the data or acting as fake routers. Therefore, this 
chapter provides an enhanced security protocol between the Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) and the 
Egress Tunnel Router (ETR) using Challenge-Response authentication and Key agreement 
technique. Consequently, the structure of this chapter is divided as the following: section 5.2 
discusses the first version of the designed enhanced security protocol for the Resolving stage 
in LISP architecture, and various discovered attacks that have been found by Automated 
Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) tool. Whereas, section 5.3 
discusses the final version of the enhanced security protocol verified using AVISPA tool. 
Finally, a summary concludes the chapter in section 5.4.   
5.2 First Version Enhanced Security Protocol for Resolving 
Procedure in LISP Architecture 
        This section discusses and formally analyses the security of the basic address 
procedure of LISP.  
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5.2.1 The Security Protocol Description  
      It has been explained in chapter 2 the transaction messages of LISP when the IoT device 
wants to communicate with other IoT device using the LISP ITR and ETR routers. Chapter 3 
has also reviewed most of the threats weaknesses between ITR and ETR. The review has led 
to the realization that a security protocol is needed to secure the transfer of data between 
these routers. The following notations in Table 5.1 describe resolving procedure in LISP 
network architecture with their definitions.   
Table 5.1 Notation Resolving Procedure in LISP Network Architecture        
 
5.2.2 The Security Protocol Exchange Messages  
Figure 5.1 shows the sequence diagram for exchange message to the resolving procedure first 
version   
𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐩𝟏: 𝐈𝐓𝐑 → 𝐌𝐒: 𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐡(𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭) 
The ITR sends a Map-Request message which includes a 4-byte random nonce (N1) and the 
address of the ITR. The ITR expects to receive the same nonce in the Map-Reply message. 
𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐩𝟐: 𝐌𝐒 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: 𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐡(𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭) 
The Map Server (MS) encapsulates Step 1 and passes it to the relevant ETR as Step 2. 
𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐩𝟑: 𝐄𝐓𝐑 → 𝐈𝐓𝐑: 𝐄𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐥𝐲, 𝐡(𝐄𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭) 
The ETR composes Step 3 which includes a Map-Reply and the received nonce (N1). Upon 
receiving this message, the ITR checks the included nonce and only when the check succeeds, 
the ITR authenticates the ETR. 
The Notation Definition  
ITR The Ingress Tunnel Router in the source EID  Space 
ETR The Egress Tunnel Router in the destination  
EID Spec 
MS The Map Server 
N1 The Nonce  
h(m) Hash value of the message (m) 
{m}{k} The message (m) being encrypted with the Key (K).  
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Fig 5.1 Security protocol for Resolving Procedure First Version 
 
5.2.3 Formal Analysis of the basic Mapping Procedure using AVISPA  
        To analyse formally the basic mapping procedure, the system has been simulated using 
AVISPA tool. AVISPA file describes the system headers via using table 3.1 which has been 
introduced earlier in chapter 3. For conciseness, it only states here that the #specifying security 
Goals and the #Intruder Information heading only are described here while the rest are less 
significant in terms of understanding the verification process. Table 5.2 shows the security 
requirements of the system are defined under the # specification security Goals heading. The 
lines start with the keyword Secret which defines the secrecy of the protocol. The Secret _of 
sec_PSK_ItrMs is the PSK shared key between the ITR router and map-Server, the PSK_MsEtr 
is the shared key between the MS router and ETR. The N1 and N2 use the random number 
(nonce). Where the weak_authentication on PSK_ItrMS asserting could be interpreted as 
follows: 
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Table 5.2 HLPSL Code: Specifying Security Goals  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be checked  
secrecy_of challenge response n1 
security_of secitr, secn1,secms,secetr 
% Check the secrecy of random nonce N1 between MS 
and ETR.  
Weak_authentication on itr_ms 
 
% Check the authentication between ITR and MS, and 
then ITR should provide confirmation witness information 
to MS. 
Weak_authentication on ms_etr 
 
% Check the authentication between MS and ETR, and the 
MS should provide confirmation witness information to 
ETR. 
Weak_authentication on itr_etr 
 
% % Check the authentication between ITR and ETR, and 
the ITR should provide confirmation witness information 
to ETR. 
authentication_on etr_itr_n1 
 
% strong authentication between ETR and ITR on value of 
random nonce N1.     
End goal %End of session goal  
 
Table 5.3 shows the # Intruder Information heading specifies the intruder identity, knowledge 
and capability. The first line identifies the Intruder’s initial Knowledge, i.e., it has been assumed 
that the intruder knows the identity of the participants and can fabricate the Map Request and 
the Map Reply messages. 
Table 5.3 Intruder Information Heading  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
intruder_knowledge={ITR,MS,ETR,PSK_ITRM
S,PSK_MSETR,H,SK,mapRequest, mapReply} 
 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities. 
Check the intruder between the ITR and MS on pre-shared 
keys PSK_ITRMS and PSKMSETR. And also check if the 
intruder captures the session key SK between the ETR and 
ITR.  
composition % It is one or more basic roles, gluing them together so 
they execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving 
semantics.  
session(itr,ms,etr,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,h)/
\  
 
% set and defined ITR, MS and ETR on the network 
environment. Also defined the keys PSK_ItrMS, PSKEtr 
and SK.  
session(ms,i,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK) 
 
%Check the intruder on MS captures the PSK_ItrMS, 
PSK_MsEtr and Sk. 
session(itr,i,sk,h)/\  
 
%Check the intruder on ITR captures the SK.    
end role %End of session role  
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5.2.4 Security Analysis for Resolving Procedure in LISP Network 
Architecture 
After generating the HLPSL description of the system using AVISPA to check the security 
assertions, the following attacks are recognized: 
          
 
Fig 5.2 Security Attacks Discovery via AVISPA 
 
Figure 5.2 shows attacks discovered by AVISPA; as messages (A1) to (B1) show the intruder 
intercepts the communication and acts as I_MS. It impersonates (imitates or mimics) both 
parties and gains access to information when the two parties are trying to send messages to each 
other. This attack is called Man in Middle Attacks (MitM), which allows a malicious actor to 
intercept, send and receive data meant for someone else, or not meant to be sent at all, without 
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either outside party knowing until it is too late. Though, the intruder intercepts the messages 
(D1) to (F) and acts as I_ITR and I_ETR. This message is transformed like a hash function (h), 
meanwhile, the Intruder (I) eavesdrops on the conversation and keeps hash. When the 
interchange is over, the intruder is either as ITR or ETR. When MS asks for a proof of identity, 
the intruder sends ITR hash read from the first session, which MS accepts and thus grants 
access to the intruder. This attack is called eavesdropping attack.  
5.3 Final Version Enhanced Security Protocol of the Address 
Resolving Procedure in LISP Network Architecture 
       To address the previous attacks, there is a need to secure the (ITR-MS) and the (MS-ETR) 
connections. As it has been mentioned in section II, for the Registration process, it is presumed 
that LISP-Capable router (ITR, ETR) and MS have already agreed on secret keys. Similarly, it 
is to be presumed that these keys will be used to secure the transactions in the resolving 
procedure. The protocol uses the Key Agreement technique with the challenge response. The 
notations in table 5.3 are used in AVISPA as the following shows: 
Table 5.3 Notation of AVISPA  
 
5.3.1 Protocol Exchange Messages 
The following messages show the protocol procedures: 
 
𝑆𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝟏: 𝑰𝑻𝑹 → 𝑴𝑺: {
𝑰𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟏, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝑺𝑲,
𝑯(𝑰𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟏, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝑺𝑲)
} {𝑷𝑺𝑲𝟏} 
 
The Notation Definition 
ITR The Ingress Tunnel Router in the source EID  Space 
ETR The Egress Tunnel Router in the destination  EID Spec 
MS The Map Server 
N1,N2 The Nonce is a random number 
H(m) Hash value of the message (m) 
{m}{k} The message (m) being encrypted with the Key (K).  
SK Secret key (session Key) 
PSK1 Is shared between  ITR and MS 
PSK2 Is shared between the MS and ETR 
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𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝟐: 𝑴𝑺 → 𝑬𝑻𝑹: {
𝑰𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟏, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝑺𝑲,
𝑯(𝑰𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟏, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝑺𝑲)
} {𝑷𝑺𝑲𝟐} 
The ITR composes Step 1 and includes a freshly generated secret key (SK) to be used by the 
ETR to encrypt the Map-Reply packet. Then, this message is forwarded by the MS towards the 
ETR router in Step 2.  
 
Fig 5.3 Security Protocol Address Resolving Procedure 
 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝟑: 𝑬𝑻𝑹 → 𝑰𝑻𝑹: {
𝑬𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟐, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚,
𝑯(𝑬𝑻𝑹, 𝑵𝟏, 𝑵𝟐, 𝑴𝒂𝒑𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚)
} {𝑺𝑲} 
When the ETR receives the Map-Request in Step 2, it replies a Map-Reply message in Step 3 
with a challenge nonce (N2). The message is encrypted using the suggested key (SK). 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝟒: 𝐈𝐓𝐑 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: {𝐍𝟐}{𝐒𝐊} 
The ITR returns the challenge (N2) encrypted using the key (SK) in Step 4. The ETR then 
checks the returned challenge to authenticate the ITR.  
5.3.2 Analysis of Results  
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPAP) is a 
modelling tool for building and analysing formal models of security protocols [AVISPA, 
2013].  Figure 5.4 shows the resolving procedure security protocol resyult verified b AVISPA, 
which integrates four back-ends namely; the On-the-fly Model-Checker OFMC, the 
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Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher CL-AtSe, the SAT-based Model-Checker SATMC, 
and the TA4SP protocol analyser, which verify protocols by implementing tree automata 
based on automatic approximations. All the back-ends of the tool analyse protocols under the 
assumption of perfect cryptography and that the protocol messages are exchanged over a 
network that is under the control of a Dolev-Yao intruder [AVISPA, 2013]. That is, the back-
ends analyse protocols by considering the standard protocol independent, asynchronous 
model of an active intruder who controls the network but cannot break cryptography. The 
intruder can inparticalar intercept messages and analyse them if he possesses the 
corresponding keys for decryption, and he can generate messages from his knowledge and 
send them under any party name. 
 
Fig 5.4 AVISPA Results 
Table 5.4 shows the results of the enhanced security protocol for resolving addresses in LISP 
architecture, while the input code and results are described in the appendix section -E.  
Besides, AVISPA is used to verify the security properties like secrecy, integrity and 
authentication. It gives details about whether protocol is safe or not. If not it gives the trace of 
the attacks found to indicate secrecy attack or authentication attack. Even through many 
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properties of the protocol are to be checked, but only few can be verified using AVISPA. For 
this the modelling is done in HLPSL, language used by AVISPA tool. For our verification, 
OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP have been used to search for the attacks on the protocol. 
The feature of finding and tracing the attack makes AVISPA different from other tools. 
Hence the tool is tested and the protocol verification results are analysed; the results shows 
that they do not have any security flaws and the security protocol resolving addresses is safe 
to be used.   
Table 5.4 AVISPA Tools (OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP) Results 
Version Tool Description Result 
 
Basic session 
 
OFMC 
Visited Nodes: 287 nodes 
Depth: 11 plies 
Search Time: 0.16s 
 
SAFE 
 
Basic session 
 
ATSE 
Analysed   : 18states 
Reachable  : 6 states 
Translation: 0.00 seconds 
Computation: 0.04 seconds 
 
SAFE 
 
 
 
 
Basic session 
 
 
 
 
SATMC 
AttackFound    false   Boolean upper 
BoundReached   true    boolean 
graphLeveledOff    4        steps 
satSolver          zchaff       solver 
maxStepsNumber  11       steps  
stepsNumber          5         steps 
atomsNumber       545      atoms  
clausesNumber    1716     clause e 
ncodingTime        0.36     seconds 
solvingTime         0.006   seconds 
if2sateCompilationTime  0.09  seconds 
ATTACK TRACE 
%% no attacks have been found... 
 
 
 
SAFE & 
goal as specified 
 
 
Basic session 
 
TA4SP 
STALISTICS 
SECURITY-As specified 
ATTACK TRACE 
No attack found 
 
SAFE 
 
5.3.3 Security Analysis for the Resolving Address in LISP Network 
Architecture 
        The main goals of the proposed protocols are to achieve a mutual authentication between 
ETR and ITR routers and secure the direct connection between them. However, it is crucial to 
achieve these goals with a minimum modification to basic LISP. The security-related goals 
could be achieved using different protocols such as the Internet Key Exchange (IEK), Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) protocols and the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [Djeddai et al. 
2016]. However, these protocols will significantly increase the number of exchanged messages, 
 
 
89 
 
at least five extra messages in the case of IKE and more than this in the case of IPsec. Moreover, 
packets-encapsulation due to the tunneling process in VPN protocols will add extra headers to 
the LISP-capable devices. The fact that the formal verification of the enhanced protocol, using 
AVISPA, found no attacks against any of the checked assertions implies that the protocol 
achieves successfully a number of crucial security requirements such as mutual authenticating 
the participating parties and maintaining the security of the session key between the ITR and 
ETR routers. Furthermore, the protocol does not require major modification to the basic LISP 
transactions and no extra headers are needed for the packets encapsulation. 
5.4 Summary  
 
      In this chapter, an enhanced security protocol has been introduced to secure the Resolving 
stage in the LISP architecture. The first designed version of the enhanced protocol uses a 
random value generating and functions to provide a safe and secure transaction message 
between ITR and ETR. The protocol is simulated using AVISPA and two attacks have been 
discovered namely (I) MitM and (II) eavesdropping attacks. 
Therefore, the final version of the enhanced security protocol for the Resolving stage in LISP 
architecture has provided a new security method, based on the Challenge-Response 
authentication and Key agreement technique, allowing ITR and ETR to authenticate each other. 
The protocol is verified by AVISPA tool. The results show that this protocol is void of any 
security flaws.  
The study goes on to propose, in chapter 6, an efficient security communication protocol for 
IoT based on LISP network architecture using El-Gamal encryption system. The proposed 
protocol method meets the objectives of practicability, simplicity and strong notions of 
security.  
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Chapter 6 
A secure Authentication Protocol for Internet of 
Things Communication using LISP Network 
Architecture  
 
6.1 Introduction  
      Needless to say that the Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming indeed a reality as vast numbers 
of smart objects are interconnected via the Internet Protocol (IP). In this context a number of 
applications come to handle sensitive information, and thus, security mechanisms are very much 
required to ensure confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the collected information. 
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is one of best solutions to adopt a huge number of the 
IoT devices by supporting communication and mobility of these connected devices. However, it 
should be always remembered that the security level of LISP is still under development. 
Therefore, this chapter proposes a new security protocol for IP-based Wireless Sensor (IP-WSN) 
using LISP architecture. The accomplished protocol is based on El-Gamal encryption system in 
order to provide End-to-End (E2E) Security to IoT devices. Hence, the structure of this chapter is 
divided as the following: 6.2 proposes the first version of the security communication protocol 
using Challenge-response and Diffie-Hellman key exchange and tackles different types of attacks 
found by Automated Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) tool. 
Whereas, section 6.3 presents the final version of security commotion protocol for IoT based 
on LISP architecture using El-Gamal encryption system verified using AVISPA tool. Finally, a 
summary concludes the chapter and that is in section 6.4.   
  
6.2 First Version of the Security Protocol for Internet of Things 
Communication using LISP Network Architecture 
        The goal of the security protocol is to offer End-to-End security to the IP-based Wireless 
Sensor Network (IP-WSN). Therefore, the following describes the security protocol:  
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6.2.1 The Security Protocol Description   
        In this protocol, Sensor-A wants to establish a secure connection and negotiate a Diffie-
Hellman key with Sensor-B. As they do not know each other in advance, the authentication is 
checked and performed using an XTR router as a trusted party. Both Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
have initially shared keys with XTR. Figure 6.1 shows the simple exchanged messages of the 
protocol.  
 First, both Sensor-A and Sensor-B create Diffie-Hellman half-keys, along with hashes that 
are encrypted for XTR (denoted by the message 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝐴 and 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝐵 , respectively). After 
checking these messages, XTR replies with appropriate acknowledged messages  𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐴 and 
𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐵 that also contain encrypted hashes for the respective recipients. Finally, Sensor-A and 
Sensor-B perform a mutual challenge-response using the new Diffie-Hellman key that is 
authenticated by XTR. Where, the XTR is used as  a third party trust authentication in order 
to provide authentication to the sensor A and Sensor B, as the Diffie-Hellman performs a 
good keys exchange between the devices only not for authentication.  
 
 
Fig 6.1 the Simple Message Exchange 
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Table 6.1 Notations of Communication Protocol 
6.2.2 The Security Protocol Exchange Messages  
𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐩 𝟏: 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐀 → 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐁 : 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐀,𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐁,𝐍, 𝐂𝐇𝟏, 𝐞𝐱𝐩(𝐆, 𝐗), 𝐇{(𝑺𝑲𝑨,𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐀, 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐁, 𝐍, 𝐂𝐇𝟏, 𝐞𝐱𝐩(𝐆, 𝐗)} 
It has been assumed that two communication parties, Sensor-A and Sensor-B, want to 
communicate together in a secure way. In step 1, Sensor-A chooses a random X value and 
compute𝐷𝐻: 𝑔𝑥𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 , then it sends a challenge response CH1 and partial key of SKA  
including N a nonce number and the compute function number which have computed early 
from Sensor-A. To prevent the adversary from revealing the message, this message is 
encrypted and hashed by H function.        
Step 2: SensorB → XTR :  SensorB, exp(G,X), XOR exp(G,Y), H{(𝑺𝑲𝑩, ( SensorA, SensorB, N, CH1, exp(G,X) }, H{(SKA, 
SensorA, SensorB, N, CH1, exp(G,X)}, SensorB, exp(G,X), XOR exp(G,Y) 
The Sensor-B chooses a random Y value, compute𝑠 𝐷𝐻: 𝑔𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and forwards the message 
to the XTR in order to verify the devices and establish authentication between the Sensor-A 
and the Sensor-B. This message includes the computed values of Sensor-A and Sensor-B. 
Obviously, both are hashed by H function. It is important to mention that the XTR is the third 
trust party and all the hush value and information of the devices are stored in the database of 
the XTR.In turn, this allows checking and verifying the device by the XTR.     
The Notation Definition 
 
Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
Two communication parties, Wireless Sensor Node; its sensor device has 
IP address and prefixes identifying the end-points called EID. 
 
 
XTR 
XTR refers to a device which functions both as an Ingress Tunnel Router 
ITR and an Egress Tunnel Router ETR (which is  usually typical),  
                    (𝓖, 𝒈, 𝒑) A finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime order 𝑝; Both  
 𝑔 and  𝑞 are publicly known. 
𝑺𝑲𝑨,𝑺𝑲𝑩 Shared Secret keys of Sensor-A and Sensor-B.  
𝑺𝑲𝑨−𝑿𝑻𝑹, 𝑺𝑲𝑩−𝑿𝑻𝑹  Shared Secret keys of Sensor-A and Sensor-B, which are shared with 
XTR router.  
⊕ Bit-wise exclusive or operation 
𝑯, 𝑯′ Two secure on-way hash functions. 
𝐃𝐇 Diffie-Hellman 
𝐂𝐇𝐧 Challenge number n 
𝑵 Random number 
𝐗𝐢 ,𝐘𝐢 Variable value which is chosen and computed from both XTR and Sensor 
nodes   
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F.g 6.2 The Security Communication Protocol for IoT first version 
Step3:  XTR → SensorB:  SensorB, SensorA, H {( 𝑺𝑲𝑩, SensorB), H {𝑺𝑲𝑨, exp (G, X) XOR exp (G, Y), H{(𝑺𝑲𝑨−𝑿𝑻𝑹, 
𝑺𝑲𝑩−𝑿𝑻𝑹 , SensorB, SensorA, H {( 𝑺𝑲𝑩, SensorB), H {𝑺𝑲𝑨, exp (G, X) XOR exp (G, Y)} 
Upon receiving step2, the XTR checks verification by its database and then generates a 
Shared Secret keys  𝑆𝐾𝐴−𝑋𝑇𝑅 ,𝑆𝐾𝐵−𝑋𝑇𝑅 , between the XTR and sensor nodes. These keys are 
usually generated after checking the computed values of the SensorA, and SensorB.  
Step4:  SensorB → SensorA: SensorB, SensorA, CH1, CH2, exp (G, Y), H {(𝑺𝑲𝑨−𝑿𝑻𝑹, exp (G, X) XOR (G, Y)}, H {(SKA, 
SensorA)} 
After receiving the message in Step3, the Sensor-B  de-capsulate the message and computes 
the value that has been received from XTR  and then compares it with the value that has been 
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generated by itself in Step1 in order to verify that the original message has not been changed 
or manipulated by a third party. After that, if the value that has been compared is true, the 
Sensor-B authenticates with XTR. If the value is not true, the protocol terminates. At the 
same time, Sensor-B forwards a message in step 4 to Sensor-A. This message includes CH1 
challenge response of Sensor-A, which has been already sent in step 1, and CH2 challenge 
response of Sensor-B and also SKA−XTR, the shared secret key between the Sensor-A and XTR 
and the computed value Y of the Sensor-B encrypted with SKA secret key of sensor-A.  
Step 5: SensorA → SensorB  : SensorA, SensorB, CH2, CH3 H {(exp G, X), Y), SensorA, SensorB, CH2, CH3} 
Sensor-A compares the challenge response CH1, CH2, then verifies the values which are sent 
from Sensor-B by computing these values and then Sensor-A will authenticate with XTR. At 
the same time, Sensor-A computes the secret key value that is sent from Sensor-B with the 
generator of XTR and then Sensor-A authenticates with sensor-B. In step 5, Sensor-A sends 
the computed value and its hash by H function, including also CH2 of Sensor-B and new 
CH3 of Sensor-A.   
Step6:  SensorB → SensorA: SensorB, SensorA   Ch3, CH4 H {(exp G, X), Y), SensorB, SensorA   Ch3, CH4 
Here, Sensor-B receives CH2 and CH3 in step 5. Sensor-B verifies and computes values, then 
Sensor-B authenticates with Sensor-A. In step 6, Sensor-B replies the message with old CH3 
of Sensor-A and new CH4 of Sensor-B in order to confirm that they are now authenticated 
and can establish the communication safely.       
6.2.3 Specification and Verification of Protocol  
         The first version of communication protocol for IP-WSN using LISP network 
architecture is simulated using AVISPA tool. In this protocol, the focus is only on the 
#Security Goals and the #Intruder Information heading as described here while the rest is less 
significant in terms of understanding the verification process. The security requirements of 
the system are defined under the #Specification Security Goals. The SKA and SKB are the 
secret shared keys which are stored in Sensor-A and Sensor-B and the shared partial between 
each other. The SKA-XTR, and SKB-XTR are the shared keys between the XTR and Sensor 
node; these keys are derived from and are generated by XTR router. The CH is the challenge 
response, in which one party, (i.e., Sensor-A) is a question (‘Challenge’) and the other party, 
(i.e., Sensor-B) must provide a valid answer (‘response’) to be authenticated. The #Intruder 
Information heading specifies the intruder identity, knowledge and capability. The first line 
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identifies the intruder knowledge and defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge. It has been 
assumed that an intruder knows the identity of the participants and fabricates the information 
between Sensor-A and Sensor-B or between XTR and Sensor nodes by intercepting the 
connection and then redirecting it to a different location.         
Table 6.2 HLPSL Code: Intruder Information Heading         
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
intruder_knowledge={a,b,xtr,h,g,n,ska_sk
b_i_xtr} 
 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities, check the 
intruder between Sensor-A, Sensor-B and XTR and also checks 
Session keys SKA and SKB if intruder captures between sensor-
A and Sensor-B 
composition % It is one or more basic roles, gluing them together so they 
execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving semantics.  
session(a,b,xtr,h,sk_a_xtr,sk_b_xtr,n,g) 
 
% In the session, one usually declares all the channels used by 
the basic roles. Likewise, set session of Sensor-A and defined 
the keys SKA, and SKB on the network environment.   
/\session(a,b,xtr,h,sk_a_xtr,sk_b_xtr,n,g  % The /\ operator indicates that these roles should execute in 
parallel. In the session, one usually declares all the channels 
used by the basic roles. Also, it sets session of Sensor-B and 
defines the keys SKB, and SKA on the network environment. 
end role %End of session role  
 
It is set in this protocol as Weak_authentication on Sensor_A_Sensor_B, and 
Weak_authentication on Sensor_B_ Sensor_A in order to see the protocol performance and 
impact against the attacks. The authentication_on Router_XTR_A key, authentication_on 
Router_XTR_B key1 and secrecy_of sec_a_Key, sec_b_Key is set as a strong authentication 
on the keys generated between the XTR and Sensor nodes.   
 
Table 6.3 HLPSL Code: Specifying Security Goals 
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be cheeked  
weak_authentication _on sensor_a  
sensor_b 
 
% Checks the authentication of Sensor-A, and then Sensor-A 
should provide confirmation witness information to SensorB. 
weak_authentication _on sensor_b 
sensor_a 
% Checks the authentication of Sensor-B, and the Sensor-B 
should provide confirmation witness information to Sensor-A. 
authentication _on router_xtr_a key  
 
% strong authentication between router XTR and Sensor-A on 
Key that is generated and computed by XTR router.     
authentication _on router_xtr_b key1  
 
% strong authentication between router XTR and Sensor-B on 
Key1 that is generated and computed by XTR router.     
Secrecy_of  sec_a_key, sec_b_key  Checks the secrecy between Sensor-A and Sensor-B in order to 
avoid any intruder between these two entities.    
End goal %End of session goal  
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6.2.4 Security Communication Protocol Analysis 
        This attack works by first observing a session between a host, (i.e., Sensor-A) and the 
replaying message from session Sensor-B, posed both as Sensor-A. Figure 6.3 shows the 
discovered attack by AVISPA tool. 
 
Fig 6.3 Security attacks discovery via AVISPA 
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Another attack recently discovered with AVISPA is the based fact that Sensor-B cannot 
distinguish messages   (A1) to (F2) which put the security protocol on risk by spoofing the 
information messages exchanged between the devices. As the intruder (i) is able to play a 
third party, he/she can redirect the communication session to different directions. This attack 
is called MitM, which allows a malicious actor to intercept, send and receive data meant for 
someone else, or not meant to be sent at all, without either outside party knowing until it is 
too late. Therefore, a new security communication protocol is needed to provide strong 
authentication to sensor nodes in order to resist any possible attacks intercepting the 
transaction messages.    
6.3 Final Version Mutual authentication Proposed for IP-WSN 
Communication using LISP network architecture 
        This section discusses an authentication and key exchange protocol using El-Gamal 
encryption method to secure sensor nodes communication based on the LISP protocol 
architecture in order to provide End-to-End Security. The protocol uses bit-wise exclusive or 
operation technique. In this protocol, the used notations are described as the following: 
   Table 6.4 Protocol Notations 
The Notation Definition 
Sensor-A and Sensor-B Two communication parties, Wireless Sensor Node; its sensor device has IP 
address and prefixes identifying the end-points are called EID. 
XTR XTR refers to a device which functions both as an Ingress Tunnel Router ITR 
and an Egress Tunnel Router ETR (which is usually typical). 
(𝓖, 𝒈, 𝒑) A finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime order 𝑝; Both   𝑔 
and  𝑞 are publicly known. 
N Is an element in   𝒢  
𝑷𝑲𝑨, 𝑷𝑲𝑩 A public key of Sensor–A and Sensor-B stores in sensor nodes and XTR and 
it is shared with XTR routing. 
𝑲𝑨, 𝑲𝑩 Private Keys of Sensors-A and B, are stored in sensor nodes and are used to 
check and verify the computes results sent from XTR router 
UA,UB It is computing and generating of secret values by XTR router. This is shared 
between Sensor-A and Sensor-B. 
⊕ Bit-wise exclusive or operative. 
𝑯′ Two secure on-way hash functions. 
SK Session key of (Sensor-A and Sensor-B) 
𝕫 Integer Number set. 
𝐱𝐢 ,𝐲𝐢, 𝐙, 𝐋 It is a Variable value which is chosen and computed from both XTR and 
Sensor nodes. 
𝒂𝒊, 𝜷𝒊 𝑎𝑖 means alpha where  𝛽𝑖  means beta, both are used to authenticate and verify 
two parties together 
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6.3.1 Description Protocol  
        In this system, it has been assumed that two communication parties, Sensor-A and 
Sensor-B, want to communicate together in a secure way. Let PKA be the secure key shared 
between Sensor-A and XTR which is arbitrary bit string. Here, Sensor-A stores (PKA, KA,) 
while the XTR stores (PKA, UA), where UA represents sensor-A and is derived and computed 
by XTR, i.e., 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 = 𝑔
𝑘𝐴 and ( 𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝐾𝐴) = 𝐻(𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝐾𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, ). Similarly, for PKB 
can be a secret key shared between Sensor-B and XTR. Again, Sensor-B stores (PKB, KB) 
while the XTR stores (PKB, UB), where 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 = 𝑔
𝐾𝐵  and  (𝑃𝐾𝐵, 𝐾𝐵) = 𝐻(𝑃𝐾𝐵, 𝐾𝐵,
𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵). Here, Sensor-A and Sensor-B can check and verify UA, and UB which have been 
computed by XTR by using ( 𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝐾𝐴) and (PKB, KB). 
6.3.2 The Security Protocol Transaction Messages for IP-WSN 
Communication    
Step1a: Sensor-A chooses a random number 𝑥 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞  and 
computes  (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
x  → NSensor−A , where the 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  is the network 
identity which is a portion of the TCP/IP address that is used to identify Sensor-A on the 
network, also the network ID here is designed to ensure the security of network and related 
resources. The 𝑃𝐾𝐴 is the public key of the sensor-A, the H is the hash function that takes the 
digital object passed through the algorithm to produce the hash.  
⊕   is the XoR used for encryption and the decryption of  the data. The   𝑔x  is the prime 
value which is publicly known, and X is the value which has been chosen from sensor-A.  
NSensor−A  is the outcome of the computes value. Then Sensor-A sends 
(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 ) to Sensor-B.  
Step1b: Sensor-B chooses a random number  𝑦 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞  and 
computes (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
y  → NSensor−B , and then Sensor-B sends  
(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 ), (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 ) to XTR router.  
 
Step2a: Upon receiving (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)   and  (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵) , XTR uses 
𝑃𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝐾𝐵 to compute (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⨁ NSensor−A  → 𝑔
x and 
(𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⨁ NSensor−B  → 𝑔
y  respectively. The XTR as a third trust 
party used its stored database to check and verify the values that have been sent from sensor  
A and sensor B whether they match or not. 
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Step2b: Now XTR chooses a random number  𝑧 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞  and computes  
(𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑧 → 𝐿  , (𝑔𝑥)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑥𝑧 → 𝑎 , (𝑔𝑦)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑦𝑧 → 𝑏 , here the 
(𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧 are the XTR shared key between  Sensor-A and Sensor-B, Z 
is the chosen value of XTR router.  The 𝑔 is the publicly known prime value.  L is the 
outcome of the computes value.  Where 𝑎 represents sensor-A which has been computed in 
step1a, and 𝑏 represents sensor-B which has been computed in step1b.  Then XTR computes  
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑏 → 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  and 
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑎 → 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵  and XTR sends 
(𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿), (𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝐿) to Sensor-B. 
 
Step3a: Once Sensor-B receives the sent message, it uses KB the private key to compute 
𝐿𝐾𝐵 → (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧 which is the variable value chosen and computed from the XTR router, 
and it is used as shard key between the XTR and Sensor-B. As the same time it used KB to 
compute  ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 → 𝑎  and sensor-B 
authenticates with XTR. Now, Sensor-B uses 𝑦  which is the previously chosen value to 
compute  𝑎𝑦 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾, (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼  and forwards 
(𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿), 𝛼 to Sensor-A. 
 
Step3b: Sensor-A receives (𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿, 𝛼) and it uses 𝐾𝐴 to compute  𝐿
𝐾𝐴 → (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧 
and ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 → 𝑏 and authenticates the 
XTR router. Then, Sensor-A uses 𝑥  to compute 𝑏𝑥 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾  and checks whether 
(𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼 holds or not. If it does not hold, the protocol terminates, 
Otherwise, Sensor-A is convinced that 𝐾  is a valid session key. After that, Sensor-A 
computes (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛽  and forwards it to Sensor-B. Sensor-A 
computes the Session Key (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻
′  → 𝑆𝑘𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴.  
 
Step3c: Upon receiving  𝛽 , Sensor-B computes (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛽  and 
verifies whether computed 𝛽 is equal to the received 𝛽. If both are equal, then B authenticates 
Sensor-A and computes the session key (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  ) → 𝑆𝑘𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 
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Fig 6.4 the proposed Security Protocol for IP-WSN node Communication using LISP Network 
6.3.3 Security Protocol Analysis for IP-WSN Communications  
        The main goal of the proposed protocol is to provide mutual authentication and E2E 
security between the IP-WSN nodes, (i.e., Sensor-A and Sensor-B) and XTR router when the 
devices are communicating with each other. Therefore, this section provides a security 
protocol proposed analysis for IP-WSN communications.  
        6.3.3.1 Trivial Attacks:  
Actually, computing the session key from the transmitted messages 𝑎  and 𝛽  is 
impossible due to one-way of hash function and, also, for computing it from other 
transmitted messages. The latter can 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 or 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 where an attacker has to 
face the difficulty of a discrete logarithm problem. Consequently, this protocol is 
resistant to trivial attack. 
        6.3.3.2 Secret Keys Guessing Attacks:  
Suppose an attacker or malicious node Sensor-B tries to guess Sensor-A secret key as 
𝑃𝐾𝐴  generates (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 → 𝑔
𝑥  and the XTR router 
in online Message 1 of the protocol. To verify the correctness of his guessed secret key; 
it needs to compute ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 → 𝑏 
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and ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝑏)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑟−𝐵 → 𝑎 as it needs the 
values of 𝐾𝐴  and 𝐾𝐵 for computing (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧  and  (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧 . Similarly, 
remaining off-line also and using the transferred messages 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿, an attacker cannot verify the correctness of its guessed secret key. 
6.3.3.3 Man in the Middle Attack:  
In message 2 of the protocol, XTR authenticates the two communicating parties Sensor-
A and Sensor-B from the message (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
x  → NSensor−A , and 
(𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
y  → NSensor−B , sent by Sensor-B. Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
authenticate XTR, from  ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑏 →
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  and ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑎 → 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵  as 
𝑃𝐾𝐴 , 𝑃𝐾𝐵  are known only to XTR. Finally, Sensor-A authenticates Sensor-B 
from(𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼 .  Based on this, each party authenticates the 
other communicating party and, hence, there is no scope for MitM. 
6.3.3.4 Replay Attack:  
Since one way-hashed function is used, this protocol is invulnerable to this attack. 
6.3.3.5 Perfect Forward Security:  
When the secret keys of 𝑃𝐾𝐴  and 𝑃𝐾𝐵  of Sensor-A and Sensor-B devices are 
compromised, the attacker cannot calculate the session key as  𝐾𝐴 and 𝐾𝐵 as known. 
These values remain unknown even to the XTR router, so there is no chance of any 
compromise. Also, the session key is independent on any session and 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧  are 
randomly chosen.  
However, the security-related goals could be archived using different protocols. For example, 
there are the Internet key Exchange (IKE), the virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols and 
the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) as mentioned above. Furthermore, packets 
encapsulation due to the tunnelling process in VPN protocols will add extra load to the 
header of Sensor communication packets which make them incompatible with the current 
implementation Sensor communication capable devices.    
6.3.4 Specification and Verification of Protocol  
        As mentioned earlier, the proposed protocol has been implemented and evaluated using 
AVISPA tool. The achieved result has shown that no attack is being found. For this protocol, 
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three basic roles played by Sensor (A), Sensor (B) and XTR (R) router have been defined. 𝐾𝐴 
and  𝐾𝐵 are secret keys of Sensor-A and Sensor-B. 𝑃𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝐾𝐵 are shared with XTR and 
hence represent the symmetric keys . 𝐾𝐴 and 𝐾𝐵 remain secret with Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
as their private keys. XTR router gets 𝑈𝐴 = exp (𝐺, 𝐾𝐴) from Sensor-A and 𝑈𝐵 = exp (𝐺, 𝐾𝐵) 
from Sensor-B. Hence 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐵 are the public keys whose inverse is known only to Sensor-
A and Sensor-B respectively.  
Table 6.5 HLPSL Code: Basic Roles 
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
role sensor_A(A, B, XTR : agent, 
PKA : symmetric_key, 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
H : hash func, 
G : text) 
played_by A 
def= 
local State : nat, 
X, Z : text, 
UA : public_key, 
GY , Key, L : message, 
const sec_m_Key : protocol_id,  
init State := 0 
% This is (a fragment of) a role as Sensor_A, with 
parameters A, B and XTR type agent, and 
Symmetric_key. The RCV and SND parameters are type 
channel, indicating that the channel type, in this case (dy), 
denotes the intruder model to be considered for this 
channel. The parameter A appears in the played_by 
section, which means, intuitively, that A denotes the 
name of the agent who plays role as Sensor_A.  
Furthermore, the local section which declares local 
variables of Sensor_A: in this case, one called State 
which is a nat (a natural number) and another called UA, 
which will represent the public key. The local State 
variable is initialised to 0 the init section.     
role sensor_B (A, B, XTR : agent, 
PKA, PKB : symmetric_key, 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
H : hash func, 
PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
G :text) 
played by B 
def= 
local State : nat, 
X, Y, Z : text, 
GX, GY : message, 
UB : public key, 
Key : message, 
M1:hash(symmetric 
key.agent.agent.message.message).message, 
M2: hash(symmetric-
key.agent.agent.message.message).message 
const sec v Key : protocol id 
init State := 0 
% The role is as Sensor_B, with parameters A, B and 
XTR type agent, and Symmetric_key. The RCV and SND 
parameters are type channel, indicating that the channel 
type, in this cause (dy), denotes the intruder model to be 
considered for this channel. The parameter B appears in 
the played_by section, which means, intuitively, that B 
denotes the name of the agent who plays role Sensor_B. 
Besides, note the local section which declares local 
variables of Sensor_B: in this case, one called State 
which is a nat (a natural number) and another called UB, 
which will represent the public key. The M1 is 
represented  on H(PKA.A.B.exp(G, X).exp(UA, Z)).exp(L, Z), 
where M2 is represented  on H(PKB.A.B.exp(G, Y ).exp(UB, 
Z).exp(L, Z). The local State variable is initialised to 0 in 
the init section 
role router_xtr(A, B, XTR : agent, 
PKA, PKB : symmetric_key, 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
H : hash func, 
PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
G : text) 
played by XTR  
def= 
 local State : nat, 
X, Y, Z : text, 
UA, UB : public key 
 GX, GY : message 
init State := 0 
% The router_xtr represent the role with parameters A,B, 
and, and Symmetric_key. The RCV and SND parameters 
are type channel, indicating that the channel type, in this 
case (dy), denotes the intruder model to be considered for 
this channel. The parameter XTR appears in the 
played_by section, which means, intuitively, that XTR 
denotes the name of the agent who plays role router_xtr. 
Besides, note the local section which declares local 
variables of router_xtr: in this case, one called State 
which is a nat (a natural number) and another called UA, 
UB which will represent the public keys. The local State 
variable is initialised to 0 the init section 
 
 
103 
 
After defining the #basic roles, it is essentially needed to define the composed roles which 
describe the sessions of the protocol. The #composed roles have no transition section, but 
rather a composition section in which the basic roles are instantiated. The /\ operator indicates 
that these roles should execute in parallel. In the #session role, it usually declares all the 
channels used by the basic roles. These variables are not instantiated with concrete constants. 
The channel type takes an additional attribute, in parentheses, which specifies the intruder 
model that is assumed for that channel. Here, the type of the declaration channel (dy) stands 
for the Dolev-Yao intruder model [AVISPA, 2013]. Under this model, the intruder has full 
control over the network, i.e., all messages sent by agents will go to the intruder. The latter 
may intercept, analyse and/or modify messages (as far as he knows the required keys) and 
may send any message he composes to whoever he pleases, posing as any other agents. 
Finally, a top-level role is always defined. This role contains global constants and a 
composition of one or more sessions, where the #intruder may play some roles as a legitimate 
user. There is also a statement which describes what knowledge the intruder initially has. 
Typically, this includes the names of all agents, specifically all the symmetric keys and any 
shares with others.  It is to be noticed that, the constant ‘I’ is used to refer to the intruder as 
the source code below: 
Table 6.6 HLPSL Code: Role Session  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
role session( A, B, XTR : agent, 
H : hash func, 
PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
UA, UB :public key, 
G : text) 
def= 
local SND, RCV : channel (dy) 
composition 
 sensor_a(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,G) 
 /\ sensor_b(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,PKB,G) 
 /\ router_xtr(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,PKB,G) 
end role 
 
% role session is a basic role, gluing them together so 
they execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving 
semantics. The /\ operator indicates that these roles 
should execute in parallel. In the session role, one usually 
declares all the channels used by the basic roles. These 
variables are not instantiated with concrete constants. The 
channel type takes an additional attribute, in parentheses, 
which specifies the intruder model one assumes for that 
channel. Here, the type declaration channel (dy) stands 
for the Dolev-Yao intruder model. Under this model, the 
intruder has full control over the network, that all 
messages sent by agents will go to the intruder. He may 
intercept, analyse, and/or modify messages (as far as he 
knows the required keys), and send any message he 
composes to whoever he pleases, posing as any other 
agent. 
intruder knowledge = {a, b, xtr, g, h, pi, ua, ub, ui} 
 composition 
 session(b, a, xtr, h, pa, pb, ua, ub, g) 
/\ session(i, b, xtr, h, pi, pb, ui, ub, g) 
/\ session(a, i, xtr, h, pa, pi, ua, ui, g) 
end role 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities. 
Check the intruder between the Sensor-A, Sensor-B and 
XTR. And also check Symmetric_key (pa,pb,pi)and 
Public(ua,ub,ui) key if intruder captures between sensor-
A and Sensor-B and XTR. The /\ operator indicates that 
these roles should execute in parallel. 
End of session role  
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#Specifying Security Goals are specified in HLPSL by enhancing the transitions of the basic 
roles with the so-called goal facts and by then assigning them a meaning by describing, in the 
HLPSL goal section, what conditions, i.e., what combination of such facts  indicate an attack 
and a violation of secrecy. The goal declaration section describes that it should be considered 
as an attack when the intruder learns a secret value internally, the attack conditions are 
specified in terms of a temporal logic. Also, useful and concise macros are provided for two 
of the most frequently used security goals, authentication and secrecy.  
 
  Table 6.7 HLPSL Code: Specifying Security Goals:  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be cheeked  
authentication on key 
 
% strong authentication between router XTR and Sensor-A on 
Key that is generated and computed by XTR router 
authentication on key1 
 
% % strong authentication between router XTR and Sensor-B 
on Key1 that is generated and computed by XTR router.    
secrecy-of sec-m-Key, sec-v-Key 
 
Check the authentication of generated and computed keys by 
XTR 
End goal %End of session goal  
 
6.3.5 Analysis of Results  
In this section the communication protocol is tested by Automated Validation of Internet 
Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPAP). It has used four back-end tools which are 
integrated by AVISPA, namely; the On-the-fly Model-Checker OFMC, the Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher CL-AtSe, the SAT-based Model-Checker SATMC and the TA4SP 
protocol analyser, which verifies protocols by implementing tree automata based on 
automatic approximations. All the back-ends of the tool analyse protocols under the 
assumptions of perfect cryptography and that the protocol messages are exchanged over a 
network that is under the control of a Dolev-Yao intruder [AVISPA, 2013]. That is, the back-
ends analyse protocols by considering the standard protocol independent, asynchronous 
model of an active intruder who controls the network but cannot break cryptography; in 
particular, the intruder can intercept messages and analyse them if he possesses the 
corresponding keys for decryption, and he can generate messages from his knowledge and 
send them under any party name as figure 6.5 shows.  
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Fig 6.5 AVISPA Results 
Table 6.8 shows the results of the security communication protocol for IoT based on LISP 
architecture, while the input code and results are described in the appendix section -F.  
Significanly, AVISPA is used to verify the security properties like secrecy, integrity and 
authentication. It gives details about whether protocol is safe or not. If not it gives then the 
trace of the attacks found, to indicate secrecy attack or authentication attack. So even though 
many properties of the protocol are to be checked, but only few can be verified using 
AVISPA. For this the modelling is done in HLPSL, language used by AVISPA tool. For our 
verification, OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP have been used to search for the attacks on 
the protocol. The feature of finding and tracing the attack makes AVISPA different from 
other tools. Henceforth, the tool is tested and those protocol verification results are analysed. 
The results show that there are not any security flaws and the security communication 
protocol is safe to be used.   
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  Table 6.8 AVISPA Tools (OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP) Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Summary  
As demonstrated in this chapter, a security communication protocol for IoT based on LISP was 
proposed in two versions. The first version of the security protocol used Challenge-response and 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange; it was proposed to secure the communication between the IoT 
devices, when they communicate with each other based on LISP network architecture.  A formal 
analysis was provided using AVISPA tool and Man in the Middle Attack (MitM) was discovered 
via AVISPA security tool. Furthermore, the final version of a new security protocol for IP-based 
Wireless Sensor (IP-WSN) communication has been proposed using El-Gamal encryption 
system. The security analysis and verification using AVISPA show that no attacks were found in 
the communication protocol.  
 
In chapter 7, an interface is set on each level of the protocol in order to achieve secure refinement 
protocol to the IoT-based on LISP network architecture. Certainly, these proposed protocols 
methods meet the targeted objectives of practicability, simplicity and the strong notions of 
security. 
 
Version Tool Description Result 
 
Basic session 
 
OFMC 
VisitedNodes:25674 nodes 
Depth: 6 plies 
Search Time: 0.2s 
 
SAFE 
 
Basic session 
 
ATSE 
Analysed:      3874 States 
Reachable:     2635 States 
Translation:   0.00 seconds 
Computation: 0.01 seconds 
 
SAFE & 
goal as specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic session 
 
 
 
 
SATMC 
STATISTICS 
Attack Found : false   Boolean 
Upper Bound Reached: true Boolean 
Graph Leveled off: 5 steps 
Sat Solver: zchaff Solver 
Max Steps Number: 11 Steps 
Steps Number : 5 Steps 
Atoms Number: 543 Atoms 
Clauses Number 1613 Clauses 
Encoding Time: 0.2 Seconds 
If2Sate Compilation Time 0.02 Seconds 
ATTACK TRACE 
%%no attacks have been found… 
 
 
 
 
SAFE 
 
Basic session 
 
TA4SP 
STALISTICS 
SECURITY-As specified 
ATTACK TRACE 
No attack found 
 
SAFE 
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Chapter 7:  
A Security Refinement Protocol and Performance 
Analysis for Internet of Things Communication 
using LISP Network Architecture 
 
7.1 Introduction 
      To begin with, chapter 4 has revealed various numbers of vulnerabilities in Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices: revealing these vulnerabilities enables the adversary to capture a node 
easily. Consequently, this chapter proposes security refinement to IoT devices using 
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP). Besides, an interface is set as encapsulated security 
protocols namely resignation, resolving and communication protocols to accomplish a robust 
refinement to IoT at network layer.  Furthermore, the security refinement protocol is verified 
using Automated Validation Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) and the 
achieved results show that they do not have any security flaws. The chapter also provides 
performance security refinement protocol analysis and evaluation for IP-Based Sensor 
Networks (IP-WSN) communication using Contiki and Cooja simulation tool. Therefore, the 
chapter is organized as follows:  Section 7.2 proposes a security refinement protocol 
interface.  Section 7.3 discusses the simulation and performance analysis.  Section 7.4 
discusses the analysis Performance of communication overhead. Section 7.5 discusses the 
performance analysis of power computation for the security refinement protocol. Section 7.6 
discusses the performance analysis of memory consumption. Section 7.7 discusses the 
performance analysis of energy consumption. Section 7.8 discusses the security refinement 
protocol resilience against node compromise. Finally, section 7.9 concludes the chapter and 
summarises the main points.   
7.2 Security Refinement Protocol for Internet of Things using 
LISP Network Architecture   
       This section introduces security refinement protocol architecture to sensor node based on 
LISP network architecture in order to provide authentication and key agreement at network 
levels.     
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The next figure shows the keys tree that is used for the security purpose in this refinement 
protocol. Here, the private key (Ki) and public key (PKi) are stored in the Sensor device, 
which is used to decrypt and verify the authentication process. The keys PK1, PK2, PK3 and 
PK4 are used for encrypting the communication channel whereas SK is the session key used 
as key agreement between the parties at the network levels, while section 7.2.1 will explain 
the messages exchange of refinement protocol for IoT devices using LISP architecture.    
 
 
Fig 7.1 Keys Tree for Security refinement Protocol  
Table 7.1 Protocol Notation of Refinement Protocol   
The Notation Description 
TKG The Trusted Ticket Granting; it randomly generates pairs of Public/Private keys. 
Sensori Wireless Sensor Node; it is a sensor device that has IP address and prefixes 
identifying the end-points called EID. 
ITR The Ingress Tunnel Router in the source EID  Space 
ETR The Egress Tunnel Router in the destination EID  Space 
XTR Refers to the device which functions both as Ingress Tunnel Router ITR and an 
Egress Tunnel Router ETR. 
MS The Map Server. 
ni The Nonce is a random number 
K(ETR), 
K(MS) 
The private keys of the ETR and MS respectively. These keys are derived by the 
TKG. 
PSK1 Pre-Shared key to secure the connection between the TKG and the ETR. 
PSK2 Pre-Shared key to secure the connection between the TKG and MS. 
PSK3 Pre-Shared Key between ITR and MS. 
PSK4 Pre-Shared Key between the MS and ETR 
PKi Public key 
Ki Private key 
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Ui It is a partial of private key shared with XTR and it is derived from and computed 
by XTR Router. 
(𝓖, 𝐠, 𝐩) A finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime order 𝑝; both   𝑔 and  𝑞 
are publicly known. 
⨁ Bit-wise exclusive or operation 
SK Session Key 
N Is an element in   𝒢 
𝕫 Integer Number set 
x,y,Z,L It is a variable value which is chosen and computed from both XTR and Sensor 
Node 
𝛂𝐢, 𝛃𝐢 𝛼𝑖  means alpha where 𝛽𝑖 means beta; both are used to authenticate and verify two 
parties together. 
H(m) Hash value of the message (m) 
{m}{k} The message (m) being encrypted with the Key (K). 
 
7.2.1 The Security Refinement Protocols Transaction Messages for Internet 
of Things  
Phase 1 
Step0: 𝐄𝐓𝐑 → 𝐄𝐈𝐃: 𝐀𝐝𝐯 
 
The protocol starts when ETR detects the new host (EID) on the LISP network architecture 
domain. 
Step1: 𝐓𝐊𝐆 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑 ∶ { 𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑){𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟏} 
Step1: 𝐓𝐊𝐆 → 𝐌𝐒 ∶ { 𝐊(𝐌𝐒){𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟐} 
In the Step1 and Step2, the Trusted Ticket Granting (TKG) responds by providing two 
communicating parties (ETR, MS) with their keys K(ETR), K(MS). These two messages are 
encrypted using the pre-shared secret keys PSK1, and PSK2,  respectively.  
Step3: 𝐄𝐓𝐑 → 𝐌𝐒: {𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫}{𝐏𝐊(𝐌𝐒)}, {𝐡(𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫)}{𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑)} 
 
Here, the ETR sends LISP Map-Register packet in Step3. The content of this packet is 
encrypted using the MS’s Public key, which is publicly known and digitally signed using the 
private key of the ETR, the Map-Register packet includes the ETR’s address (RLOC), a 
random (n1) and a list of EID-Prefix managed by ETR.  
Step4: 𝐌𝐬 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: {𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲}{𝐏𝐊(𝐄𝐓𝐑)}, {𝐡(𝐌𝐚𝐩 − 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲)}{𝐊(𝐌𝐒)} 
Upon receiving Step3, the MS will use its private key K(MS) to decrypt the message and then 
verify the signature using the ETR’s public key PK(ETR). Finally, the MS will hash the 
included Map-Register and compare the result with the received signed value. Only if the two 
values are equal, the MS composes a Map-Notify packet as Step4, which includes the 
received random number (n1). This message is encrypted using the ETR’s public key and 
digitally random number (n1). The same message is encrypted using the ETR’s public key 
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and digitally signed using the MS’s private key. The ETR will check the included random 
number and only when the check succeeds, the ETR authenticates the MS.    
Phase 2 
Step5:  𝐈𝐓𝐑 → 𝐌𝐒: {𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐒𝐊, 𝐇(𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐒𝐊, )}{𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟑}  
 
The registration protocol will send a confirmation message that registration has been done 
successfully and ETR has been authenticated with MS in Step4. The second protocol will be 
run automatically in order to process authentication between the routers, i.e., ITR and ETR. 
Otherwise, the protocol will terminate. In Step6, the ITR will send a map-Request message 
which includes 4 byte random nonce (N1) and the address of the ITR. The ITR expects to 
receive the same nonce in the Reply message. In addition, Step5 includes a freshly generated 
Secret (SK) to use the ETR and then to encrypt the Map-Reply packet.     
Step6:  𝐌𝐒 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: {𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐒𝐊, 𝐇(𝐈𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐒𝐊)}{𝐏𝐒𝐊𝟒} 
 
The MS forwards the message in Step6 towards the ETR router. 
 
Step7: 𝐄𝐓𝐑 → 𝐈𝐓𝐑: { 𝐄𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟐, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐥𝐲, 𝐇(𝐄𝐓𝐑, 𝐍𝟏, 𝐍𝟐, 𝐌𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐥𝐲)}{SK} 
 
Upon receiving Step6, the ETR replies a Map-Reply message in Step7 with a challenge 
nonce (N2). The message is encrypted using the suggested key (SK).  
Step8: 𝐈𝐓𝐑 → 𝐄𝐓𝐑: {𝐍𝟐}{𝐒𝐊} 
The ITR returns the challenge (N2) encrypted using the key (SK) in Step8 the ETR, then, 
checks the returned challenge to authenticate the ITR.  
Phase 3 
Step9A:  When Sensor-A device wants to establish communication with anther device 
Sensor-B on different LISP network architecture domain, the third communication protocol 
will run automatically if the second protocol of resolving addresses has been successfully 
preceded and ITR has been authenticates with ETR in Step8. This will be done by sending a 
confirmation message from the second protocol that routers authenticate successfully, 
otherwise the protocol will terminate. Here, Sensor-A chooses a random number 𝑥 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞 
and computes (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
x  → NSensor−A, where the 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 is the network 
identity which is a portion of the TCP/IP address that is used to identify Sensor-A on the 
network. The network ID here is designed to ensure the security of the network and related 
resources. The 𝑃𝐾𝐴 is the public key of sensor-A and the H is the hash function that takes the 
digital object passed through the algorithm to produce the hash.  
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⊕   is the XoR used for encryption and the decryption of  the data. The   𝑔x  is the prime 
value which is publicly known, and X is the value which has been chosen from sensor-A.  
NSensor−A  is the outcome of the computes value. Then Sensor-A sends 
(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 ) to Sensor-B.  
Step9B: Sensor-B chooses a random number  𝑦 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞  and 
computes (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⨁ 𝑔
y  → NSensor−B , and then Sensor-B sends  
(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 ), (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 ) to XTR router.  
Step10A:  Upon receiving (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)  and (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵), XTR uses 
𝑃𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝐾𝐵 to compute (𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⨁ NSensor−A  → 𝑔
x and 
(𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⨁ NSensor−B  → 𝑔
y  respectively. The XTR as a third trust 
party used its stored database to check and verify the values that have been sent from sensor 
A and sensor B whether they match or not. 
Step10B: Now XTR chooses a random number  𝑧 ∈𝑅  𝕫𝑞  and computes  
(𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑧 → 𝐿 , (𝑔𝑥)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑥𝑧 → 𝑎 , (𝑔𝑦)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑦𝑧 → 𝑏 , here the 
(𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧 are the XTR shared key between  Sensor-A and Sensor-B, Z 
is the chosen value of XTR router.  The 𝑔 is the publicly known prime value.  L is the 
outcome of the computes value.  Where 𝑎 represents sensor-A which has been computed in 
step1a, and 𝑏 represents sensor-B which has been computed in step1b.  Then XTR computes  
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑏 → 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  and 
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴,𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑎 → 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵  and XTR sends 
(𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿), (𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝐿) to Sensor-B. 
Step11A:    Once Sensor-B receives the sent message, it uses KB the private key to compute 
𝐿𝐾𝐵 → (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧 which is the variable value chosen and computed from the XTR router, 
and it is used as shard key between the XTR and Sensor-B. As the same time it used KB to 
compute  ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑦, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 → 𝑎  and sensor-B 
authenticates with XTR. Now, Sensor-B uses 𝑦  which is the previously chosen value to 
compute  𝑎𝑦 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾, (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼  and forwards 
(𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿), 𝛼 to Sensor-A. 
Step11B:  Sensor-A receives (𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝐿, 𝛼)  and it uses  𝐾𝐴  to compute  𝐿
𝐾𝐴 →
(𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧  and ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)
𝑧, 𝑔𝑥, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴, 𝑃𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴 → 𝑏  and 
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authenticates the XTR router. Then, Sensor-A uses 𝑥 to compute 𝑏𝑥 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾 and checks 
whether (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼  holds or not. If it does not hold, the protocol 
terminates, Otherwise, Sensor-A is convinced that 𝐾  is a valid session key. After that, 
Sensor-A computes (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛽  and forwards it to Sensor-B and 
Sensor-A computes the Session Key (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻
′  → 𝑆𝑘𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴.  
Step11C: Upon receiving  𝛽 , Sensor-B computes (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛽  and 
verifies whether computed 𝛽 is equal to the received 𝛽. If both are equal, then B authenticates 
Sensor-A and computes the session key (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐴  ) → 𝑆𝑘𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟−𝐵 
 
 
Fig 7.2 Security Refinement Protocol for Internet of things using LISP Network Architecture 
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7.2.2 Formal Analysis and Results for Refinement Protocols using AVISPA  
 
        The proposed refinement protocol has been implemented and evaluated using AVISPA 
tool. The achieved results have shown that no attack is being found. For this refinement 
protocol, six basic roles played by Sensor Node device and the LISP network architecture 
have been defined. 𝐾𝑖 and 𝑃𝐾𝑖 are private and public keys of Sensor Node; these are stored 
on the devices used for encryption/decryption and verification of authentication. Here, PSK1 
is Pre-Shared key to secure the connection between the TKG and the ETR, PSK2 is the Pre-
Shared key to secure the connection between the TKG and MS, PSK3 is the Pre-Shared Key 
between ITR and MS and PSK4 is the Pre-Shared Key between the MS and ETR. These keys 
represent the symmetric keys as table 7.2 shows.  
 
   Table 7.2 HLPSL Code:  Basic Roles  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
role sensor_A (A, B, ITR,ETR : agent, 
 
% This is a role as Sensor_A, with parameters A, B, ITR, and ETR 
type agent. 
PKA : symmetric_key, %Data-type for symmetric keys of Sensor_A 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), % The RCV and SND parameters are type channel, indicating that 
the channel type, in this cause (dy), denotes the intruder model to 
be considered for this channel 
H : hash func, % Data-type for one-way function 
G : text) % it is a finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime 
order 𝑝; both   𝑔 and  𝑞 are publicly known 
played_by A % The parameter A appears in the played_by section, which means, 
intuitively, that A denotes the name of the agent who plays role 
Sensor_A. 
def=  
local State : nat 
%Note the local section which declares local variables of Sensor_A 
X, Z : text, % X and Z are a variable value which is chosen and computed from 
Sensor_A 
UA : public_key, % Data-type for public keys of Sensor_A. 
GY , Key, L : message, % GY,Key, and L % X and Z are a variable value which is chosen 
and computed from  Sensor_A 
const sec_m_Key : protocol_id,  %Used to check authentication of Sensor_A 
init State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
role sensor_B (A, B, ITR,ETR : agent, %% This is a role as Sensor_B, with parameters A, B, ITR, and 
ETR type agent. 
PKA, PKB : symmetric_key, %Data-type for symmetric keys of Sensor_B 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), % The RCV and SND parameters are type channel, indicating that 
the channel type, in this case (dy), denotes the intruder model to be 
considered for this channel 
H : hash func, % Data-type for one-way functions 
G :text) %% it is a finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime 
order 𝑝; both   𝑔 and  𝑞 are publicly known 
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played by B %% The parameter B appears in the played_by section, which 
means, intuitively, that B denotes the name of the agent who plays 
role Sensor_B. 
def= 
local State : nat, 
%Note the local section which declares local variables of Sensor_B 
X, Y, Z : text, %X ,Yand Z are variable value which are chosen and computed 
from both XTR and Sensor_B 
GX, GY : message, 
 
% GX, and GY It is a variable value which is chosen and computed 
from  Sensor_B 
UB : public key, % Data-type for public keys of Sensor_B. 
M1: hash(symmetric-
key.agent.agent.message.message). 
message, 
%M1 is represented  on  H(PKA.A.B.exp(G, X).exp(UA, Z)).exp(L, Z), 
M2: hash(symmetric-
key.agent.agent.message.message). 
message 
% M2 is represented  on H(PKB.A.B.exp(G, Y ).exp(UB, Z).exp(L, Z) 
const sec v Key : protocol id %Used to check authentication of Sensor_B 
init State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
role router_ETR (ETR, MS, TKG,ITR, 
A,B, : agent 
%% This is a role as router_ETR, with parameters ETR, MS, TKG, 
ITR, A and B type agent. 
PKA, PKB: symmetric key %Data-type for symmetric keys of router_ETR 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
 
% The RCV and SND parameters are type channel, indicating that 
the channel type, in this case (dy), denotes the intruder model to be 
considered for this channel. 
H: hash func, % Data-type for one-way function. 
PSK1, PSK2, PSK3, PSK4: 
symmetric key 
%Data-type for symmetric keys of router_ETR 
G: text  % It is a finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime 
order 𝑝; both   𝑔 and  𝑞 are publicly known 
played_by ETR 
 
%The parameter ETR appears in the played_by section, which 
means, intuitively, that ETR denotes the name of the agent who 
plays role router_ETR. 
def= 
local State: nat, 
%Note the local section which declares local variables of 
router_ETR. 
N1, N2, N3,N4: text %The Nonce is a random number  
X, Y, Z: text % X, Y and Z are  variable values which are chosen and computed 
from both router_ETR 
M, M2, ACK: messages % acknowledgment  
UA, UB, PK_ETR, PK_MS: Public 
key  
% Data-type for public keys of  router_ETR.. 
K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ 
inv(public_key), 
%Compute keys question by router_ETR  
SK: symmetric  %Data-type for symmetric keys (session Key) of router_ETR 
EIDPre: messages %Endpoint Identifiers  
GY, Key, L: message, 
 
% GY, Key and L are  variable values which are chosen and 
computed from router_ETR 
init   State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
role router_ITR (ETR, MS, A,B,TKG 
: agent, 
%% This is a role as router_ITR, with parameters ETR, MS, TKG, 
ITR, A and B type agent. 
PKA, PKB: symmetric key %Data-type for symmetric keys of router_ITR 
SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
 
% The RCV and SND parameters are type channels, indicating that 
the channel type, in this cause (dy), denotes the intruder model to 
be considered for this channel. 
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H: hash func, % Data-type for one-way functions. 
PSK1,PSK2,PSK3,PSK4 : symmetric 
key 
%Data-type for symmetric keys of router_ITR 
G: text  
 
% It is a finite cyclic group 𝒢 generated by an element 𝑔 of prime 
order 𝑝; both   𝑔 and  𝑞 are publicly known 
played_by % The parameter ITR appears in the played_by section, which 
means, intuitively, that ITR denotes the name of the agent who 
plays role router_ITR. 
def= 
local State: nat, 
%Note the local section which declares local variables of 
router_ITR. 
N3,N4: text %The Nonce is a random number  
X, Y, Z :text % X, Y and Z  are variable values which are chosen and computed 
from both router_ITR 
M,M2,ACK :messages % acknowledgment  
UA, UB, PK_ETR,PK_MS: Public 
key  
% Data-type for public keys of  router_ITR.. 
K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ 
inv(public_key), 
%Compute keys question by router_ITR  
SK: symmetric  %Data-type for symmetric keys (session Key) of router_ITR 
EIDPre: messages %Endpoint Identifiers  
GY, Key, L: message, % GY, Key and L are  variable values which are chosen and 
computed from router_ETR 
init   State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
role map_server (MS,ETR,ITR: 
agent, 
% This is a role as map_server, with parameters, MS, ETR, and 
ITR type agent. 
PSK1,PSK2,PSK3,PSK4 : symmetric 
key, 
%Data-type for symmetric keys of map_server 
SND ,RCV : channel(dy), % The RCV and SND parameters is type channel, indicating that 
the channel type, in this case (dy), denotes the intruder model to be 
considered for this channel. 
H: hash func, % Data-type for one-way functions. 
played_by MS 
 
% The parameter MS appears in the played_by section, which 
means, intuitively, that MS denotes the name of the agent who 
plays role map_server. 
def= 
local State: nat 
%Note the local section which declares local variables of 
map_server. 
N1, N2,N3,N4: text %The Nonce is a random number 
M,M2,ACK :messages % acknowledgment  
PK_ETR,PK_MS: Public key  % Data-type for public keys of map_server. 
K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ 
inv(public_key), 
%Compute keys question by map_server. 
SK: symmetric   %Data-type for symmetric keys (session Key) of router_ETR 
init   State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
role the_trusted_ticket_granting 
(TKG,ETR,MS: agent, 
% This is a role the_trusted_ticket_granting with parameters TKG 
ETR and MS type agent. 
PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key,    
  
%Data-type for symmetric keys of the_trusted_ticket_granting. 
PUK_ETR , PUK_MS: Public_Key  % Data-type for public keys of the_trusted_ticket_granting. 
H    : hash_func, % Data-type for one-way functions. 
Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
 
% The RCV and SND parameters is type channel, indicating that 
the channel type, in this case (dy), denotes the intruder model to be 
considered for this channel. 
 
 
116 
 
played_by TKG 
 
% The parameter TKG appears in the played_by section, which 
means, intuitively, that TKG denotes the name of the agent who 
plays role the_trusted_ticket_granting. 
local  State  : nat, %Note the local section which declares local variables of 
the_trusted_ticket_granting. 
N1 : text %The Nonce is a random number 
M,M2,ACK, : messages % acknowledgment  
PVK_ETR,PVK_MS:{text.public_key}_
inv(public_key) 
%Compute keys question by the_trusted_ticket_granting. 
EIDPre:messages %Endpoint Identifiers  
init State := 0 %indicates initialisation of local variables 
 
After defining the #basic roles, it is essentially needed to define the composed roles which 
describe the sessions of the protocol.  The # Transitions represent the receipt of messages and 
the sending of reply messages, i.e., showing all the messages exchanges while the input code 
and results are described in the appendix-G. The #composed roles have no transition section, 
but rather a composition section in which the basic roles are instantiated. The /\ operator 
indicates that these roles should execute in parallel. In the session role, it usually declares all 
the channels used by the basic roles. These variables are not instantiated with concrete 
constants. The channel type takes an additional attribute, in parentheses, which specifies the 
intruder model that is assumed for that channel. Here, the type of the declaration channel (dy) 
stands for the Dolev-Yao intruder model [AVISPA, 2013]. Under this model, the intruder has 
full control over the network, i.e., all messages sent by agents will go to the intruder. He may 
intercept, analyze and /or modify message (as far as he knows the required keys) and send 
any message he composes to whoever he pleases, posing as any other agents. Finally, a top-
level role is always defined. This role contains global constants and a composition of one or 
more sessions, the Table 7.3 below shows the #intruder may play some roles as a legitimate 
user. There is also a statement which describes what knowledge the intruder initially has. 
Typically, this includes the names of all agents, all the symmetric keys and any shares with 
others. Note that the constant ‘I’ is used to refer to the intruder, as the source code below. 
Table 7.3 HLPSL Code: Intruder Information Heading         
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
intruder knowledge = {a, b, itr,etr,ms,tkg, g, h, 
pi, ua, ub, ui ,pk_etr,pk_ms,k_etr,k_ms, 
h,psk1,psk2,psk3,psk4,m,m2 sk,maprequest, 
mapreply} 
 
% Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities. Check 
the intruder between the Sensor-A, Sensor-B, ETR, ITR and 
MS. And also check public keys UA and UB and the  pre-
shared key PSK1,PSK2,PSK,3 and PSK4 if intruder captures 
between the sensor-A and Sensor-B, and ITR,ETR and MS. 
Composition % It is one or more basic roles, gluing them together so they 
execute together, usually in parallel with interleaving semantics.  
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session(b, a, itr,etr h, pa, pb, ua, ub, g) % In the session, one usually declares all the channels used by 
the basic roles. Likewise, set session of Sensor-A, ITR, and 
ETR defined the Public keys UA, and UB on the network 
environment.   
/\ session(i, b,etr, itr, h, pi, pb, ui, ub, g) 
/\ session(a, i, itr,etr, h, pa, pi, ua, ui, g) 
/\ session(etr,i,k_etr,h) 
/\ session(ms,i,k_ms,h) 
/\ session(itr,ms,etr, psk3,psk4,sk,h) 
/\   session(ms,i,psk3,psk4,sk) 
/\   session(itr,i,sk,h)  
/\  session(etr,i,sk,h) 
% The /\ operator indicates that these roles should execute in 
parallel. In the session, one usually declares all the channels 
used by the basic roles. Also, set session of intruder checker on 
the network environment. 
end role %End of session role  
 
Table 7.4 shows the #Specifying Security Goals are specified in HLPSL by augmenting the 
transitions of the basic roles with the so-called goal facts and by then assigning them a 
meaning by describing, in the HLPSL goal  section, what conditions –i.e., what combination 
of such facts  indicate an attack and a violation of secrecy. The goal declaration section 
describes that it should be considered as an attack when the intruder learns a secret value 
internally; the attack conditions are specified in terms of temporal logic, but useful and 
concise macros are provided for two most frequently used security goals, authentication and 
secrecy.  
 
Table 7.4 HLPSL Code: Specifying Security Goals  
HLPSL Code in AVISPA Comments  
Goal % Specifies the security properties to be cheeked  
securecy_of Map_server, Router_ETR 
Router_ITR Sensor_A,Sensor_B on 
psk1,psk2,psk3,psk4,n1,n2,n3 
 
% Check the secrecy of random nonce N1,N2,N3 and pre-
shared key PSK1,PSK2,PSK3, and PSK3 between MS,ETR, 
and ITR and between the Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
Router_ETR weak authenticates Server_MS  % Check the authentication between ETR and MS, and then 
ETR should provide confirmation witness information to 
MS. 
Router_ITR weak authenticates Map_Server  % Check the authentication between ITR and MS, and the 
ITR should provide confirmation witness information to 
MS. 
Router_ITR weak authenticates Router_ETR  % Check the authentication between ITR and ETR, and the 
ITR should provide confirmation witness information to 
ETR. 
Router_ETR authenticates Server_MS on n1 
authentication on_n1 
 
% strong authentication between ETR and MS on value of 
random nonce N1.     
Router _ETR authenticates Router _ITR on n2 
authentication_on n2 
% strong authentication between ETR and ITR on value of 
random nonce N2.     
Router _ITR authenticates Router _ETR on n3 
authentication_on n3 
% strong authentication between ITR and ETR on value of 
random nonce N3.     
sensor_a authenticates aensor_b on sk 
 
% strong authentication between Sensor-A and Sensor-B on 
session key SK.     
End goal %End of session goal  
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7.2.3 Analysis of Results  
In this section the refinement protocol tests by Automated Validation of Internet Security 
Protocols and Applications (AVISPAP). It has been used four back-end tools which is 
integrated by AVISPA, namely; the On-the-fly Model-Checker OFMC, the Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher CL-AtSe, the SAT-based Model-Checker SATMC, and the TA4SP 
protocol analyser, which verifies protocols by implementing tree automata based on 
automatic approximations. All the back-ends of the tool analyse protocols under the 
assumptions of perfect cryptography and that the protocol messages are exchanged over a 
network that is under the control of a Dolev-Yao intruder [AVISPA, 2013]. That is, the back-
ends analyse protocols by considering the standard protocol independent, asynchronous 
model of an active intruder who controls the network but cannot break cryptography; in 
particular, the intruder can intercept messages and analyse them if he possesses the 
corresponding keys for decryption, and he can generate messages from his knowledge and 
send them under any party name as figure 7.3 shows.  
 
Fig 7.3 AVISPA Results 
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Table 7.5 shows the results of the security refinement protocol for IoT based on LISP 
architecture, while the input code and results are described in the appendix section -G.  Also, 
AVISPA is used to verify the security properties like secrecy, integrity and authentication. It 
gives details about whether the protocol is safe or not. If not it gives then the trace of the 
attacks found, to indicate secrecy attack or authentication attack. Consequently even through 
many properties of the protocol are to be checked, only few can be verified using AVISPA. 
For this the modelling is done in HLPSL, language used by AVISPA tool. For our 
verification, OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP have been used to search for the attacks on 
the protocol. The feature of finding and tracing the attack makes AVISPA different from 
other tools. Henceforth, the tool is tested and the protocol verification results are analysed; 
they show that they do not have any security flaws and the security refinement protocol is 
safe to be used.   
Table 7.5 AVISPA Tools (OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP) Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Version Tool Description Result 
 
Basic session 
OFMC Visited Nodes: 4765 nodes 
Depth: 6 plies 
Search Time: 0.6s 
 
SAFE 
 
 
Basic session 
ATSE Analysed:      6844  States 
Reachable:     22735States 
Translation:   0.00   seconds 
Computation: 0.01  seconds 
 
SAFE & 
goal as specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic session 
 
 
 
 
SATMC 
STATISTICS 
Attack Found : false   Boolean 
Upper Bound Reached: true Boolean 
Graph Leveled off: 4 steps 
Sat Solver: zchaff Solver 
Max Steps Number: 11 Steps 
Steps Number : 18 Steps 
Atoms Number: 423 Atoms 
Clauses Number 1412 Clauses 
Encoding Time: 0.1 Seconds 
If2Sate Compilation Time 0.01 Seconds 
ATTACK TRACE 
%%no attacks have been found… 
 
 
 
 
SAFE 
 
Basic session 
TA4SP STALISTICS 
SECURITY-As specified 
ATTACK TRACE 
No attack found 
SAFE 
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7.3 Simulation and Performance Analysis  
        As a beginning, IP-WSN consists of a large number of small size sensor nodes deployed 
in the observed environment. As shown earlier, Sensor nodes have a small memory (8K of 
total memory and disk space) and a limited computation power (8-bit, 4 MHZ CPU) [Singh et 
al., 2017]. They usually communicate with a power base station, i.e. X Tunnel Routing (XTR) 
which connects sensor nodes with external network, e.g. ID/Locator Spilt Protocol (LISP). 
The limited energy at sensor nodes creates some hindrances in implementing complex 
security schemes. There are two major factors for energy consumption. The First factor is the 
transmission and reception of data while the second is the processing of query request. 
Consequently, the sensor network environment simulator is built in Contiki and Cooja tool. 
The network simulated consists of 100 nodes. The sink node (XTR) is placed at the corner to 
maximise network depth. Connectivity information is derived from empirical data collected 
from a real world study. Furthermore, the simulation tool and the results show that the 
refinement protocol memory is efficient as it requires 72 bytes of memory storage for keys, 
where transmission and reception cost per connection is 75.125 bytes.   
In order to demonstrate the performance evaluation of security refinement protocol, a 
randomly 100 sensor nodes plus one XTR in 1000 by 1000 terrain has been simulated. Basic 
simulation parameters employed are described in table 7.6.  
Table 7.6 Simulation Parameters in Cooja  
Terrain  1000x1000 
Total Number of Nodes  101 (including XTR)  
Initial battery of each sensor node 1x10
6
J 
Power consumption for transmission  1.7 W 
Power consumption for reception  1.3 W 
Idle power consumption  1.16 W 
Carrier sense threshold  3.631E- 10W 
Receive power threshold  1.557e – 11 W 
Frequency  9.15e8 
Transmitting & Receiving antenna gain  2.0 
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The figure 7.4 shows the security refinement protocol designed in a network layer at sensor 
node architecture which is simulated in Cooja tool.     
 
Fig 7.4 Integrate the Security Protocols in Sensor Node Architecture 
The figure 7.5 shows the WSN network simulated consists of 100 nodes, where is built in 
Contiki and Cooja tool. 
 
Fig 7.5 Nodes Simulation in Cooja tool 
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7.4 Performance Analysis of Communication Overhead  
      In the simulation scenario in cooja, the application sent data packets of size 30 bytes in a 
periodic interval. The communication overhead of Security refinement protocol for one 
communication is decreased in the transference of a number of data packets as shown in 8.8 . 
Communication Overhead (CO %) is calculated as:  
 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐎𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐡𝐞𝐚𝐝 (𝐂𝐎%) = (
𝐓𝐧∗𝟕𝟓.𝟏𝟐𝟓
∑ 𝐍𝐢
𝐩𝐧
𝐢=𝟎 ∗𝟑𝟎
) ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎             (𝟏)                       
Here , ‘Tn’is the total number of connections and 𝑁𝑖
𝑝
is the number of packets transferred by 
node i. whereas,75.125 bytes have been multiplied to Tn because every connection security 
refinement exchanges messages or packets during the authentication and key exchange phase 
whose cumulative size is 75.125 byte. The size of each data packet is 30 bytes.  
 
7.6. Communication Overhead (%) of Security Refinement Protocol to Internet of Things  
  Figure 8.8 shows the relationship between the number of data packets transferred and the 
average number of connections. Likewise it shows the comparison of this research study 
security protocol proposed with other security protocols. As seen from the chart above, the 
communication overheard decreases from 25 blue lines if the number of the connections to 
the network is less. On the other hand, if the number of connections increases in the red line 
the communication overhead increases as well.     
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7.5 Performance Analysis of Power Computation for Security 
Refinement protocol   
      Power Computation depends primarily on which type of protocol is used whether 
symmetric or asymmetric.  The computation power required for symmetric encryption and 
decryption scheme is assumed to be  CSEN and CSDN respectively and computation power 
of asymmetric encryption and decryption is CAEN and CADN respectively too. Then, the 
total power consumption required by single node during first two phases is  
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = (𝑪𝑺𝑬𝑵 + 𝑪𝑺𝑫𝑵) + (𝑪𝑨𝑬𝑵 + 𝑪𝑨𝑫𝑵)                       (𝟐) 
Computation power required by a single node during data transmission phase is calcite as,  
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = (𝑻𝑵𝑺𝑫𝑷 ∗ 𝑪𝑺𝑬𝑵) + (𝑻𝑵𝑹𝑫𝑷 ∗ 𝑪𝑨𝑫𝑵)                   (𝟑) 
Where the Total Number of Sent Data Packets is (TNSDP) and the Total Number of 
Received Data Packets is (TNRDP). 
7.6 Performance Analysis Memory Consumption in the IP-WSN  
      Every IP-WSN node needs to store only six keys, three of them are permanent whereas 
the other three are temporary. Permanent keys consist of one public key and one private key; 
the public key shares with XTR. Temporary keys consist of a public key, a shared secret key 
and of another node and session secret keys. In order to save these keys, only 72 bytes are 
needed. This approach will make sensor network memory efficient. Details of this approach 
are given in table 7.7.    
Table 7.7 Storage Requirement of Keys in Sensor Node Device   
Store Number Keys Size (in bytes) 
Permanent Keys 
1 Public Key  of Sensor Node  16 byte 
2 Private Key of Sensor Node 16 byte 
3 Shared Secret key with XTR  8 byte 
Temporary Keys 
4 Public key of other Node  16 byte 
5 Shared Secret key of other Node  8 byte 
6 Session Key  8 byte 
Total Storage Size Required  72 bytes 
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7.7 Performance Analysis of Energy Consumption in the IP-WSN  
      The main source of energy consumption at IP-WSN node is its transmission and reception 
cost. Cooja simulation is used to calculate the consumption energy of the sensor node in 
different modes: Transmit Receive, Idle and Sleep. Energy consumption rate of each node is 
given in Table 7.7. For each connection, the security  
control packets of cumulative 75.125 bytes require authentication and key exchange 
mechanism, which is an acceptable trade-off between energy and security. The simulation 
result of energy consumption is shown in figure 7.7. When the pulse of the energy increases 
as shown in section 2, it means that the device is in an active mode, but when the pulse drops 
down as section 1 shows, it means that the device is in the sleep mode. The rectum and the 
winding line in section 3 mean that the device is in the idle mode. 
 
Fig 7.7 Energy Consumptions for IP-WSN 
7.8 Resilience against Node Compromise  
      This means that the single node compromise will not expose the whole communication in 
the network. In other words, only the communication links that are established with 
compromised node can expose the network. Let’s Suppose ‘SNCN’ is the set of sensor node 
that establishes the connection and ‘SNCNP’ is the set of compromised nodes. Then, SNCN 
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∩ SNCNP will give a set of nodes that are compromised as well as connected. The maximum 
number of connections in equation (4) can be exposed only if all compromised nodes are 
connected to uncompromised nodes. On the other hand, the minimum numbers of links in 
equation (5) can be exposed only if all compromised nodes are connected with each other.  
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝑳𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒆𝒔: 𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵 ∩ 𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵𝑷                                        (𝟒) 
𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝑳𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒔  [
𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵 ∩ 𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵𝑷     
𝟐
𝒇𝒐𝒓 → 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏
𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵 ∩ 𝑺𝑵𝑪𝑵𝑷+𝟏
𝟐
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 → 𝒐𝒅𝒅 
]                  (𝟓)      
 
If IP-WSN network is assumed to consist of 1000 nodes and a total of 500 connections are 
established between a pair of nodes, the total links that can be minimum and maximum 
compromise will be as shown in figure 7.8. If the numbers of compromised links increase the 
maximum connection of compromised nodes rises up as   the red line in the figure shows. On 
the contrary, if the numbers of the compromised link decrease, the minimum of the 
compromised nodes decrease as shown by the blue line.  
 
Fig 7.8 Percentage of Compromised Links (IP-WSN) 
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7.9 Summary  
      In this chapter, a security refinement protocol has been proposed to the IoT using LISP 
network architecture. Furthermore, the refinement is based on three security protocols namely 
resignation, resolving and communication which have been already introduced in previous 
chapters. Noticeably, the main idea of these protocols is to set an interface for each phase of 
the protocol to be joined together as one refinement protocol. Moreover, the security 
refinement protocol analysis and verification using AVISPA show that no attacks have been 
detected.  Finally, simulating the security refinement protocol in Contiki and Cooja 
simulation tool and the results show that the security refinement is highly scalable and the 
memory is quite efficient. It only needs 72 bytes of memory to storage the keys in the device 
and it introduces 75.125 bytes of transmission and reception cost per connection. In this 
context, it has the advantage of securing defines against compromised nodes.  
 
Consequently, chapter 8 a comparison of the recent security protocol for IoT against the 
present research study protocols 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
Chapter 8:  
A comparison of Security Protocols for Internet of 
Things  
8.1 Introduction  
The Internet of Things (IoT) has recently become an important research topic because it 
integrates various sensors and objects to communicate directly with one another without 
human interference. Furthermore, the requirements for the large scale deployment of the IoT 
are rapidly increasing with a major security concern. Therefore, a new security approach for 
IoT communications proposed in chapter 7 provided End-to-End Security (E2E) 
communications to IoT using Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP). Consequently, this 
chapter provided a comparison of security protocols for IoT against the present security 
protocol of this research. Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is divided as the following: 
section 8.2 discusses the secure IoT. Section 8.3 discusses the recent security protocols for 
the IoT. Finally, a summary concludes the chapter in section 8.4.     
8.2 Secure Internet of Things  
Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) [Nicolls et al., 2017] offers interconnection of almost 
every object with the Internet. Furthermore, it leads to massive possibilities to develop new 
applications for the IoT, such as home automation and home security management, smart 
energy monitoring and management, item and shipment tracking, smart cities and health 
monitoring. Therefore, due to the global connectivity and sensitivity of applications section 
9.2.1, provided the main security requirements which are necessary in IoT devices [Yang et 
al., 2017], and are discussed as well. 
8.2.1 Security Requirements in Internet of Things   
Confidentiality: Messages that flow between a source and a destination could be easily 
intercepted by an attacker and secret contents are revealed as a result. Consequently, these 
messages should be hidden from the intermediate entities; in other words, End-to-End (E2E) 
message secrecy is required in the IoT. 
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Data Integrity: No intermediary between a source and a destination should be able to change 
secret contents of messages without being discovered, e.g. a medical data of a patient. 
Furthermore, stored data should not be modified without being noticed. Message Integrity 
Code (MIC) is mostly used to provide this service. 
Authentication: Communicating end points should be able to verify the identities of each 
other to ensure that they are communicating with the entities who they claim to be.  
Availability: For smooth working of the IoTs and access to data whenever needed, it is also 
important that services offered by applications should be always available and work properly. 
In other words, intrusions and malicious activities should be detected. Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) and firewalls, in addition to the security mechanisms above, are used to 
ensure the availability of the security services. 
Freshness: Considering both data and key to ensure that there is no replays of old messages 
because unsecured router and IoT node causes unnecessary old replays.  
Non-Repudiation: Last but not least, a compromised intermediate node can store a data 
packet and replay it at a later stage. The replayed packet can contain a typical sensor reading 
(e.g. a temperature reading) or a paid service request. It is, therefore, important that there 
should be mechanisms to detect duplicate or replayed messages. Replay protection or 
freshness security services provide this; they can be achieved through integrity-protected 
timestamps, sequence numbers, nonces. 
Resiliency: It provides an acceptable level security even if some IoT nodes are compromised.     
8.3 Security Protocols for the Internet of Things  
This section discusses different security protocols which have been proposed to the IoT 
devices.   
[Figueroa et al., 2012] has proposed a lightweight security protocol to access web services in 
Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks  over IPv6 (6LoWPAN). The protocol’s 
objective is to provide a reliable end to end security communication for IoT/6LoWPAN by 
using a compression and decompression of Internet protocol. Furthermore, the protocol 
provides confidentiality to IoT networks via the use of SNOW Stream cipher.  However, this 
protocol does not address a number of attacks. For example, if the adversary captures one of 
the sensor nodes of IoT/6LoWPAN, he can find out about the cryptographic data which is 
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stored in the sensor node and discloses the network confidentiality. Adding to this, the 
attacker can launch DoS and wormhole/ sinkhole attacks that make the sensor nodes believe 
that they are a neighbour node and forward the packets between them. This may cause 
confusion to the getaway to locate the node or receive false data. Moreover, by launching a 
rushing attack through the deployment nodes, this could cause the breakdown of the 
communication between the source and the destination by transmitting a huge number of 
packets at the same time.  
[Zhou et al., 2011] has proposed an amended security gateway based on 6LoWPAN, which 
connects IoT/6LoWPAN with IPv6 network. The proposed protocol used an SNEP 
mechanism to achieve authentication and confidentiality through providing a secure 
guarantee for communication between networks. The main objective of this protocol is to 
provide security between the getaway and the node against the malicious nodes or any 
suspect attacks that can compromise the network. However, this protocol does not address the 
resource consumption attacks i.e. replayed attacks, DoS and physical node capture attacks. 
E.g. the adversary captures a sensor node (6LoWPAN) via using selective forward attacks/or 
even stealing cryptographic material which is stored on the node by injecting fake packets in 
the networks. The attacker can launch a man in middle attack between the getaway and the 
sensor node and steal/or modify the information between them. Furthermore, Sybil attacks, 
where can deliver false information message to the getaway through malicious nodes. 
[Khan et al., 2012] has proposed an authentication and mutual key establishment scheme for 
IP based wireless sensor network (6LoWPAN). The authentication has been achieved in 
6LoWPAN via Eliptic Cure Cryptosystem (ECC). Although, public key cryptography is 
costly in terms of WSN (6LoWPAN) as shown in [Yang et al., 2017], [Masdari et al., 2017] 
and [Mstaf et al., 2017]. Furthermore, the authors considered virtual network architecture 
which combines two sub networks connected to each other through edge routers. The specific 
node in the network acts as a reference for the different supported security functionalities, 
and is called the Network Security Manager. They stated in their work that the node should 
be authenticated with each other by generating the authentication keys to secure the 
communication link which are the public/ private keys for encryption and decryption of the 
message. Therefore, a node should process four steps in order to achieve successful 
authentication with key establishments; firstly, each entity of the network generates a random 
number which is assigned by the Network Security Manager after a node registration phase. 
Secondly, one entity of network shares the assigned public key, while others share the public 
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key has generated by the relevant local Network Security Manager. Thirdly, the Author 
considered the secure communication between two nodes in the network which are the source 
IP and the destination IP that are used to generate a specific elliptic curve. Fourthly, each 
entity and network has its own generator Ge and Gn respectively. However, if the adversary 
compromises nodes, he can launch a combination of the wormhole and sinkhole attacks 
which can affect the confidential data of the (6LoWPAN). 
[Jara et al., 2011] has proposed a security protocol for 6LoWPAN based on the ID/Locator 
split architecture which is an extension of the Return Reputability (RR) process with ECC-
based asymmetric cryptography in order to carry out scalable inter-domain authentication. 
Basically, this protocol is designed to stop any malicious nodes from establishing false 
updates of the system location,  and also to prevent some packets from reaching their 
intended destination diverting some traffic to the intruder/or flooding third parties with 
unwanted traffic. Therefore, the main goal of this protocol is to allow authentication for the 
mobile nodes in the visited network; besides providing authentication to the getaway in order 
to achieve a secure mobility management of the mobile nodes (6LoWPAN). However, the 
author used RR security which depends mainly on the Internet to ensure the IP address. Since 
RR is based on the communication between two entities; it can be more susceptible to being 
spoofed by any attacker. Referring to the registration stage of the node, the adversary can 
launch a man in middle attack between  6LoWPAN nodes and the getaway and can steal the 
cryptographic data through the exchange of the transactions update, then he can modify/or 
corrupt the data by sending false information to the getaway or even to the victim node.   
[Kothmayr et al., 2013] has proposed a security authentication protocol for 6LoWPAN based 
on RSA mechanism which uses public key cryptography algorithm. The objective of this 
protocol is to perform authentication in the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 
between nodes and the source publisher via the use of handshake which is based on an 
exchange of x.509 certificates containing RSA keys. Furthermore, the security protocol 
provides message integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. However, the author did not 
consider the encryption of data between the 6LoWPAN nodes. Therefore, a malicious node 
can spoof on the original node information which can cause confusion to the system by 
transmitting false data.Even more it can claim to be an original node to the getaway/or other 
neighbouring nodes by using act technique.  
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[Ikram et al., 2009] has proposed a simple lightweight authentic bootstrapping protocol for 
IPv6 based on 6LoWPAN by using AES encryption which is an encryption standard in IEEE 
802.15.4. The purpose of this protocol is to provide resource efficiency and security features 
assured by securing the communication between nodes.  Furthermore, this protocol depends 
on the key management infrastructure and addresses different types of attacks such as, replay 
attack, location privacy attack, passive eavesdropping, DoS attack and data loss attack. The 
author assumed that every node (RFDs and FFD) in the 6LoWPAN is equipped with AES-
CMAC-128, AES-CTR and AES- CCM-128. However, the adversary can launch an 
overwhelming attack, which can destroy the routing by generating a lot of traffic in order to 
affect the performance of the getaway. Moreover, if the adversary compromises nodes; he 
can launch a combination of wormhole and sinkhole attacks in order to manipulate the use of 
the routing lists that are included in the route request query. Adding to this, an adversary can 
manipulate the end-to-end integrity control by modifying a number of messages which will 
have to travel to their destination to discover that they have been altered. This means that the 
energy is wasted due to the fact that integrity violations are not detected as soon as possible 
and the maliciously modified packet is still forwarding to its destination. 
[Brachmann et al., 2012] has proposed end to end transport security in the IP-based Internet 
of Things via using different scenarios i.e. HTTP/CoAP, and TLS/DTLS. This protocol 
provides E2E security between two devices located in homogeneous networks using either 
HTTP/TLS or CAP/DTLS by proposing a mapping between TLS and DTLS. However, 
CoAP does not itself provide protocol primitive for authentication or data encryption. 
Therefore this protocol does not address flooding replay and amplification attacks. There is 
no authentication to identify 6LoWPAN devices claim. This protocol just provides E2E 
security between the node and the getaway, so if the adversary captures a node and gets the 
global security information before the security setup is finished; he can obtain the security 
information within its vicinity.                 
[Raza et al., 2013] has proposed a lightweight protocol security CoAP for the Internet of 
Things. The author provided an investigation to reduce the overhead of DTLS in 6LoWPAN 
header compression by integrating DTLS and CoAP for Internet of Things. However, the 
proposed protocol provided communication security (End-to-End Security) to the 6LoWPAN 
devices by comparing the DTLS. However, it does not address the authentication or the 
encryption process, so any malicious node can claim that it is the original node and can 
communicate with the getaway or even act as fake getaway and steal all the nodes’ 
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information. Furthermore, spoofing on the data can occur easily here since there is no 
encryption procedure to provide confidentiality. Therefore, the attacker can track the 
legitimate encrypted packet of the node. It can copy the encrypted data from the node and 
give false information to the getaway. Denial of Service attack (DoS) can attack 6LoWPAN 
devices that use lightweight IPsec which can cause extra load on the network and breakdown 
the communication link.      
[Kim, 2008] has provided analysis for security threats to the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer 
from the point of view of IP packet fragmentation attacks. The proposed work showed that IP 
fragmentation is the attack that can most affect the 6LoWPAN. A security mechanism against 
the packet fragmentation attacks and replay attacks has been proposed. This security 
mechanism uses Timestamp and None Options that are added to the fragmented packets at 
the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer. Nevertheless, the mechanism does not address a number of 
attacks e.g. Packet drop attack/or blackhole which can occur when the router is compromised 
due to different causes; one of these causes is occurs through the DoS attack because packets 
are routinely dropped from a network. The adversary can effectively launch a combined 
rushing and wormhole attack during the neighbour discovery phase and convince the remote 
sensor nodes that he is one of the neighbouring nodes and adding him to their list.   
[Bonetto et al., 2012] has investigated the ability to secure the communication for smart IoT 
objects. The objective of this work is to design a lightweight protocol procedure to set up 
secure end to end channels between unconstrained and remote peers and IoT devices. The 
author addressed security in terms of resilience against node capture via using lightweight 
IPsec security association. However, this is not enough to provide a high level of protection 
to the network. The adversary can launch a DoS attack which can affect the performance of 
the network. Also, the attacker can capture legitimate nodes by launching the selective 
forwarding attack or by combining the wormhole/ sinkhole/ rushing attacks which affects the 
communication between node and getaway. 
[Raza et al., 2011] has proposed lightweight IPsec protocol to secure the communication 
between sensor nodes in 6LoWPAN and the hosts in the IPv6-enabld Internet. The goal of 
this protocol is to provide end to end security via using existing methods and infrastructures. 
Also, it provides confidentiality and data integrity between the sensor node and the 
6LoWPAN router which is connected to the Internet source. However, the attacker can sniff 
the legitimate encrypted packet of the node. It can copy the encrypted data from the node and 
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give false information to the getaway. DoS attacks can occur in 6LoWPAN devices that use 
lightweight IPsec protocol which can cause an overloaded network and breakdown the 
communication link.    
[Jung et al., 2009] has proposed a lightweight protocol for IP-WSN (6LoWPAN) via using 
ECC based lightweight SSL. The objective of this protocol is to secure both sensors and 
clients who are connected to the Internet, and that has been achieved by using ECC and SSL 
which is based on the handshake protocol. The handshake protocol allows the sensor and 
getaway which are connected to the Internet to be authenticated by negotiating cryptographic 
algorithms and keys. The author has used ECC 160 bit which provides the same level of 
security as RSA using 1024 bit key according to [Mstafa et al. 2017]. This study has proved 
that ECC 160 exchange key operations are 13 times faster than 1024 bit RSA decryption 
operations on the mode. The protocol provided authentication and confidentiality. Although 
there is end to end security between the WSN and getaway which is connected to the source 
(internet); the adversary can launch Man in middle attacks which can set between the WSN 
(6LoWPAN) and the getaway as a third party and spoof on the data or even modify and send 
it to other nodes or getaways.  
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8.4 Summary     
In this chapter provided a security analysis protocols to IoT devices. The outcome of this analysis shows the recent design for the security 
protocols does not reached the security requirement goals i.e. authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, freshness, availability 
and reliability. Therefore Table 8.1 Shows the comparison summary for IoT protocols with the present security protocol of this research based 
on security requirements       
Table 8.1:  Protocol Comparison based on Security Requirements  
 
  
Security requirements 
addressed by the protocol 
Authentication Confidentiality Integrity Non-
repudiation 
Freshness Availability Reliability 
[Figueroa et al.,  2012 ]    × √ √ × √ √ Good 
[Zhou et al., 2011]            √ √ × × × × Limited 
[Khan et al., 2012]            √ √ × × × √ Good 
[Jara et al., 2011]     √ √ √ √ √ √ Good 
[Kothmayr et al., 2012]    √ √ × × × √ Medium 
[Ikram et al., 2009]        √ √ √ √ × √ Medium 
[Brachmann et al., 2012]   × × √ × √ × Variable 
[Raza et al., 2013]            × × √ × √ × Medium 
[Kim H, 2008]  × √ √ × × × Limited 
[Bonetto et al., 2012]        × √ √ × √ √ Good 
[Raza et al., 2011]      × √ √ × √ √ Medium 
[Jung et al. 2009]          √ √ √ × √ √  
Good 
The Security Protocol for this 
research 
√ √ √ √ √ √  
Good 
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Furthermore, it has been provides a comprehensive comparison for the published work against the security protocol of this research, the 
comparison based on the security attacks, these attacks are eavesdropping, replayed, DoS, man in middle attacks, node capturing, selective 
forward, sinkhole, Sybil, wormhole and hello attack in Table 8.2 . These attacks can affect the security performance of IoT network. 
 
Table 8.2 The Comparison Summary of 6LoWPAN Security Attacks for (outside and inside) Adversaries. 
Note: N/A means that there was not enough information to decide if the attack has been addressed by the protocol
Security attacks 
addressed by the 
protocol 
Protocols comparison based on security attacks 
Eavesdrop Replayed DoS Man in Middle 
attack 
Nod 
Capturing 
Selective 
forward 
Sinkhole Sybil Wormhole Hello 
[Figueroa et al.,  2012 ]    N/A × × × × N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
[Zhou et al., 2011]            √ √ √ √ √ × × × × √ 
[Khan et al., 2012]            √ √ √ √ √ × √ √ √ N/A 
[Jara et al., 2011]     √ √ √ √ √ N/A √ √ √ √ 
[Kothmayr et al., 2012]    × √ × √ × N/A × × × × 
[Ikram et al., 2009]        × √ √ √ √ N/A √ √ √ √ 
[Brachmann et al., 2012]   × × × × × N/A × × × × 
[Raza et al., 2013]            × × × × × N/A × × N/A N/A 
[Kim H, 2008]  × × × × × N/A × × × × 
[Bonetto et al., 2012]        √ √ √ × × N/A × × × × 
[Raza et al., 2011]      √ √ × × × N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
[Jung et al. 2009]          √ √ × × × N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The Security Protocol 
for this research  
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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 In order to compare between different evaluation approaches, a broad set of evaluation 
approach has been used. Table 8.3 presents the evaluation of each IoT protocol. The 
following points explain each evaluation in details.   
-Energy consumption: Energy is a critical resource of the network since it is one of the main 
elements that define the survivability of the network. Deciding if the protocol is suitable for a 
specific application highly depends on the energy consumption that occurs due to the 
protocol’s functionality   
-Communication overhead: Each protocol follows its own routing and security approach 
based on the application’s objectives and requirements. These procedures create 
communication overhead with the messages that need to be exchanged between nodes during 
the setup establishment, data forwarding and maintenance phases of each procedure. 
Therefore, the protocols that evaluate how many messages are transmitted are considered 
under this criterion. This may concern security related packets, e.g. key setup packets.   
-Storage overhead: The security approach taken by each protocol creates a storage overhead 
related to the size of cryptographic keys stored on each node. Aspects such as; power 
consumption, time, memory size etc play an important role in evaluating the protocols’ 
design that assess the storage overhead of the new approaches. 
 
   Table 8.3 Evaluation of Protocol based on three fundamental aspects   
 
Note:   N/A means that that is not enough information to decide if the energy consumption, communication overhead and 
storage overhead are addressed by the protocol 
 
Security Protocols Energy consumption Communication 
overhead 
Storage overhead 
[Figueroa et al.,  2012 ]    
√ × √ 
[Zhou et al., 2011]            
× × × 
[Khan et al., 2012]            
√ × √ 
[Jara et al., 2011]     
N/A × √ 
[Kothmayr et al., 2012]    
× × √ 
[Ikram et al., 2009]        
√ √ √ 
[Brachmann et al., 2012]   
N/A N/A √ 
[Raza et al., 2013]            
√ √ √ 
[Kim H, 2008]  
N/A N/A × 
[Bonetto et al., 2012]        
√ × √ 
[Raza et al., 2011]      
√ √ × 
[Jung et al. 2009]          
√ × √ 
The Security Protocol for 
this research  
√ √ √ 
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Chapter 9:  
Conclusions and Further Work  
 
9.1 Introduction  
       In this chapter, a concise summary of the main ideas proposed in this thesis is provided.  
The results, noteworthy achievements and the future applications of the proposed new 
concepts are similarly projected. It captures the main theme of this research study and shows 
how it succeeds in answering the research questions.      
9.2 How are the key research questions addressed? 
 The research study has identified the crucial gaps in addressing the issue of providing 
security protocols in the IoT using LISP architecture. It also reveals the processes to integrate 
security protocols to the IoT in order to provide connectivity in LISP environments. Adding 
to this, and due to the open dynamic nature of the future of the IoT, for instance, the research 
highlights the need for addressing the issue of security of IoT based on LISP in different 
scenarios. These issues are then embedded into the four important research questions.    
 How to introduce an efficient architecture for the Internet of Things 
and what are the main operational entities that are required in this 
architecture? 
The answer to this question is to present a new LISP architecture in chapter 2. Furthermore, 
the new LISP architecture of the future internet has been introduced; the architecture defines 
the structure of the main networks entities, required for security purposes and for devices 
services. These entities are summarised as the following:   
- Endpoint identifiers (EID) are represented in such devices as the IoT.  
- Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) is responsible for receiving packets from host and 
sending LISP packets towards the map server.  
- Egress Tunnel Routers (ETR) are responsible for receiving LISP packets from map 
server and passing them to  host  
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- X Tunnel Routers (XTR) act as both ETR and ITR.  
- Mapping System (MS) is a globally database that contains all known ETR.  
Consequently, The LISP has three important situations to allow the devices to join the 
network: the Initial Registration, Communications procedures and mobility procedures. 
These procedures have been discussed in details in section 2.10, chapter 2.  
What are the Security vulnerabilities/threats in term of Internet of 
Things that the devices can be exposed to in Locator ID Separation 
Protocol?   
As stated in chapter 3, to answer this question, the research has provided an investigation to 
the security issues that could occur from deploying the LISP in the IoT. Therefore, X.805 
framework has been used to define the most security vulnerabilities and threats in the IoT.    
 How to provide End-to-End Security Commutation to Internet of 
Things? 
The answer to this question has been provided in chapter 6. The research has proposed a new 
security protocol communication to IoT devices that provides End-to-End Security. Where 
the achieved protocol has been designed via using El-Gamal encryption mechanism and is 
verified by AVISPA tool. The results demonstrate that they do not have any security flaws.  
 Considering the proposed security protocols, how could the security 
protocols interface to a refinement be integrated in order to 
approach a robust security for internet of things using Locator ID 
Separation Protocol network? 
The answer to this question is in Chapter 8. After designing the three security protocols in the 
Registration stage, resolving Stage and communication in chapters 5, 6, and 7, an interface 
for each level of these protocols has been set to achieve a robust security refinement protocol. 
The refinement protocol has been verified by using formal methods approach based on the 
AVISPA. 
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9.3 Main Contributions 
As started in Chapter 1, the main contributions of this research study include:   
 A critical review of existing network architectures for the IoT and network operation 
in these architectures has been presented. Furthermore, it reviews the existing 
solutions of different security protocols communication for the IoT. Consequently, 
this review uncovers important defects that hinder the successful realisation of 
designing End-to-End security communication for the IoT.   
 Providing a comprehensive security analysis via using X.805 security framework to 
analyse the most security threats that have direct impact on the IoT, based on LISP 
network architecture. Besides, the study proposes a model concerning the security 
threats for the IoT  based on LISP in three scenarios, i.e., initial Registration Stage, 
Resolving stage and communication procedure using AVISPA tool in order to design 
efficient protocols against these threats. 
  Providing security enhancement protocols for the IoT based on LISP network 
architecture; these protocols are simulated via AVISPA verifying tool and are divided 
as the following:  
 
1. The Initial Registration Stage: each LISP protocol capable router needs to be 
registered with a map server known as Registration Stage. 
2. The Resolving addresses between the RLoC routers need to be addressed. For 
example, when the RloC router (A) wants to send data to the RLoC router (B), 
both of these routers need to be authenticated so that information can be reached 
from its original destination.    
3. Proposing a new End-to-End Security protocol for the IoT communication. The 
new security protocol provides a message authentication scheme that relies only 
on locally shared keys and symmetric cryptographic operation. It, also, introduces 
a level of security approximating End-to-End security mechanism. The 
foundation of the scheme’s security is the creation of multiple disjoint 
(disconnected) authentication paths.     
 Proposing an interface between each protocol, namely, the Registration stage, the 
Resolving stage and the communication procedure. The aim is to achieve security 
refinement protocol to the IoT based on LISP network architecture. Furthermore, a 
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performance security refinement protocol analysis is provided in order evaluated the 
developed protocol impact on the IP-Based Sensor Network (IP-WSN).   
 Provided a comparison of the recent security protocol for IoT against this present 
research study protocols. 
 Verifying all the designed security protocols by using formal methods approach based 
on AVISPA tool. The performance and the evaluation have used Contiki and Cooja 
simulation tool to achieve the purpose      
9.4 Elaboration on the main contributions  
9.4.1 Identification of the main gaps in knowledge in the field of 
providing Internet of Things security in network environments. 
The study conducts a comprehensive literature survey of related works in the IoT network 
and security. The study highlights the following crucial drawbacks in the investigated 
approaches: 
- Uncertainty about the architecture of networks environments, which leads to 
many abstract solutions that do not reflect clear network architecture or/offer 
specific scenario solutions.    
- Lack of routing efficacy: various research works have provided different types 
of architecture to support the IoT devices; however, they do not consider the 
huge numbers of the IoT devices that networks contain, which add, in turns, 
overloads on the routing table efficacy and network infrastructure.  
- Poor realization of the IoT nature network, the unique features of the IoT 
should be considered in the designed security, therefore no conflict might result 
in implementing them.   
 
9.4.2 Defining a security issues and a generic structure of Internet of 
Things Network architecture. 
A generic architecture for the IoT network and security issues has been defined in Chapter 
2 successively. The chapter discusse two important security issues that IoT devices suffer 
from #Issue 1, as a result of the vast increase vastly as well. This is because the 
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communication between the devices can be easily exposed to disclosures by attackers. 
However, IPsec is not a practical solution to tiny devices link IoT. Hence, it is necessary to 
provide a mechanism in order to protect the transaction links between these devices 
against these adversaries. Concerning #Issue 2, IoT has a lack of privacy, integrity and 
confidentiality, defects that make the devices vulnerable against unauthorised device 
access.   Likewise, chapter 2 introduce an architecture demonstrating the main operational 
network entities and transaction messages for each scenario. Therefore, the existing 
architectures network to IoT such as MIPv6, PMIPv6 and NEMO are discussed. In 
addition, certain some comparisons of the mobility protocols have been done in terms of 
different mobility and communication scenarios. The exchange messages used for 
neighbour discovery in IoT networks have also been investigated. The comparisons show 
that each mobility protocol has its own advantages depending on the scenarios it involves. 
Though, most of these mobility protocols, such as MIPv6, PMIPv6 and NEMO, where 
traffic is caused by these mobility protocols, may be too much for low-bandwidth wireless 
links in domains with large IoT. Besides, as the number of connected devices increase, 
i.e.IoT devices, the burden on the network infrastructure increase as well. One of the key 
challenges will be the size of the routeing tables and efficiency of the current routing 
protocols in the Internet backbone. For that reason, LISP supports different types of 
networks, i.e.IoT which defines compressed and size optimised mobility/communication 
signalling.              
     9.4.3 Defining a Security threats in Internet of Things   
After defining the network architecture, security threats analyses has been provided in 
Chapter 3. The analysis expose the security threats in different levels on LISP architecture, 
i.e., initial Registration, resolving stage, communications procedures and mobility 
procedures.  Specifically this researched study demonstrates the most common security 
issues and vulnerabilities in the IoT network. The analysis is based on the X.805 security 
standard and has, consequently, considered the security threats of IoT based on LISP 
network architecture. Furthermore, the analysis showes that there is a genuine need to 
provide new mechanisms to enforce Access control, Authentication, Non repudiation, 
Data Confidentiality, Communication Security, Data Integrity, Availability and Privacy. 
Additionally, the researched study has considered two layer threats namely, the 
infrastructure and service layers to expose the security threats during the unsecure signal 
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transactions between the IoT, the LISP-capable routers and the mapping system. As results, 
a number of security vulnerabilities have been discovered and described.    
9.4.4 Providing an Enhanced Security Protocol for Registration Stage in 
Locator/ID Separation Protocol Architecture  
The enhanced security protocol for registration stage to the IoT based on LISP architecture 
has been already introduced in Chapter 4. The first designed version enhanced protocol 
used a Trust Authentication Server (TAS) as a third party trusted between ETR and MS, in 
order to provide two-party mutual authentication to entities i.e ETR and MS. Strikingly, 
attacks had been discovered by AVISPA; these attacks where divided into three categories 
in the registration protocol. (I) attacks on the I_ETR and I_TAS; here the intercepts the 
messages between ETR and TAS: These attacks are called playbacks. (II) Attacks on the 
I_MS and I_TAS, here the intruder listens to the conversation between MS and TAS. 
These attacks are called eavesdropping attack. (III) The third category is attack on I_ETR 
and I_MS where the intruder intercepts the communication and acts as I_ETR or I_MS 
conversation between the ETR and MS. These are known as Man in the Middle Attacks 
(MitM). Consequently, the final version of enhanced security protocol for registration 
stage in LISP architecture provided a new security method based on IBC, allowing a Map-
Server to check the received information (i.e. the EID-Prefix) and provided secure 
authentication as well. The protocol is verified by AVISPA tool and the shows there are 
no security flaws.       
9.4.5 Providing an Enhanced Security Protocol for Resolving Stage in 
Locator/ID Separation protocol Architecture  
The enhanced security protocol for resolving stage to the IoT based in LISP architecture 
has been already introduced in Chapter 5. The first designed version of the enhanced 
protocol uses a random value generating and hash functions to provide a safe and secure 
transaction message between ITR and ETR. Furthermore, the protocol is simulated using 
AVISPA and two attacks have been discovered namely MitM and eavesdropping attacks. 
Thus, the final version of the enhanced security protocol for the resolving stage in LISP 
architecture has provided a new security method, based on Challenge-Response 
authentication and Key Agreement technique, allowing ITR and ETR to authenticate each 
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other. The protocol is verified by AVISPA tool. The results show that this protocol is void 
of any security flaws.          
9.4.6 Providing End-to-End Security Communication to Internet of 
Things using Locator/ID Separation protocol Architecture 
Chapter 6 has provided End-to-End security communication protocol to IoT using LISP 
architecture. Furthermore, two security versions have been provided, the first version of 
security protocol used Challenge-Response and devices, when they communicate with 
each other based on LISP network architecture. A formal analysis was provided using 
AVISPA tool and MitM was discovered via AVISPA security tool. Besides, the final 
version of a new security protocol for IP-based Wireless Sensor (IP-WSN) communication 
has been proposed using El-Gamal encryption system. The security analysis and 
verification using AVISPA shows that no attacks have been found in the communication 
protocol.    
9.4.7 Providing a Security Refinement Protocol and Performance to 
Internet of Thing using Locator/ID Separation protocol Architecture 
Chapter 7 has provided a security refinement protocol and performance to the IoT devices 
using LISP architecture. Likewise, the refinement protocol is based on three security 
protocols namely resignation, resolving and communication which have been already 
introduced in previous chapters. Strikingly, the main idea of these protocols is to set an 
interface for each phase of the protocol to be joined together as one refinement protocol. 
Furthermore, the security refinement protocol analysis and verification using AVISPA 
show that no attacks have been detected. Finally, simulating the security refinement 
protocol in Contiki and Cooja simulation tool and the results show that the security 
refinement is highly scalable and the memory is quite efficient. It only needs 72 bytes of 
memory to storage the key in the device and it introduces 75.125 bytes of transmission and 
reception cost per connection. In this context, it has the advantage of securing defines 
against compromised nodes.   
9.4.8 Providing a Comparison of Security Protocols to Internet of Things  
Chapter 8 has provided a security protocols to IoT devices. The outcome of this analysis 
shows that the recent design for the security protocols has not met the security requirement 
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goals i.e. authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, freshness, availability 
and reality. Besides, it has been provided a comprehensive comparison is for the published 
work against the security protocol of research, the comparison based on the security 
attacks, namely eavesdropping , relayed, Dos, MitM, node capturing, selective forward, 
sinkhole, Sybil, wormhole and hello attacks. These attacks can affect the security 
performance of IoT network. Also, it has been provided a comparison between different 
evaluation approaches such as energy consumption, communication overhead, and storage 
overhead.  
9.5 Future improvements to solutions to maximize the study  
The Internet of Things is a relatively new concept in terms of optimised protocols and 
security. It is an ever-changing area that will continue to change, and thus there is a lot of 
work for the future. Although, speed and cryptographic strength are especially important 
in the Internet of Things, however, the most pressing issue is simplifying the use of 
security in IoT for developers without a need for thorough knowledge of IT security. 
Designing and implementing security in protocols that are simple for developers to use is a 
must for the future of IoT. As devices in the Internet of Things are constrained devices, 
efficient implementations of cryptographic algorithms are especially important to keep the 
cryptographic strength at an acceptable level. Though the recommendations in this thesis 
are made with practical hypothesis for the future of IoT and encompass many different 
solutions, one will have to re-examine the recommendations with large changes in the 
market. As many cryptographic properties will always be existing and important, most of 
the recommendations will be the same for all foreseeable future. Consequently, the 
following is a list of set of improvements to the proposed solutions and related works upon 
which this study is based and which will hopefully result in a further improvement in 
performance:  
 Defining the cryptographic algorithm in the proposed protocols: this involves 
comparing different algorithms and analysing how these might affect the 
performance of the whole protocol.      
 Reducing the transaction messages of the proposed protocol in order to achieve 
lightweight protocol to the IoT.  
 Implementing the proposed security refinement protocol in the IoT such as WSN 
device in order to evaluate the devices performerance.  
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9.6 Concluding Remarks  
As shown throughout the different chapters of this thesis, the key issues of providing security 
refinement protocol to the IoT based on LISP architecture have been directly addressed. The 
security refinement protocol was verified using formal methods based on AVISPA tool and 
the archived results show that the refinement protocol is completely free of any security 
flaws. This significant achievement will definitely and hopefully will furnish the way for 
more development of the security protocols in the future of the Internet of networks. The 
outcome will definitely open new vistas to researchers to explore new possibilities in varied 
safe and secure use of the internet of network.    
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% Role of the initiator by ETR: 
role router_ETR (ETR, MS: agent,              
            PUK_ETR: public_key,  
            PSK1_TAS, PSK2_TAS: Symmetric_key,  
            H: hash_func 
            KeyRing: (agent.public_key) set, 
            Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) 
 
played_by ETR def= 
 
  local State : nat, 
        N1, N2: text, 
        Map-Register: text, 
        Map-Notify: text, 
        ACK: text, 
        PUK_MS: public_key 
 
  init State := 0 
 
  transition 
 
   % Start, if ETR must request MS public key from TAS 
   ask.    State  = 0 /\ Rcv(start) /\ not(in(MS.PUK_MS', KeyRing)) 
       =|> State':= 1 /\ Snd {(ETR.N1.Map-Register),{H(N1.Map-  Register.MS)} 
 
   % Receipt of response from Trust Authentication Server 
   learn.  State  = 1 /\ Rcv {TAS,N1,Map-Register), ({PUK.MS'}_inv(PSK1_TAS)) 
       =|> State':= 0 /\ KeyRing':=cons(MS.PUK', KeyRing) 
  
   % Start/resume, provided ETR knows MS public key 
   knows.  State  = 0 /\ Rcv(start) /\ in(MS.PUK', KeyRing) 
       =|> State':= 4 /\ ETR':=new() /\ Snd {(ETR,Map-Register)   {MS}_PUK') 
                      /\ secret(ETR',setra,{ETR,MS}) 
                      /\ witness(ETR,MS,Router,Map_Server) 
 
   cont.   State  = 4 /\ Rcv{(MS.Map-Notify)_PUK_ETR)}  
       =|> State':= 6 /\ Snd {(ETR.ACK.Map-Notify)_PUK_MS)} 
                       
 
end role 
 
% Role of the receiver by MS: 
role Map_Server(ETR, MS: agent,       
         PUK_MS: public_key, 
         PSK1_TAS, PSK2_TAS: Symmetric_key   
         H: hash_func 
         KeyRing: (agent.public_key) set, 
         Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) 
played_by MS def= 
 
  local State: nat, 
        N1, N2: text,  
        PUK_ETR: public_key 
        Map-Register: text, 
        Map-Notify: text, 
        ACK: text, 
 
  init State := 2 
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  transition  
 
   % Start if MS must request ETR public key from key server 
   ask.    State  = 2 /\ Rcv {(ETR,Map-Register)(PUK_MS)} /\ not(in(ETR.PUK_ETR', KeyRing)) 
       =|> State':= 3 /\ Snd{(MS.N2.Map-Register),{H(N2.Map-  Register.ETR)} 
    
% Receipt of response from Trust Authentication Server 
   learn.  State  = 3 /\ Rcv {TAS,N2,Map-Register), ({PUK.ETR'}_inv(PSK2_TAS))       =|> State':= 2 /\ 
KeyRing':=cons(ETR.PUK', KeyRing) 
 
   % Start/resume, provided MS knows ETR public key 
   knows.  State  = 2 /\ Rcv /\ in(ETR.PUK', KeyRing) 
       =|> State':= 5 /\ MS':=new() /\ Snd{(ETR,Map-Notify)   {ETR}_PUK')                      /\ 
secret(MS',smsa,{MS,ETR}) 
                      /\ witness(MS,ETR,Map_Server,Router) 
 
   cont.   State  = 5 /\ Rcv {(ETR.ACK.Map-Notify)_PUK_MS)})  
        
end role 
 
% Role of the Trust Authentication Server   
role server(TAS: agent, 
            PSK1_TAS, PSK2_TAS: Symmetric, 
            PUK_ETR, PUK_MS: Public key 
            H: hash_func  
            KeyMap: (agent.public_key) set, 
            Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) 
played_by S def= 
 
  local ETR, MS: agent, 
        State: nat, 
        PUK_MS: public_key 
 
  init State := 8 
 
  transition 
   req1.   State = 8 /\ Rcv{(ETR,N1,Map-RequestRegister),{h(N1,Map-Register)'.MS') /\ in(MS'.PUK_MS', 
KeyMap) 
       =|> State':= 8 /\ Snd({N1,Map-Register)'.PUK_MS'}_inv(PSK1_TAS)) 
 
Req2.   State = 9 /\ Rcv{(MS,N2,Map-Register),{h(N2,Map-Register)'.MS') /\ in(ETR'.PUK_ETR', KeyMap) 
       =|> State':= 9 /\ Snd({N2,Map-Register)'.PUK_ETR'}_inv(PSK2_TAS)) 
 
end role 
 
% Role representing a partial session between ETR and MS: 
role nspk(Snd, Rcv: channel(dy), 
          PSK1_TAS, PSK2_TAS: Symmetric 
          Instances: (agent.agent.Symmetric_key.Symetric_key) set, 
          KeySet: agent -> (agent.Symmetric_key) set) 
def= 
 
  local ETR, MS: agent, 
        PUK_ETR, PUK, MS: public_key, 
  
 composition 
     /\_{in(ETR.MS.PUK_ETR.PUK_MS,Instances)} 
       (ETR(ETR,MS,PUK_ETR,PSK1_TAS,KeySet(ETR),Snd,Rcv) 
       /\ MS(MS,ETR,PUK_MS,PSK2_TAS,KeySet(MS),Snd,Rcv)) 
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end role 
 
 
 
% The main role: 
role environment() def= 
 
  local KeyMap: (agent.public_key) set, 
        Snd, Rcv: channel(dy) 
 
  const etr, ms, tas, i: agent, 
        PUK_ETR, PUK_MS, KUPi: public_key, 
        PSKi, PSK1_TAS, PSK2_TAS: Symmetric, 
 
        snetr, snms, router_map_server_nms, map_server _router_netr: protocol_id 
 
  init KeyMap := {etr.puk_etr, ms.puk_ms, i.kupi} 
 
  intruder_knowledge = {etr, ms, psk1_tas, psk2_tas, puk_etr, puk_ms, puki,pski, inv(ki)} 
 
  composition 
        map_server(ms,psk1_tas, psk1_tas KeyMap, Snd, Rcv) 
     /\ nspk(Snd, Rcv,                  % channels 
             Psk1, psk2                 % Pre-shared keys to secure                 
                                        % the connections between  
                                        % the TAS and ETR, MS                               
             {etr.ms.puk_etr.puk_ms,    % session instances  
              etr.i.puk_etr.ki, 
              i.ms.ki.puk_ms 
             }, 
             {etr.{etr.puk_etr,ms.puk_ms},   % initial 
              KeyRings 
              ms.{ms.puk_ms}, 
              i.{i.ki}}) 
end role 
 
% Description of goal properties: 
goal 
 
  secrecy_of sn1, sn2,etr, ms, tas 
  Weak_ authentication on etr_tas 
  Weak_authentication on ms_tas 
  Weak_authentication on etr_ms 
  authentication_on router_map_server_n1 
  authentication_on map_server_router_n2 
 
end goal 
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role router_ITR (ITR, ETR, MS : agent, 
                     PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                                   H    : hash_func, 
                              Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
 
played_by ITR 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
SK : symmetric_key  
                  N1,N2 : text 
   MappRequest,MappReply: text 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
 
init   State := 0 
 
transition 
   1. ask.State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1 
       /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N1.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_ItrMs)  
   2. learn.State = 1 
       /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
       /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
       /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
3.knows.State = 2 
       /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
State' := 3 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N1.MappReply,N2,H(ETR.N1.MappReply)}_SK) 
       /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N1,N2') 
       /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
4.State = 3 
       /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
State' := 4 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N2}_SK 
 
end role 
role router_ETR (ETR,ITR,MS: agent, 
PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                                H    : hash_func, 
                      Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by ETR 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
SK : symmetric_key  
                  N1,N2 : text 
   MappRequest,MappReply: text 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
init State := 0 
transition 
   1. learn.State = 1 
        /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
        /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
        /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
2.knows.State = 2 
        /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
State' := 3 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N1.MappReply,N2,H(ETR.N1.MappReply)}_SK)  
        /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N1,N2') 
        /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
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3.cont.State = 3 
        /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
State' := 4 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N2}_SK 
end role 
role Map_Server (MS,ITR,ETR: agent, 
        PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                      H    : hash_func, 
                 Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by MS 
def= 
local ITR,ETR: agent 
SK : symmetric_key  
                     N1,N2 : text 
      MappRequest,MappReply: text, 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
init State := 0 
transition 
   1. req1.State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) 
      =|> 
State' := 1 
      /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N1.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_ItrMs)  
   2. State = 1 
      /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
      /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
      /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
 
end role 
 
role session(ITR,ETR,MS: agent, 
    PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                  H    : hash_func, 
def= 
 
    SITR,SETR,RITR,RETR,DMS,LMS: channel (dy) 
composition 
    map_server(MS,ITR,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,DMS,LMS) 
    router_itr(ITR,MS,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,SITR,RETR) 
    /\ router_etr(ETR,MS,ITR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,SETR,RETR) 
 
end role 
role environment()  
def= 
 
const itr, etr, ms: agent 
        PSK_ItrMS,PSK_MsEtr,SK:symmetric_key 
                H   : hash_func, 
               N1,N2: protocol_id, 
 
 
intruder_knowledge = {ITR,MS,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,H,SK,mapRequest, mapReply} 
composition 
session(itr,ms,etr, PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,h) /\  
session(ms,i,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK) 
session(itr,i,sk,h)/\  
session(ETR,i,sk,h) 
 
end role 
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goal 
 
%secrecy_of challenge response n1 
  security_of secitr, secn1,secms,secetr 
  Weak_authentication on itr_ms 
  Weak_authentication on itr_ms 
  Weak_authentication on itr_ms 
  authentication_on etr_itr_n1 
 
end goal  
 
 
170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX –C 
Communication Protocol for Internet of Things Version -I 
In HLPSL Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
%Macros 
  %M1 = SenserA, SenserB, N, CH1, exp(G,X) 
  %M2 = M1, H (SKA, M1),SenserB,exp(G,X) XOR exp(G,Y) 
  %M3 = SenserB, SenserA,H(SKB, SenserB),H(SKA,exp(G,X) XOR exp(G,Y)) 
  %M4 = SenserB, SenserA, CH1, CH2, exp(G,Y), 
       H(SKA,exp(G,X) XOR exp(G,Y)),H(SKB,SenserB) 
  %M5 = SenserA, SenserB, CH2, CH3 
  %M6 = SenserB, SenserA, CH3, CH4 
  %1. SenserA -> SenserB  : M1,H(SKA,M1) 
  %2. SenserB -> XTR     : M2,H(SKB,M2)  
  %3. XTR     -> SenserB  : M3,H(SKBXTR, SKAXTR M3)  
  %4. SenserB -> SenserA  : M4,H(exp(exp(G,X),Y),M4)  
  %5. SenserA -> SenserB  : M5,H(exp(exp(G,X),Y),M5) 
  %6. SenserB -> SenserA  : M6,H(exp(exp(G,X),Y),M6) 
 
role sensor_A( 
   A,B,XTR : agent, 
    SND,RCV    : channel(dy), 
    H          : hash_func, 
    SKA,SKB    : symmetric_key, 
      N,G      : text) 
 
played_by A def= 
 
  local 
    State       : nat, 
    X,CH1,CH3   : text, 
    CH2,CH4     : text, 
GY,Key      : message 
SKAXTR,SKBXTR: symmetric_key 
 
const sec_a_Key : protocol_id 
     
  init  State := 0 
 
  transition 
 
 1. State  = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|> 
    State':= 1 /\ X' := new() 
               /\ CH1' := new() 
               /\ SND(A.B.N.CH1'.exp(G,X').H(SKA.A.B.N.CH1'.exp(G,X'))) 
 
 2. State  = 1 /\ RCV(B.A.CH1.CH2'.GY'. 
                      H(SKAXTR.xor(exp(G,X),GY')). 
                      H(SKAB.B). 
                      H(exp(GY',X).B.A.CH1.CH2'.GY'. 
                        H(SKA.xor(exp(G,X),GY')). 
                        H(B.VGK))) 
              =|> 
    State':= 2 /\ CH3' := new() 
               /\ Key':=exp(GY',X) 
               /\ SND(A.B.CH2'.CH3'.H(Key'.A.B.CH2'.CH3')) 
               /\ witness(A,B,key1,Key') 
 
 3. State  = 2 /\ RCV(B.A.CH3.CH4'.H(Key.B.A.CH3.CH4')) =|> 
    State':= 3 /\ request(A,B,key,Key) 
               /\ secret(Key,sec_m_Key,{A,XTR})%XTR must be honest anyway.. 
end role 
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role sensor_B ( 
    A,B,XTR    : agent, 
    SND,RCV    : channel(dy), 
    H          : hash_func, 
    SKA,SKB    : symmetric_key, 
    N,G        : text) 
 
played_by B def= 
 
  local 
    State          : nat, 
    GX,Key         : message, 
    FM1 : hash(symmetric_key.agent.agent.text.text.message), 
    FM2 : hash(symmetric_key.agent), 
    FM3 : hash(symmetric_key.message), 
    M2  : message, 
    Y,CH2,CH4      : text, 
CH1,CH3        : text 
SKAXTR,SKBXTR   : symmetric_key 
 
  const sec_b_Key : protocol_id 
 
  init  State := 0 
 
  transition 
 
  1. State = 0 /\ RCV(A.B).N.CH1'.GX'.FM1') =|> 
     State':= 1 /\ Y' := new() 
               /\ Key':=exp(GX',Y') 
               /\ M2' := A.B.N.CH1'.GX'.FM1'.B.xor(GX',exp(G,Y')) 
               /\ SND(M2'.H(SKAXTR,SKBXTR.M2')) 
               /\ witness(B,A,key,Key') 
  
  2. State = 1 /\ RCV(B.A.FM2'.FM3'.F(SKA.SKB.VGK.MT.FM2'.FM3')) =|> 
     State':= 2 /\ CH2' := new() 
               /\ SND(  B.A.CH1.CH2'.exp(G,Y).FM3'.FM2'. 
                        H(Key.B.A.CH1.CH2'.exp(G,Y).FM3'.FM2')) 
 
  3. State = 2 /\ RCV(A.B.CH2.CH3'.H(Key.A.B.CH2.CH3')) =|> 
     State':= 3 /\ CH4' := new() 
               /\ SND(B.A.CH3'.CH4'.H(Key.B.A.CH3'.CH4')) 
               /\ request(B,A,key1,Key) 
               /\ secret(Key,sec_v_Key,{A}) 
          
end role 
 
role router_XTR( 
    A,B,XTR        : agent, 
    SND,RCV        : channel(dy), 
    H              : hash_func, 
    SKAXTR,SKBXTR  : symmetric_key, 
    NIL,G      : text) 
  
played_by XTR def= 
 
  local 
    State         : nat, 
    GX,GY         : message, 
    CH1           : text 
   SKA,SKB        : symmetric_key, 
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    init 
    State := 0 
 
  transition 
 
  1. State = 0  /\ RCV(       A.B.NIL.CH1'.GX'. 
                         H(SKA.SKB.MT.VGK.NIL.CH1'.GX'). 
                              VGK.xor(GX',GY'). 
                      H(SKAXTR.A.B.N.CH1'.GX'. 
                         H(SKBXTR.A.B.N.CH1'.GX'). 
                              B.xor(GX',GY')))  =|> 
 
     State':= 1 /\ SND(       B.A.H(SKB.B).F(SKA.xor(GX',GY')). 
                      F(SKBXTR.B.A.H(SKB.B).F(SKA.xor(GX',GY')))) 
 
end role 
 
role session( 
    A,B,XTR : agent, 
    H          : hash_func, 
    SKA,SKB    : symmetric_key, 
    N,G        : text) 
def= 
    SKAXTR,SKBXTR    : symmetric_key, 
 
  local SND,RCV : channel (dy) 
 
  composition 
    sensor_A(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,SKA,SKB,SKAXTR,SKBXTR,N,G) 
 /\ router_XTR(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H, SKAXTR, SKBXTR, SKB, SKA ,N,G) 
 /\ sensor_B(B,A,XTR,SND,RCV, SKA,SKB,SKAXTR,SKBXTR,N,G) 
 
end role 
 
 
role environment() 
def= 
 
  const 
    a,b,xtr      : agent, 
    h            : hash_func, 
    key,key1     : protocol_id, 
    sk_a_xtr,sk_b_xtr,ska_skb_i_xtr: symmetric_key, 
     n,g        : text 
 
  intruder_knowledge = {a,b,xtr,h,g,n,ska_skb_i_xtr } 
 
  composition 
     session(a,b,xtr,h,sk_a_xtr,sk_b_xtr,n,g) 
  /\ session(a,b,xtr,h,sk_a_xtr,sk_b_xtr,n,g) 
 
end role 
 
goal 
        authentication_on key 
  authentication_on key1 
  secrecy_of sec_a_Key, sec_b_Key 
 
end goal 
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role router_ETR (ETR, MS, TKG : agent, 
                PUK_ETR,PUK_MS: Public_Key  
                     PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key,    
                         H    : hash_func, 
                    Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
 
played_by ETR 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
N1 : text 
              M,M2,ACK, : messages 
        PVK_ETR, PVK_MS :{text.public_key}_inv(public_key), 
EIDPre :messages 
 
 
init   State := 0 
 
transition 
 
   1. State   = 0  /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1 
                   /\ Snd(TKG.ETR.{PVK_ETR}_PSK1  
 
   2. State   = 1  /\ Rcv(Start) =|> 
State' := 2 
                   /\ Snd(TKG.MS.{PVK_MS}_PSK2 
 
3.State    = 2  /\ Rcv(PVK_ETR)PSK1) =|> 
State'  := 3           
                   /\  Snd(ETR.MS.{M,ETR,N1,EIDPre}{PUK_MS}, {H(M,ETR,N1,EIDPre)}{PVK_ETR} 
                   /\  witness(ETR,MS,N1)  
                   /\  secret (PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,{ETR,MS}) 
4.State    = 3  /\ Rcv(PVK_MS)PSK2) =|> 
     State'  := 4  /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{m2,N1}{PUK_ETR},{H(m2,n1)}{PVK_MS)} 
                   /\ witness(MS,ETR,N1) 
                   /\ secret (PUK_ETR,PVK_MS,{MS,ETR}) 
 
end role 
role map_server (MS,ETR: agent, 
       PUK_ETR , PUK_MS: Public_Key  
              PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key,    
                  H    : hash_func, 
             Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by MS 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
N1 : text 
              M,M2,ACK, : messages 
        PVK_ETR, PVK_MS :{text.public_key}_inv(public_key), 
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                  EIDPre:messages 
init State := 0 
transition 
 
1.State    = 2  /\ Rcv(PVK_ETR)PSK1) =|> 
State'  := 3           
                   /\  Snd(ETR.MS.{M,ETR,N1,EIDPre}{PUK_MS}, {H(M,ETR,N1,EIDPre)}{PVK_ETR} 
                   /\  witness(ETR,MS,N1)  
                   /\  secret (PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,{ETR,MS}) 
2.State    = 3  /\ Rcv(PVK_MS)PSK2) =|> 
     State'  := 4  /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{m2,N1}{PUK_ETR},{H(m2,n1)}{PVK_MS)} 
                   /\ witness(MS,ETR,N1) 
                   /\ secret (PUK_ETR,PVK_MS,{MS,ETR}) 
 
end role 
role the_trusted_ticket_granting (TKG,ETR,MS: agent, 
       PUK_ETR , PUK_MS: Public_Key  
              PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key,    
                  H    : hash_func, 
             Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by MS 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
N1 : text 
              M,M2,ACK, : messages 
        PVK_ETR, PVK_MS :{text.public_key}_inv(public_key), 
                  EIDPre:messages 
init State := 0 
transition 
 
 
 
 1. State   = 0  /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1 
                 /\ Snd(TKG.ETR.{PVK_ETR}_PSK1  
 
 2. State   = 1  /\ Rcv(Start) =|> 
State' := 2 
                 /\ Snd(TKG.MS.{PVK_MS}_PSK2 
 
end role 
       role session(ETR,MS,TKG: agent, 
      PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS: Public_Key  
                         PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key, 
H : hash_func, 
                                N1: protocol_id 
def= 
 
    SETR,SMS,RETR,RMS,DTKG,LTKG: channel (dy) 
composition 
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    router_ETR(ETR,MS,TKG,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H,SETR,RETR)  
    map_server(MS,ETR,TKG,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H,SMS,RMS) 
    /\the_trusted_ticket_granting(TKG,ETR,MS,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR, 
    PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H,DTKG,LTKG) 
 
end role 
role environment()  
def=      
const etr,ms,tkg : agent 
  PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS: Public_Key  
                      PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key, 
H : hash_func, 
                             N1: protocol_id 
 
intruder_knowledge = {ETR,MS,ETR,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H,M,M2} 
composition 
     session(etr,ms,PUK_ETR,PUK_MS,PVK_ETR,PVK_MS,PSK1,PSK2,h) /\  
session(etr,i,PVK_ETR,h)/\  
session(Ms,i,PVK_MS,h) 
 
end role 
goal 
  %securecy_of Map_server, Router_ETR on n1 
security_of secEtrMS, secMsEtr  
  % Router_ETR wakly authenticates Server_MS on _ETR 
  weak_authentication_on _ETR 
  % Map_server waly authenticates on _MS 
  weak_authentication_on_MS 
  %Mutual authentication% 
  %ROUTER_ETR authenticats Server_MS on n1 
authentication on_n1 
 
end goal 
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role router_ITR (ITR, ETR, MS : agent, 
                     PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                                   H    : hash_func, 
                              Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
 
played_by ITR 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
SK : symmetric_key  
                  N1,N2 : text 
   MappRequest,MappReply: text 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
 
init   State := 0 
 
transition 
   1. ask.State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1 
       /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N1.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_ItrMs)  
   2. learn.State = 1 
       /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
       /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
       /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
3.knows.State = 2 
       /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
State' := 3 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N1.MappReply,N2,H(ETR.N1.MappReply)}_SK) 
       /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N1,N2') 
       /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
4.State = 3 
       /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
State' := 4 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N2}_SK 
 
end role 
role router_ETR (ETR,ITR,MS: agent, 
PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                                H    : hash_func, 
                      Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by ETR 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
SK : symmetric_key  
                  N1,N2 : text 
   MappRequest,MappReply: text 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
init State := 0 
transition 
   1. learn.State = 1 
        /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
        /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
        /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
2.knows.State = 2 
        /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
State' := 3 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N1.MappReply,N2,H(ETR.N1.MappReply)}_SK)  
        /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N1,N2') 
        /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
 
 
180 
 
3.cont.State = 3 
        /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
State' := 4 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N2}_SK 
end role 
role Map_Server (MS,ITR,ETR: agent, 
        PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                      H    : hash_func, 
                 Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by MS 
def= 
local ITR,ETR: agent 
SK : symmetric_key  
                     N1,N2 : text 
      MappRequest,MappReply: text, 
const sec_PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK :protocol_id 
init State := 0 
transition 
   1. req1.State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) 
      =|> 
State' := 1 
      /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N1.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_ItrMs)  
   2. State = 1 
      /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N1,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N1.MappRequest)}_PSK_MsEtr)  
      /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N1,N2') 
      /\ secret (PSK1,PSK2,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
 
end role 
role session(ITR,ETR,MS: agent, 
    PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr: symmetric_key, 
                  H    : hash_func, 
def= 
 
    SITR,SETR,RITR,RETR,DMS,LMS: channel (dy) 
composition 
    map_server(MS,ITR,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,DMS,LMS) 
    router_itr(ITR,MS,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,SITR,RETR) 
    /\ router_etr(ETR,MS,ITR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,H,SETR,RETR) 
 
end role 
role environment()  
def= 
 
const itr, etr, ms: agent 
        PSK_ItrMS,PSK_MsEtr,SK:symmetric_key 
                H   : hash_func, 
               N1,N2: protocol_id, 
 
 
intruder_knowledge = {ITR,MS,ETR,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,H,SK,mapRequest, mapReply} 
composition 
session(itr,ms,etr, PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK,h) /\  
session(ms,i,PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK) 
session(itr,i,sk,h)/\  
session(ETR,i,sk,h) 
 
end role 
goal 
 
  %secrecy_of PSK_ItrMs,PSK_MsEtr,SK, n1,n2 
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security_of secItrMS, secMsEtr, secItrEtr 
  % Router_ITR Weak authenticates Map_Server on PSK_ItrMS 
  weak_authentication_on PSK_ItrMS 
  % Router_ITR Weak authenticates Map_Server on     PSK_MsEtr  
  weak_authentication_on PSK_MsEtr 
  % Router_ITR Weak authenticates Router_ETR on Sk 
  weak_authentication_on PSK_ItrMS on Sk 
  %Mutual authentication% 
  % ROUTER_ETR authenticats ROUTER_ITR on n1 
  authentication_on n1 
  % ROUTER_ITR authenticats ROUTER_ETR on n2 
  authentication_on n2 
 
 
end goal  
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%% Macros: 
%%  M1: H(PKA.A.B.exp(G, X).exp(UA, Z)).exp(L, Z) 
%%  M2: H(PKB.A.B.exp(G, Y ).exp(UB, Z).exp(L, Z) 
%% Key: exp(exp(GY, Z), X) = exp(exp(GX, Z), Y ) 
%%  GX: exp(G, X) 
%%  GY: exp(G, Y) 
      %% 1.Sensor_A -> Sensor_B : xor(exp(G, X), H(PKA.A.B)) 
%% 2.Sensor_B -> Router_XTR : xor(exp(G, X), H(PKA.A.B)), 
%%               xor(exp(G, Y ), H(PKB.A.B)) 
%% 3.Router_XTR -> sensor_B : xor(exp(GY, Z), M1), 
                 xor(exp(GX, Z)M2) 
%% 4.sensor_B -> sensor_A : xor(exp(GY, Z), M1).H(A.B.Key) 
%% 5.sensor_A -> sensor_B : H(A.B.Key) 
%% HLPSL: 
role sensor_A(A, B, XTR : agent, 
               SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                      H : hash func, 
                    PKA : symmetric key, 
                      G : text) 
  played_by A 
  def= 
  local State : nat, 
         X, Z : text, 
           UA : public_key, 
  GY , Key, L : message, 
const sec_m_Key : protocol_id,  
 
init State := 0 
 
transition 
 
  1. State = 0 /\RCV(start)= | > 
    State’:= 1 /\ X' := new() 
               /\ SND(xor(exp(G, X'), H(PKA.A.B))) 
  2. State = 1 /\ RCV (xor(exp(GY', Z'), 
 
                  H(PKA.A.B.exp(G, X).exp(UA', Z'))).L) = | > 
     State’:= 2 /\ Key’ := exp(exp(GY’,Z’),X) 
                /\ SND(H(A.B.Key')) 
                /\ witness(A, B, key1, Key') 
 
  3.  State = 2  /\ RCV (A.B.Key) = | > 
      State’:= 3 /\ request(A, B, key, Key) 
                 /\ secret(Key, sec_m_Key, A, B) 
  
end role 
role sensor_B (A, B, XTR : agent, 
                SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                       H : hash func, 
                PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
                       G :text) 
played by B 
def= 
 local State : nat, 
        X, Y, Z : text, 
         GX, GY : message, 
                UB : public key, 
               Key : message, 
                M1: hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message, 
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                M2: hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message 
 
const sec v Key : protocol id 
 
init State := 0 
 
transition 
   1. State = 0   /\ RCV (xor(exp(G, X'), H(PKA.A.B))) = | > 
      State’:= 1  /\ Y':= new() 
                  /\ SND(xor(exp(G, X'), 
                     H(PKA.A.B)).xor(exp(G, Y'), H(PKB.A.B))) 
 
   2. State = 1   /\  RCV (xor(exp(GY, Z'),M1'). 
                      xor(exp(GX', Z'), M2')) = |> 
      State’:= 2  /\  SND(xor(exp(GY, Z'), M1)) 
   3. State = 2   /\  RCV (H(A.B.exp(exp(GX',Z'), Y )))= |> 
      State’:= 3  /\  Key':= exp(exp(GX',Z'),Y ) 
                     /\  SND(H(A.B.Key')) 
                     /\  request(B, A, key1, Key) 
                     /\  secret(Key, sec_v_Key, B,A) 
                     /\  witness(B,A,key,Key') 
end role 
role router_xtr(A, B, XTR : agent, 
                 SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                        H : hash func, 
                 PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
                         G : text) 
played by XTR  
def= 
 local State : nat, 
     X, Y, Z : text, 
      UA, UB : public key, 
      GX, GY : message 
  init State := 0 
  transition 
  1. State = 0 /\ RCV (xor(exp(G, X'), 
               H(PKA.A.B)).xor(exp(G,Y'), H(PKB.A.B)))= |> 
   State’:= 1  /\ Z' := new() 
               /\ UA':= new() 
               /\ UB':= new() 
               /\ GY':= new() 
               /\ GX':= new() 
               /\ SND(xor(exp(GY', Z'), 
            H(PkA.A.B.exp(G, X').exp(UA',Z')). 
            exp(G, Z')). 
            xor(exp(GX',Z'), H(PKB.A.B. 
            exp(G, Y').exp(UB', Z')).exp(G, Z')))  
end role 
role session( A, B, XTR : agent, 
                       H : hash func, 
                PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
                  UA, UB :public key, 
                       G : text) 
def= 
local SND, RCV : channel (dy) 
composition 
    sensor_a(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,G) 
 /\ sensor_b(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,PKB,G) 
 /\ router_xtr(A,B,XTR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,PKB,G) 
end role 
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role environment() 
def= 
const a, b, xtr : agent, 
              h : hash func, 
      key, key1 : protocol_id, 
     pa, pb, pi :symmetric_key, 
     ua, ub, ui :public key, 
              g : text 
 intruder knowledge = {a, b, xtr, g, h, pi, ua, ub, ui} 
 composition 
    session(b, a, xtr, h, pa, pb, ua, ub, g) 
 /\ session(i, b, xtr, h, pi, pb, ui, ub, g) 
 /\ session(a, i, xtr, h, pa, pi, ua, ui, g) 
end role 
 
goal 
authentication on key 
authentication on key1 
secrecy-of sec-m-Key, sec-v-Key 
end goal  
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role sensor_A (A, B, ITR,ETR : agent, 
                         SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                         H : hash func, 
                        PKA : symmetric key, 
                        G : text) 
 
  played_by A 
  def=  
 
  local State : nat, 
             X, Z : text, 
             UA : public_key, 
             GY , Key, L : message, 
 
const sec_m_Key : protocol_id,  
        
init State := 0 
     
   transition 
 
  16. State = 0 /\RCV(start)= | > 
    State’:= 1 /\ X' := new() 
               /\ SND(xor(exp(G, X'), H(PKA.A.B))) 
  17. State = 1 /\ RCV (xor(exp(GY', Z'), 
                  H(PKA.A.B.exp(G, X).exp(UA', Z'))).L) = | > 
     State’:= 2 /\ Key’ := exp(exp(GY’,Z’),X) 
                /\ SND(H(A.B.Key')) 
                /\ witness(A, B, key1, Key') 
  18.  State = 2  /\ RCV (A.B.Key) = | > 
      State’:= 3 /\ request(A, B, key, Key) 
                 /\ secret(Key, sec_m_Key, A, B) 
    end role  
 
  role sensor_B (A, B, ITR,ETR : agent, 
                          SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                          H : hash func, 
                          PKA, PKB : symmetric key, 
                         G :text) 
played by B 
def= 
 
 local State : nat, 
        X, Y, Z : text, 
         GX, GY : message, 
                UB : public key, 
               Key : message, 
                M1: hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message, 
                M2: hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message 
const sec v Key : protocol id 
init State := 0 
 
transition 
 
  16. State = 0   /\ RCV (xor(exp(G, X'), H(PKA.A.B))) = | > 
      State’:= 1  /\ Y':= new() 
                  /\ SND(xor(exp(G, X'), 
                     H(PKA.A.B)).xor(exp(G, Y'), H(PKB.A.B))) 
 
   17. State = 1   /\  RCV (xor(exp(GY, Z'),M1'). 
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                      xor(exp(GX', Z'), M2')) = |> 
      State’:= 2  /\  SND(xor(exp(GY, Z'), M1)) 
   18. State = 2   /\  RCV (H(A.B.exp(exp(GX',Z'), Y )))= |> 
      State’:= 3  /\  Key':= exp(exp(GX',Z'),Y ) 
                     /\  SND(H(A.B.Key')) 
                     /\  request(B, A, key1, Key) 
                     /\  secret(Key, sec_v_Key, B,A) 
                     /\  witness(B,A,key,Key') 
  end role 
        
       role router_ETR (ETR, MS, TKG,ITR, A,B, : agent, 
                           SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                           H: hash func, 
                          PSK1, PSK2, PSK3, PSK4: symmetric key 
                          PKA, PKB: symmetric key 
                                  G: text  
          
             played_by ETR 
     def= 
 
     local State: nat, 
     N1, N2, N3,N4: text 
     X, Y, Z: text 
             M, M2, ACK: messages 
             UA, UB, PK_ETR, PK_MS: Public key  
             K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ inv(public_key), 
     SK: symmetric  
     EIDPre: messages 
     GY, Key, L: message, 
             init   State := 0 
 
       transition 
 
        1. State   = 0  /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
    State' := 1 
                   /\ Snd(TKG.ETR.{K_ETR}_PSK1  
 
       2. State   = 1  /\ Rcv(Start) =|> 
    State' := 2 
                      /\ Snd(TKG.MS.{PK_MS}_PSK2 
 
       3. State    = 2 /\ Rcv(K_ETR)PSK1) =|> 
    State'  := 3 /\  Snd(ETR.MS.{M,ETR,N1,EIDPre}{PK_MS}, {H(M,ETR,N1,EIDPre)}{K_ETR} 
                     /\  witness(ETR,MS,N1)  
                     /\  secret (PK_MS,K_ETR,{ETR,MS}) 
       13. learn.State = 3 
                             /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
            State' := 4 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N3,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N3.MappRequest)}_PSK3)  
                             /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N3,N4') 
                             /\ secret (PSK3,PSK4,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
       14.knows.State = 4 
                             /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
            State' := 5 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N1.MappReply,N4,H(ETR.N3.MappReply)}_SK)  
                             /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N3,N4') 
                             /\ secret (PSK3,PSK4,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
       15.cont.State = 5 
                             /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
    State' := 6 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N3}_SK 
         
        18. State = 0 /\ RCV (xor(exp(G, X'), 
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               H(PKA.A.B)).xor(exp(G,Y'), H(PKB.A.B)))= |> 
   State’:= 1    /\ Z' := new() 
                      /\ UA':= new() 
                      /\ UB':= new() 
                      /\ GY':= new() 
                      /\ GX':= new() 
                      /\ SND(xor(exp(GY', Z'), 
            H(PkA.A.B.exp(G, X').exp(UA',Z')). 
            exp(G, Z')). 
            xor(exp(GX',Z'), H(PKB.A.B. 
            exp(G, Y').exp(UB', Z')).exp(G, Z')))  
 
       end role 
role router_ITR (ETR, MS, A,B,TKG : agent, 
                       SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
                       H: hash func, 
                      PSK1,PSK2,PSK3,PSK4 : symmetric key 
                      PKA, PKB: symmetric key 
                              G: text  
             played_by ITR 
     def= 
 
     local State: nat, 
     N3,N4: text 
     X, Y, Z :text 
             M,M2,ACK :messages 
             UA, UB, PK_ETR,PK_MS: Public key  
             K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ inv(public_key), 
     SK: symmetric  
     EIDPre: messages 
     GY, Key, L: message, 
             init   State := 0 
 
transition 
 
 6. ask.State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
                     State' := 1 
                          /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N3.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N3.MappRequest)}_PSK3)  
 7. learn.State = 1 
                          /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
         State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N3,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N3.MappRequest)}_PSK4)  
                          /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N3,N4') 
                          /\ secret (PSK3,PSK4,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
 8.knows.State = 2 
                          /\ Rcv(ETR') =|> 
         State' := 3 /\ Snd(ETR.ITR.{ETR.N3.MappReply,N4,H(ETR.N3.MappReply)}_SK) 
                          /\ witness(ITR,ETR,N3,N4') 
                          /\ secret (PSK3,PSK4,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR}) 
  9.State = 3  /\ Rcv(ITR') =|> 
         State' := 4 /\ Snd(ITR.ETR.{N4}_SK 
 
  18.State = 0 /\ RCV (xor(exp(G, X'), 
                  H(PKA.A.B)).xor(exp(G,Y'), H(PKB.A.B)))= |> 
   State’:= 1  /\ Z' := new() 
               /\ UA':= new() 
               /\ UB':= new() 
               /\ GY':= new() 
               /\ GX':= new() 
               /\ SND(xor(exp(GY', Z'), 
            H(PkA.A.B.exp(G, X').exp(UA',Z')). 
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            exp(G, Z')). 
            xor(exp(GX',Z'), H(PKB.A.B. 
            exp(G, Y').exp(UB', Z')).exp(G, Z')))  
 
end role 
role map_server (MS,ETR,ITR: agent, 
                   PSK1,PSK2,PSK3,PSK4 : symmetric key 
                     SND, RCV : channel(dy), 
             H: hash func, 
                   played_by MS 
     def= 
     local State: nat, 
     N1, N2,N3,N4: text 
        M,M2,ACK :messages 
        PK_ETR,PK_MS: Public key  
        K_ETR, K_MS: {text.public_key}_ inv(public_key), 
SK: symmetric  
EIDPre: messages 
        init   State := 0 
    4. State    = 2    /\ Rcv(K_ETR)PSK1) =|> 
 State'  := 3    /\  Snd(ETR.MS.{M,ETR,N1,EIDPre}{PK_MS}, {H(M,ETR,N1,EIDPre)}{K_ETR} 
                      /\ witness(ETR,MS,N1)  
                      /\  secret (PK_MS,K_ETR,{ETR,MS}) 
    5.State    = 3     /\ Rcv(K_MS)PSK2) =|> 
    State'  := 4 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{m2,N1}{PK_ETR},{H(m2,n1)}{K_MS)} 
                      /\ witness(MS,ETR,N1) 
                      /\ secret (PK_ETR,K_MS,{MS,ETR}) 
   10. req1.State = 0  /\ Rcv(start) 
                         =|> 
         State' := 1 
                            /\  Snd(ITR.MS.{ITR.N3.MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N3.MappRequest)}_PSK3)  
   12. State = 1 
                           /\ Rcv(MS') =|> 
          State' := 2 /\ Snd(MS.ETR.{ITR.N3,MappRequest.SK.H(ITR.N3.MappRequest)}_PSK4)  
                           /\ witness(ITR,ETR,MS,N3,N4') 
                           /\ secret (PSK3,PSK4,sec_SK,{ITR,ETR,MS}) 
 
 
       end role 
 
role the_trusted_ticket_granting (TKG,ETR,MS: agent, 
                      PUK_ETR , PUK_MS: Public_Key  
                      PSK1,PSK2: symmetric_key,    
                                  H    : hash_func, 
                        Snd, Rcv  : channel(dy), 
played_by TKG 
def= 
 
local  State         : nat, 
N1 : text 
                  M,M2,ACK, : messages 
                  PVK_ETR, PVK_MS :{text.public_key}_inv(public_key), 
                  EIDPre:messages 
init State := 0 
 
transition 
 
 1. State   = 0  /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1 
                       /\ Snd(TKG.ETR.{PVK_ETR}_PSK1  
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 2. State   = 1  /\ Rcv(Start) =|> 
State' := 2 
                       /\ Snd(TKG.MS.{PVK_MS}_PSK2 
       end role 
 
       role session(ETR,ITR,A,B,MS,TKG: agent, 
                    PK_ETR, PK_MS, K_ETR, K_MS, UA, UB: Public_Key  
                    PSK1, PSK2, PSK3, PSK4, PKA, PKB, SK: symmetric_key, 
   H: hash func, 
                          G: text) 
     def= 
      local SND, RCV : channel (dy 
   composition 
 sensor_a (A, B, ITR, ETR, SND, RCV, H, PKA, G) 
      /\ sensor_b(A,B,ITR,ETR,SND,RCV,H,PKA,PKB,G) 
     /\ router_itr(A,B,ITR,ETR,MS,SND,RCV,H,PSK3,PSK4,SK,PKA,PKB,G) 
     /\ router_etr(A,B,ITR,ETR,MS,TKG,SND,RCV, PK_ETR,PK_MS,K_ETR,K_MS 
H,PSK1,PSK2,PSK3,PSK4,SK,PKA,PKB,G) 
     /\ map_server(MS,ITR,ETR,TKG,PK_ETR,PK_MS,K_ETR,K_MS,PSK1,PSK2,PSk3,PSK4) 
     /\the_trusted_ticket_granting(TKG,ETR,MS,PK_ETR,PK_MS,K_ETR, K_MS,PSK1,PSK2,H) 
 
end role 
 
role environment() 
def= 
const a, b, itr,etr,ms,tkg : agent, 
              h : hash func, 
      key, key1 : protocol_id, 
     pa, pb, psk1,pak2,psk3,psk4,sk,pi :symmetric_key, 
    PK_ETR,PK_MS,K_ETR,K_MS ua, ub, ui :public key, 
              g : text 
 
intruder knowledge = {a, b, itr,etr,ms,tkg, g, h, pi, ua, ub, ui ,pk_etr,pk_ms,k_etr,k_ms, 
h,psk1,psk2,psk3,psk4,m,m2 sk,maprequest, mapreply} 
 composition 
    session(b, a, itr,etr h, pa, pb, ua, ub, g) 
 /\ session(i, b,etr, itr, h, pi, pb, ui, ub, g) 
 /\ session(a, i, itr,etr, h, pa, pi, ua, ui, g) 
 /\ session(etr,i,k_etr,h) 
        /\ session(ms,i,k_ms,h) 
 /\ session(itr,ms,etr, psk3,psk4,sk,h) 
        /\   session(ms,i,psk3,psk4,sk) 
        /\   session(itr,i,sk,h)/\  
        /\  session(etr,i,sk,h) 
end role 
 
goal 
          %securecy_of Map_server, Router_ETR Router_ 
           ITR Sensor_A,Sensor_B on psk1,psk2,psk3,psk4,n1,n2,n3 
  security_of secpsk1, secpsk2,secpsk3,secpsk4,sec-m-Key,sec-v-Key 
          % Router_ETR wakly authenticates Server_MS on _ETR 
            weak_authentication_on _ETR 
  % Router_ITR wakly authenticates Map_Server on  psk3 
  weak_authentication_on _ETR 
  weak_authentication_on psk3 
           % Router_ITR wakly authenticates Router_ETR on Sk 
            weak_ authenticates _on psk3 on sk 
           % Map_server waly authenticates on _MS 
    weak_ authenticates _on_MS 
    %Mutual authentication% 
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   %ROUTER_ETR authenticates Server_MS on n1 
   authentication on_n1 
            % ROUTER_ETR authenticats ROUTER_ITR on n3 
           authentication_on n3 
           % ROUTER_ITR authenticates ROUTER_ETR on n4 
              authentication_on n4 
             sensor_a authenticates aensor_b on sk 
 
    end goal 
